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Many practitioners and scholars consider public participation an essential component of 
the planning process.  Participation provides local knowledge for decision making, 
empowers communities by contributing to social and political capital, and increases the 
credibility of planning decisions by officials.  Many also view public participation as a 
principle of democratic society and an indisputable “good” thing: the public’s 
involvement in the planning process is essentially positive and more participation is often 
assumed to be better.  While much current planning research supports the benefits of 
participation and these participatory ideals, far less has been written on the subject of 
participation in brownfields and the role of community organizations in the brownfields 
planning process.  This research examines the ways in which participation through 
community organizations happens in a planning context  by looking at the conditions that 
are present for  participation to take place.  This research perspective is unique since it 
addresses specific organizational forms of participation, the conditions under which they 
operate most effectively, and the impacts that organizations may have in participation. 
 
1. Statement of Problem 
 
Brownfields are a national problem.   These polluted sites affect human and 
environmental health, depress neighborhood property values and contribute to chronic 
problems often in areas that have experienced years of economic decline.  A majority of 
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these sites are located in communities of color and low-income which have historically 
had less access to the political process and to the decisions that directly affect them.   
 
New brownfield policies and programs provide unprecedented opportunities for cleanup 
and redevelopment and many call for increased participation by community stakeholders.  
Yet as the focus of planners, politicians, and developers has increasingly turned to 
brownfield sites, what these sites turn into and what they should turn into remains 
unclear.  Brownfields represent competing agendas, unequal access to power and 
decision making, neoliberal “professionalization” of public programs, and larger issues of 
gentrification and change to neighborhoods that are often ill-prepared to plan for these 
sites.   
 
Participation, in the eyes of many scholars and practitioners, could provide local 
knowledge, express community needs, empower individuals, and influence policy.  
Participation, generally, is fundamental to citizenship and the democratic process.  Some 
view community organizations as a way to mediate between the difficulties of 
brownfields cleanup and redevelopment and as an effective means of getting the public 
involved (Berry, Portney, Thomson, 1993; Ihrke & Johnson, 2004; McKnight, 1997).  
Despite calls for increased participation in brownfields, however, many factors prevent 
organizations from fulfilling this role: economic conditions, outside capital and control, 






2. Purpose of Study 
 
My research examines whether community organizations are playing a role in 
brownfields cleanup and redevelopment and, if so, what affect this role has on project 
process, outcomes, and neighborhood residents.  This study also looks specifically at 
whether community organizations are encouraging residents to participate in brownfield 
projects.  I also examine the ways which individuals and organizations are able to access 
the decision making process, a process that often is controlled and rationalized by those 
in power.  I make recommendations for programs and policy and for further research. 
 
This research also addresses other questions and debates in the literature.  
Doescommunity participation ever occur without community organization activity? Does 
the presence of a community organization always guarantee involvement of that 
organization?  Can community organizations address the variety of issues involved in 
brownfields cleanup and redevelopment projects given organizations’ often narrowly 
focused agendas (e.g. community development corporations and housing)?  This study 
addresses these and other questions by exploring the role of community organizations in 
the brownfields planning process and the conditions in which organizations play that role, 
using the King County, Washington brownfields program as the focus of study.  
 
Brownfields: 
Cities across the country face the problem of abandoned, contaminated land – often 
known as brownfields – with new federal and state programs aimed at reducing liability 
and enhancing redevelopment opportunities.  Brownfields, according to the federal 
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government, are “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be 
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
contaminant” (EPA, 2006).  Brownfields generally consist of older industrial and 
commercial sites where there is known or perceived pollution in groundwater and soil.  
Contamination (or the perception of contamination) negatively impacts redevelopment of 
these sites mainly due to liability issues and funding availability.  Prior to the enactment 
of federal and state brownfields legislation, owners of brownfield sites were often held in 
the chain of liability even though they did not cause or contribute to the contamination.  
Additionally, because of the unknown nature of the contamination and the cost of 
cleanup, traditional financial lenders were hesitant to provide funding for projects on 
brownfield sites.  Therefore, brownfield sites have remained vacant, unsightly, and 
sometimes harmful to neighboring residents despite, in many cases, a demand for 
developable land.   
 
Brownfields have become an increasingly visible planning issue in recent years for a 
variety of reasons.  Brownfields often represent the last remaining land available for 
development in cities; smart growth advocates see these sites as a viable alternative to 
developing virgin land on the outskirts of cities and and as an option to combat urban 
sprawl and its associated negative effects.   Brownfield sites are often in residential areas 
and areas of high-minority and low-income populations who have traditionally been left 
out of the planning process.  Federal and state brownfield programs are relatively recent 
creations and are still ‘testing the waters’ in terms of program components and 
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effectiveness.  Brownfield programs present ample opportunities for study due to their 
continuing evolution as programs and policies. 
 
3. Background and study framework 
 
Academic research and professional practice encourage public participation in the 
planning process and routinely cite the benefits of collaborations between government, 
developers, and neighborhood residents.  Public participation plays an important role in 
scholarly debates on communicative planning and community organizations and provides 
a relevant framework for this study.  Using a framework based primarily on urban 
planning, social work, and environmental justice, this study examines whether, when, and 
how community organizations are the mediators between state government, developers, 
residents, and other stakeholders.  This study also explores the primary factors 
influencing community participation by individuals.  This research does not exclude 
identification of other roles played by community orgnizations, for example, several 
organizations in this study fulfilled education or advocacy roles in their communities. 
 
Scholars and practitioners call widely for public participation and current developments 
in environmental policy increasingly emphasize public participation.  Participation can 
benefit government agencies, developers, and residents by providing information, 
community opinions, constituency support, political influence, and program and policy 
changes. Public participation is fundamental to the democratic process and promotes 
citizen empowerment, capacity-building, community control, and government 
responsiveness (Berry, Portney, Bablitch, and Mahoney, 1984; Fiorino, 1990; Faber & 
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McCarty, 2001; Laurian, 2004; Elwood, 2004).  Public participation also plays an 
important role in brownfield studies, communicative planning theory and practice (Healy, 
1996; Solitare, 2001; Innes & Booher, 2002; Bartsch, 2003; Innes, 2004). 
Communicative planning ideals appear in recent brownfields literature (Solitare, 2005), 
perhaps not surprisingly, given the importance in the communicative and brownfields 
literature of all stakeholder voices  and the  emphasis on social and environmental justice 
goals.  Many debates exist in the literature and practice concerning spatial and political 
context, stakeholder equity, and project outcomes.  My case studies provide insight into 
the communicative planning debates and use these debates to inform the methods used in 
this study, particularly the interview questions.  Community organizations in these cases 
do not exist or act alone: multiple social, political, and economic forces are at play, 
possibly influencing the process and outcomes of these cases. But if so, how much?  Do 
community organizations truly have an equal place at the stakeholder table or do 
powerful elites dominate? Are the outcomes of these cases the ones that communities and 
their organizations wanted even if they did not happen in a participatory or 
communicative manner?  Do no results still spell success for these groups and is the 
process just as important? Valuing planning processes, as noted in the literature review in 
this study, reflects changes in planning practice in recent decades and a shift to more 
meaningful and deliberative partnerships between residents, government, and developers, 
regardless (to some) of whether projects achieve their intended outcomes. 
 
Scholars and practitioners also maintain an ongoing debate over the strategy, objectivity, 
and composition of community organizations (Beierle & Konisky, 2000; Konisky & 
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Beierle, 2001; Portney, 2005; Swindell, 2000).  Issues of recruitment (how individual 
participants are chosen), composition (the final makeup of the group), and mandate (the 
role each participant assumes within the group) can call the legitimacy of the group and 
its decisions into question (Davies, Blackstock, Rauschmayer, 2005).  And while many 
researchers and practitioners assert that participation by community organizations in 
planning is important, others fear that proposals calling for the inclusion of citizen groups 
can lead to co-optation of those groups by government or business as simply a means of 
“rubberstamping” plans and do not ensure that the interests of the group are truly 
represented (Crowfoot and Wondolleck, 1990).  Some researchers also question whether 
individuals are able to leave private/personal interests behind when participating in a 
community organization and adopt a publicly centered decision-making perspective 
(Davies, Blackstock, Rauschmayer, 2005; Rockloff & Moore, 2006). 
 
Beyond the debates on communicative planning and community organizations, this 
research is relevant to other ongoing changes in planning practice related to community 
organizations: 
• Community organizations have seen a shift in their responsibilities and roles over 
the past few decades.  Primarily, this change has been in response to a shift of 
previously public responsibilities to local areas (Checkoway, 1995, p. 2) but 
possibly the recognition that local organizations can better represent and respond 
to local needs or are the only prospect for areas with little hope of outside help 
(Kretzman & McKnight, 1996; Portney, 2005).  Studies like this one are 
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necessary to inform organizations, and other stakeholders, of their better roles in 
the planning process. 
• Related to the previous point, the scholarly literature has expressed an ongoing 
concern with a shift toward the professionalization or more corporate-like 
organizational models for planning and environmental decision making (Faber & 
McCarthy, 2001; McCann, 2001).  These models are a response to what some 
have seen over recent decades as increased ‘corporate’ planning (Friedmann, 
1973) or, more commonly, a neoliberal policy agenda that emphasizes a smaller 
and more efficient state, and the social, political, and economic benefits of 
unfettered market activity (Elwood, 2004).  These benefits, however, are achieved 
through ‘liberation’ from all forms of state interference, shrinking and/or 
privatization of public services, dismantling welfare programs, and reduction of 
meaningful public participation opportunities (Brenner & Theodore, 2002).  As 
will be shown in the case studies, increased calls for public participation in 
brownfield programs appear at odds with public programs that increasingly 
benefit private interests 
• Environmental response to contaminated sites has changed.  Earlier methods of 
managing environmental risk and contamination oversight -- focusing solely on 
cleanup and relying on positivist rational knowledge – have given way to more 
comprehensive, market-influenced, locally-inflected environmental programs 
(Fiorino, 1990).  Brownfields, however, remain a relatively new issue in planning 
and policy makers and planners continue to search for appropriate roles for 
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stakeholders, new models for the cleanup and redevelopment process, and 
accurate measures of success. 
• Streamlining the participation process -- by such ways as informing policy 
guidelines and program requirements, tapping local assets, and promoting local 
organizational skills – can make participation more effective for governments 
seeking input, knowledge, and validation and for local residents and community 
organizations seeking influence, community building, and preferred outcomes.  
 
This study responds to previous calls for new studies and new methods.  Existing studies 
tend to limit the scope of research by focusing solely on the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) program, often failing to examine non-federal sites, community 
organizations and organizations’ roles in the planning process, and making assumptions 
about participation and the roles that community organizations play (Greenberg and 
Lewis, 2000; Beierle and Konisky, 2000; Solitare, 2001; Lange and McNeil, 2004).  For 
example, rather than assume that organizations and their constituents would want to have 
input on the design and programming of the Olympic Sculpture Park, I gathered data 
showing that organizations in the neighborhood had little interest in doing so (despite not 
having a true avenue for meaningful input anyway) and focused their energies on 
educating their constituencies and supporting the developer.  Also, indicators of 
successful programs and projects remain mostly economic in nature and not indicative of 
social or political costs and benefits.  In my study, for example, Rainier Court, 
Harborview’s Ninth and Jefferson Building, and the Olympic Sculpture Park are all 
considered economic and environmental success stories by the Seattle/King County 
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Brownfields Program yet my research uncovered many residents dissatisfied with certain 
project outcomes and organizations that have lost some trust within the neighborhoods 
they serve. 
 
4. Research Questions 
 
My research identifies the mediating role that community organizations play in 
brownfields cleanup and redevelopment.  I describe the context, politics, processes, and 
outcomes and examine the impact that these items have on community organizations and 
participation.  I based my descriptions, questions, and analyses on existing brownfield 
studies, local observations, community organization debates, and the communicative 
planning literature.  I seek to fill in the gaps in the brownfields literature and inform 
planning practice regarding the role of community organizations. 
 
Four questions direct this study: 
1. How do community organizations involve individuals in brownfield cleanup and 
redevelopment sites in King County, WA?  
2. How does community organization involvement affect the outcomes of these 
brownfield projects? 
3. What role do community organizations play in the brownfields cleanup  and 
redevelopment process in King County, WA?   
4. Under what conditions do community organizations play a role in brownfields 




This study also questions some assumptions and arguments in the literature.  As noted 
earlier, the brownfields literature disregards community organization placement within 
the cleanup and redevelopment process.  Even if mentioned, community organizations 
are often agglomerated with other forms and methods of public participation, masking 
their unique characteristics and contributions to public participation.  Organizations, if 
present in a neighborhood, are either assumed to be interested and involved in 
brownfields decisions (Greenberg and Lewis, 2000) or denied and oppressed by powerful 
elites (Brachman, 2004; Hanks and Morrison, 2003; Laurian, 2004).  Brownfields 
practice makes many of these same assumptions (Solitare, 2005).  The cases chosen for 
this study challenge these assumptions and fill in this gap in the literature by showing the 
variety and depth of community organization involvement, influence, collaboration, and 
limitations present in brownfield cleanup and redevelopment projects.  For example, 
despite a wealthier and more educated residential population, the Belltown community 
organizations influenced the overall decisions at the Olympic Sculpture Park to a lesser 
extent than their counterparts involved in the Rainier Court project in the poorer Rainier 
Valley neighborhood.  Belltown organizations, however, exerted considerable leverage 
on specific aspects of the Park project and in many other redevelopment projects in the 
neighborhood. 
 
5.  Procedures 
 
Characteristics of Qualitative Research: 
 
I apply multiple qualitative research methods in this study.  My research attempts to 
describe and explore phenomena in a specific setting and to understand how people are 
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interacting and understanding this setting.  Qualitative research methods allow me to 
conduct in-depth studies, discuss issues of process, relationships, and meaning, and 
identify complex dynamics that are at play in each planning situation.  Qualitative 
research “is a systematic, empirical strategy for answering questions about people in a 
particular social context” (Locke, Spirduso, Silverman 2000, p. 96).  Qualitative research 
is appropriate for this study due to the natural setting in which the cases are studied, the 
use of multiple sources of data, and the holistic perspective that is necessary to 
understand the broad, panoramic viewpoints and multiple levels of context (Creswell, 
1998: Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Patton, 1990). 
 
 
Qualitative Research Strategy – Case Study: 
 
This research examines community organizations and public participation using case 
studies in King County, Washington.  King County’s brownfields program provides an 
appropriate setting for case study research.  City and regional planning research, such as 
studies of plans, neighborhoods, or public agencies, including organizational processes, 
often employ case study research methods (Yin, 1984).  Researchers prefer the case study 
when examining contemporary events but when the relevant behaviors cannot be 
manipulated (as opposed to an experiment) (Yin, 1984).  Case studies are bounded by 
time and activity, and the researcher collects detailed information using a variety of data 
collection procedures over a sustained period of time (Stake, 1995, p.15).  Yet the case 
study strategy implies much more than simply studying the phenomenon in the field: 
studying a case involves exploring the relation to the complex dynamics to which the 
case intersects (Groat and Wang, 2002. p.347).  Case studies expand and generalize 
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theories (analytic generalization) rather than enumerate frequencies (statistical 
generalization) (Yin, 1984). 
 
King County, a mix of urban, suburban, and rural land uses with a population of over 1.7 
million, is clearly linked to a multitude of contextual factors and theoretical issues.  The 
area (which includes the city of Seattle) experiences continuing population and economic 
growth, an increasing demand for land in a state with a Growth Management Act, and a 
growing need for affordable housing.  The area also counts an increasing number of 
millionaires and growing local philanthropy, much of this based upon the large, local 
technology industry.  Related to this, the Seattle region maintains one of the most 
technology-savvy and internet-connected populations in the country.  Together, these 
factors give the local population greater access to local officials, information, and each 
other amidst a rapidly changing physical, social, and economic landscape, a landscape 
that is also changing in many other American regions. 
 
Rationale for Cases: 
I chose my cases based upon evidence of completion and participation and to maintain 
consistency with other brownfield studies.  At my request, Lucy Auster, the director of 
the King County brownfields program, compiled a list of all brownfields projects in the 
county that had received assistance from the county’s program.  She listed 25 projects, 16 
of which were completed or nearing completion: the other projects were either just 
starting up or had come to a halt.  Ms. Auster later refined this listing and provided me 
with contact information, addresses, and brief notes of assistance provided by her office, 
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the Environmental Coalition of South Seattle (ECOSS, the County’s contractor for 
brownfields technical assistance), and EPA for the 16 completed projects.  I applied 
criteria for selecting my cases: first, the project had to be completed or nearing 
completion; second, the project had to have evidence of some public participation and 
community organization involvement; and, third, a range of participation across the cases 
had to be present.  This left out a majority of the 16 projects.  Many projects used county 
brownfields funding to simply conduct soil and groundwater assessment for future 
marketing and site transfer and did not require public participation.  Some projects, 
usually small sites that were being redeveloped into local businesses (for example, a 
restaurant and a bakery), did not require public participation.  One project was a study of 
contamination studies for an area of unincorporated King County.  I selected three cases 
that fit all of my selection criteria (see Figure 1 for locations): 
 
Three Case Studies: 
Rainier Court is a former vehicle storage lot (and site of much illegal dumping) 
redeveloped into affordable housing and commercial space.  Southeast Effective 
Development (SEED) community development corporation, a long-standing and 
respected organization, owns the site in a low-income, high-minority and, until recently, 
low-demand area of Seattle.  SEED involved community residents according to the 
requirements of the Brownfields Redevelopment Loan Fund (BRLF) but also has a 
history of communication and trust with neighborhood residents.  The organization’s 
vision, site control, longevity, and strong political connections strongly affected the 
outcome of this project.  SEED officials see themselves as playing an advocacy role for 
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community residents in local brownfields projects; my research identifies other roles for 
the organization as well. 
  
Harborview Medical Center, a quasi-public entity, cleaned up a former dry cleaning 
site for the location of a new clinic and office tower in the heart of a residential 
neighborhood with a history of large, adjacent, institutional uses.  Harborview’s 
redevelopment of the site is consistent with a master plan for the area.  Community 
organizations in the neighborhood conducted minimal outreach to residents on this 
project despite being active and powerful stakeholders in other neighborhood planning 
projects: individuals appear to have participated of their own accord primarily through 
the outreach efforts of the medical center.  The community organizations in the 
neighborhood did not greatly affect the outcome of this project, specifically, but 
significantly impacted the creation of the Major Institutions Master Plan, which guided 
the brownfields redevelopment.  
 
The Olympic Sculpture Park is a Seattle Art Museum (SAM) project on contaminated 
industrial land near downtown Seattle and a burgeoning high-end residential district.  
Private donors provided a majority of the funding for this very high-profile project.  
SAM, government, and community leaders agreed almost unanimously on the park’s 
location, cleanup, programming, and benefit to the city.  Neighborhood residents 
appreciate the park’s positive aesthetic and financial impact on their area despite having 
essentially no input into the design or programming of the space.  Community 
organizations and community residents did not feel a great need to participate in this 
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project because it had no apparent downsides, a large amount of official promotion, and 
private funding.  Unlike the other two cases, the project impact area of the Olympic 
Sculpture Park spans a very large area and called upon expertise, opinions and donations 
from across the city and region. 
 




All three sites are located in the city of Seattle and are the beneficiaries of funding and 
technical assistance from the county program.  These sites represent contrasting situations 
where, at times, community organizations appear to be integral to the planning process 
and resident involvement and other times where they do not.  These cases share many of 
the same economic, political, and social conditions, similar county program assistance, 
similar physical characteristics, and some of the same stakeholders, therefore making 











According to Stake (1994), cases should be selected for their learning potential, 
representative nature, and variety.  My cases worked well in this respect.  Learning 
potential deals with issues of logistics, receptiveness of the research and researcher, and 
the resources available.  All but one of the interviewees agreed to meet with me (the 
interviewee who initially declined later agreed to meet) and appeared quite frank in terms 
of planning processes, successes, and mistakes.  Logistically, ample documentation of 
these projects existed due to the reporting requirements of the agencies involved and 
local publicity.  As for variety, these cases presented contrasting community organization 
involvement in cleanup and redevelopment decisions.  These cases represented a 
spectrum of involvement, from essentially no input for the Olympic Sculpture Park to 
substantial input for Rainier Court.  The cases identify various levels of organization 
support for the developers of each; including formal input channels for Harborview along 
with informal methods for input and outreach.Each case offered insight into the roles that 
community organizations play in practice, identified the conditions under which they 
operate, and informed the debates in the scholarly literature. 
 
Data Categories: 
I created the following data categories based on the assumptions of community 
organizations noted earlier in the chapter, local observations, communicative planning 
literature, and previous research on both brownfields and community organizations which 




1. Participation mission and methods: many organizations and some programs have 
a stated mission to involve individuals in the planning process (Bartsch and 
Dorfman, 2000).  The First Hill Community Council, for example, stated that part 
of the organization’s mission is to involve individuals in neighborhood projects, 
such as Harborview’s Ninth and Jefferson Building.  Others, such as developers 
and government agencies, employ informal methods of public participation 
identified through interviews as well as documentation.  SEED, the Rainier Court 
developer, stated that it plays a “catalyst” role in its mission statement and an 
“advocacy” role in interviews, yet makes no specific statement for individual 
involvement.  The group, however, provided many opportunities for individual 
input on Rainier Court.  Other groups often mentioned that they canvassed the 
neighborhood for opinions and outreach through casual face-to-face contact on 
the street.  
2. Previous relationships: communicative planning advocates point to the 
importance of second and third-tier effects of collaboration (Innes and Booher, 
1999), such as spin-off partnerships, new ideas for use in other situations, and 
new institutional forms of planning, where understandings have been built over 
time and players have been mobilized (Innes, 2004).  The cases in this study show 
several examples of prior working relationships, both good and bad, between 
government, community organizations, and developers that affected the current 
brownfield projects. 
3. Ownership:  site ownership is not mentioned as a factor in the brownfield studies 
reviewed, yet initial interviews identified at least one government official and one 
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community organization leader  who observed that many brownfield projects may 
be nothing more than private property transactions and not necessarily ripe for 
public participation.  Another community organization leader, however, claimed 
that ownership of the site was a key component to public participation.  
4. Stakeholder equity and power influences: Communicative planning scholars and 
practitioners claim that truly collaborative planning will not be dominated by 
elites (Innes & Booher, 2002; Innes, 2004; Healy, 1996).  Others insist that this 
perspective willfully ignores the power and context of political, economic, and 
social realities (Fainstein, 2000; Huxley and Yiftachel, 2000; Webler & Tuler, 
2000). My cases highlight the decisions and non-decisions made in the planning 
process and how these decisions were the results of power, the rationalization of 
decisions and knowledge, and the ‘mobilization of bias’ (Bachrach & Baratz, 
1963; Flyvbjerg, 2002; Coaffee & Healy, 2003)  The cases show that power 
imbalances prevented community organizations from effectively conveying 
residents’ concerns for the site redevelopment and influencing project outcomes. 
The Olympic Sculpture Park case, in particular, exhibited very similar power 
relations and maneuvering seen during the failed Seattle Commons project, a 
precursor to the Sculpture Park (Iglitzen, 1995). 
5. Size of the project site, spatial context, and the scope of the planning area:  Size, 
context, and scope are a point of contention in the communicative planning 
debates (Fainstein, 2000).  For example, NIMBYism (not in my backyard) in 
socially homogeneous areas and loss of local knowledge in metropolitan-wide 
planning efforts can occur despite the best of communicative planning intentions.  
20 
 
Brownfields research also often fails to distinguish between projects of varying 
scales (Yount and Meyer, 1999) and spatial contexts.  One community 
organization in this research, noting the spatial context of their site, stated that 
their influence was possibly more powerful because few others (developers and 
government officials) were interested in the site.  Another organization leader 
stated the importance of the developer’s function (the developer is a hospital) and 
the large geographic area it serves possibly influences how she interacts with 
development plans. 
6. Redevelopment and expertise: Does the type of redevelopment affect the 
importance of a community organizations’ involvement in brownfield projects?  
Vidal (1992) states that CDCs with clearly defined strategies and experience in 
specific program areas (most often housing) greatly influence the organizations’ 
accomplishments in planning projects.  Other organizations in this research, 
however, feel that they can, should, and do comment on a wide variety of projects 
despite not having professional staff members with direct experience in residential 
or commercial development.  
7. Existing plans: Interviews and documentation research identify existing master 
plans for some areas containing brownfield projects.  Do these pre-existing plans 
influence participation?  Is this another second-tier effect from previous 
collaborations between community organizations, government officials, and 
developers?  One interviewee noted that an existing plan for the area leaves little 
ambiguity for redevelopment and may, in fact, deter participation by both 




I initially suspected that participation either occurs or does not occur (and with clear 





If a… Enters a brownfield 
project with these 
conditions… 























Greater effect on 
brownfield project 
outcomes 
   
















Less or no 
participation by 
individuals 
Lesser or no effect 
on brownfield 
project outcomes 
Table 1.1: Factors that may influence public participation in this study 
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However, I also expected that the cases would show great nuance in each category and 
would likely reflect the interrelated and interconnected nature of planning processes and 
characteristics such as political context, social and economic conditions, and past 
relationships.  Yet I used these characteristics and my initial assumptions to construct the 
interview questions and data collection procedures.   
 
 
Data Collection Procedures: 
 
This research employs multiple sources of evidence.  According to Creswell (2003), 
qualitative research uses multiple methods of data collection that are interactive and 
humanistic (p. 181).  Although qualitative data collection methods are traditionally based 
on open-ended observations, interviews, and documents, new materials such as emails 
and images are increasingly used.  I collected evidence from initial interviews with 
officials; site identification and clarification; documentation and secondary data 
collection; and follow-up interviews with officials, organization leaders, residents, and 




I compiled documentation from a number of  sources.  I gathered site data, including size 
and the nature of the contamination.  I looked at project timelines, costs, and ownership.  
I reviewed meetings, attendance, correspondence, and land use.  For each site I 
studiedplanned reuse, stage of cleanup and redevelopment.  My sources included the 
Environmental Coalition of South Seattle; the County’s brownfields planner; municipal 
planning agencies; site developers; local organizations; the EPA Region 10 brownfields 
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coordinator; and the state’s Office of Community, Trade, and Economic Development, 
which administers the Brownfields Revolving Loan Fund.  Newspaper and other media 
articles and programs provided significant insight into participation issues, neighborhood 






My extensive interviews with stakeholders in the county’s brownfields projects identified 
participation efforts, motivations, methods, politics, and effects for each site using the 
categories above as well as new factors that were identified through interview 
participants.  Information continued to be gathered through interviews with Ms. Auster of 
the county’s brownfields program and Mr. Bayley from ECOSS.  I met with the 
brownfields administrator of the Washington State Department of Community Trade and 
Economic Development, the agency which applied for and received the federal funding 
to start the state’s brownfields program (including the Seattle/King County program).  I 
also met with community organization leaders, rank-and-file members, community 
residents who were not member of a local organization, project managers, local 
municipal officials (including the Department of Planning and Development, Department 
of Neighborhoods, Office of Economic Development, Office of Housing, and City 
Council staff), environmental regulators, project proponents, and other stakeholders as 




I interviewed 36 people for this study using a reputational method that identified the 
stakeholders in the projects starting with Ms. Auster at the Seattle/King County 
brownfields program.  I gathered additional stakeholder names from these initial 
interviews and proceeded to interview them.  I continued this process until there were no 
other stakeholders identified.  I was also able to identify stakeholders from project 
documentation and media stories.  Several interviewees were also identified through 
chance encounters at the project sites.  These methods allowed me to identify 
stakeholders that I would otherwise likely have missed and also to triangulate those that I 
had identified: the same name mentioned in multiple interviews indicated that a person 
was indeed a likely stakeholder in the project.  However, these methods do not guarantee 
representation and may not have identified individuals left out of the planning process for 
these sites.  Despite residents’ input for this study, I risked including only those who were 
already a part of the local elite decision making bodies.  Other residents, perhaps those 
with divergent opinions from the status quo or with little access to decision making 
bodies, may still not be heard: identifying those individuals would make for a stronger 
and more complete study.  Additionally, the economic development potential of a site, 
particularly in lower-income neighborhoods, may mute public concern about cleanup or 
environmental risk (Wernstedt and Hersh, 1998).  With more time and resources, 
additional methods, such as surveys, could produce these hidden individuals. 
 
Preliminary discussions with officials led me to believe that many, but not all, 
participants in brownfields projects in this study would be cooperative and forthright.  
Almost all interviewees gave generously of their time to answer my interview questions.  
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Interviews were conducted in person to obtain in-depth understanding of stakeholders’ 
experiences with the planning process and participation at each site.  Meeting sessions 
varied in length and lasted from 30 minutes to 120 minutes.   
 
I employed an open question format and outline script for all of the interviews, approved 
by the Institutional Review Board at the University of Michigan.  I covered the data 
categories discussed above with all interviewees although some respondents could not 
answer all questions (e.g. some residents who were non-members of a local organization 
could not tell me whether an organization had previous working relationships with 
government agencies or developers).  I asked interviewees questions such as, did 
ownership of the site matter to the project?  Were all stakeholders treated equally?  How 
did community organizations affect residents’ involvement in this project?  Did the size 
and/or location of this project affect stakeholders and participation?  Did public 
participation affect the outcome of the project?  I also discovered early in the interview 
process that interviewees were expressing a difference between ‘cleanup’ and 
‘redevelopment’ in the projects.  I incorporated this distinction into the questioning as 
well as a general question about the interviewee’s satisfaction with the project, which 
often drew out more personal opinions on the issues that I uncovered. The interview 




Data Analysis Procedures: 
 
I conducted within-case and cross-case analysis of the data.  I framed the within-case 
analyses in each case study chapter by the debates in the literature discussed above but 
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also to reflect the key issues of each case, including specific events, key decisions, 
outcomes and stakeholder roles.  Chapter 7 includes the cross-case analysis and answers 
the research questions guiding the study by identifying the common themes and 
characteristics of community organizations in the planning process. 
 
The findings from the data sources provide answers to the questions guiding this study.  I 
answer Question 1 by identifying the mission statements, stated outreach methods, and 
informal procedures through document review, and personal interviews with organization 
leaders, members, and non-members.  Question 2 utilizes document review (notably 
media coverage) and interview data.  Interviews regarding community organization 
leaders’ goals for a project along with interviews with other stakeholders, particularly 
questions from the communicative planning literature on stakeholder equity and power 
influences, determine whether an organization was important to the actual project 
outcome.  Question 3 identifies any mediating role of community organizations through 
stakeholder interviews and document review questions based upon the community 
organization and communicative planning debates and the brownfields literature.  The 
interview data categories listed earlier provide the basis for answering Question 4 and 
identifying the conditions under which a community organization did or did not play an 
important role in brownfields cleanup and redevelopment.  The cases chosen for this 
study represent a range of community organization involvement, expertise, and influence 
as well asother non-organization participants and participation methods.  This range 
showcases the myriad factors present when community organization involvement is 




Strategies for Validating Findings: 
 
According to Creswell (2003), validating the findings of qualitative research adds 
credibility and accuracy to the work.  “Validity…is seen as a strength of qualitative 
research, but it is used to suggest determining whether the findings are accurate from the 
standpoint of the researcher, the participant, or the reader of an account” (p.195).  He also 
offers eight primary strategies to check the accuracy of research findings and suggests 
that the researcher chose one or more (p. 196).  For my study, I will primarily use rich, 
thick descriptions to “transport the readers to the setting and give the discussion an 
element of shared experiences” (p. 196).  
 
Role of the Researcher: 
I believe that participant trust in me as a researcher was a factor in determining access to 
interviewees and data as well as whether the responses that I gathered from these sources 
were truthful.  As a researcher, I attempted to minimize perceived bias by emphasizing 
my university affiliation and my lack of affiliation with government, community groups, 
developers, lenders, or other stakeholders.  I also emphasized that I am not a nearby 
resident of any brownfield site and therefore not personally affected by the results of this 
study. Although I have tried to be value free and objective at every step of the way, and 
because of my structural position as a white middle class male, certain value beliefs and 
conjectures may have unconsciously entered the research process.  I know that it is 





Through the variety of data sources discussed above, and the questions posed, I believe 
my findings provide a rich and detailed picture of community organizations and public 
participation at brownfield sites in King County and answer the research questions 







Academic research and professional practice encourage public participation in 
brownfields cleanup and redevelopment and other planning processes and routinely cite 
the benefits of collaborations between government, developers, and neighborhood 
residents.  In particular, many scholars claim that community organizations play a 
mediating role between individuals and government and encourage public participation.  
However, community organizations face a multitude of contradictions when entering into 
brownfields projects that may hinder their ability to play a traditional mediating role. 
These organizations may play a modified role that contributes to a project but may not 
encourage participation.  As shown in this study, brownfield programs, policies, and 
studies often advocate for increased participation by all stakeholders but, in reality, the 
pressures of economic development, outside capital, and political maneuvering may 
lessen the role and need for individual and group input.  The literature review frames the 
conundrum that community organizations face when attempting to encourage public 
participation in brownfield projects and, in particular, focuses on the debates within 
several key areas. 
 
In this review, 1) I look at the negative impact and new tools for dealing with brownfields 
and how the brownfields literature emphasizes the importance of participation in the 
cleanup and redevelopment of these distinctive parcels.  2) I continue this argument to 
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address how participation in planning, generally, is often regarded as an important 
normative venture despite many disagreements over such things as definitions, methods, 
representation, and costs.  3) Following this, I look at how one aspect of participation – 
community organizations – is identified as having the potential to promote participatory 
democracy, advocate for individuals, and impact project outcomes.  This potential exists 
notwithstanding critics who claim that organizations are subject to manipulation, personal 
interests, and financial pressures.  Part of this section looks at Community Development 
Corporations – a key stakeholder in the Rainier Court case study – and their characteristic 
features that make these organizations sometimes suited for encouraging public 
participation despite economic and political challenges.   4) The communicative planning 
literature, which follows, agrees with much of these benefits but critics also agree with 
the detractors and point out the realities of context, power, and space. 
 
The following literature review, while not exhaustive, provides a framework for 
examining whether community organizations play a mediating role; whether community 
organizations actually promote individual involvement; whether community organization 
involvement makes a difference to project outcomes (and if they had an equal role with 
other stakeholders); and what kind of public involvement community organizations 
promote. 
 
Brownfields – Problems, Opportunities, and Public Participation: 
Brownfields are the unfortunate legacy of our industrial past but new federal and state 
programs are creating opportunities for cleanup, redevelopment, environmental justice, 
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and smart growth.  Brownfields, according to the federal government, are “real property, 
the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or 
potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant” (EPA, 2006).  In 
laymen’s terms, brownfields are generally older industrial or commercial sites – factories, 
dry cleaners, gas stations – where there is known or perceived pollution in groundwater 
and soil.  The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that there are more 
than 450,000 brownfield sites across the country (EPA, 2007) although quantification is 
difficult without actual site inspection and testing: deterioration and contamination 
problems that often plague vacant industrial and commercial sites are virtually impossible 
to quantify beyond the community level (Collaton and Bartch, 1996). 
 
Brownfields negatively impact the communities in which they are located.  Brownfields, 
by their very nature, are potentially hazardous to human health and the environment: 
Love Canal may be the most extreme example of this hazard.  Contaminated sites of 
lesser scale, and the focus of the EPA and state brownfields programs (the most serious 
contaminated sites are handled under the EPA Superfund Program), impact the health of 
many community residents (Greenberg, Lowrie, Mayer, Miller, & Solitare, 2001).  Air 
quality and drinking water quality, for instance, may be affected.  Contamination (or the 
perception of contamination) has also traditionally impacted the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites due to liability issues and funding availability (GAO, 2005).  Prior to the 
enactment of federal and state brownfields legislation, owners of brownfield sites were 
often held in the chain of liability even though they did not cause or contribute to the 
contamination.  Additionally, traditional financial lenders were hesitant to provide 
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funding for projects on brownfield sites because of the unknown nature of the 
contamination and the cost of cleanup.  Therefore, brownfield sites have remained 
vacant, unsightly, and sometimes harmful to neighboring residents despite, in many 
cases, a demand for developable land.  Many developers choose “greenfield” sites for 
their projects because of these liability fears and additional project cleanup costs 
(Committee on Government Reform, 2006). 
 
A consistent and long-term lack of redevelopment and reinvestment in brownfield sites 
due to fear of liability and lack of funding contributes to a devastating effect on 
neighborhoods.  “The abandonment of properties and exodus of higher earning families 
from many of our older cities are reducing property tax revenues that support many 
school systems and critical municipal services” (Greenberg et al, 2001).  Brownfields 
abandonment has coincided with economic and infrastructure policies that have 
encouraged regional shifts in manufacturing and development of suburban land resulting 
in a continuous cycle of depressed property values and public health concerns in inner 
cities (Wong and Owens-Viani, 2000; DeSousa, 2006). 
 
These negative brownfields factors affect high-minority and low-income communities 
more so than the general population.  Higher minority populations are disproportionately 
burdened by environmental hazards, partly due to residential proximity to hazardous 
waste dumps (UCC, 1987, USEPA, 1992).  Brownfield properties are no exception: 
although located in thousands of neighborhoods across the country, brownfields are 
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mostly in poor communities of color (Greenberg et al, 1998; Ross & Green Leigh, 2000; 
Freeland, 2004) 
 
New Opportunities and Pitfalls: 
New federal and state programs provide unprecedented opportunities for communities to 
cleanup and redevelop brownfields, however, pitfalls on the road to revitalization exist.  
Interest in brownfields cleanup and redevelopment has exploded in recent years and 
brownfields programs have arguably become the linchpins of current efforts to devise 
more effective waste cleanup programs (Wernstedt & Hersh, 1998).  As evidenced by the 
federal definition and accompanying federal and state programs, brownfields have 
become an increasingly visible planning issue for a variety of reasons.  Brownfields 
revitalization addresses inner city economic concerns, environmental justice issues, 
human and environmental health concerns, community revitalization efforts, and smart 
growth techniques (DeSousa, 2006).    
 
Most brownfield programs maintain that regulatory flexibility is necessary to remediate 
contaminated properties, bring them back into productive use, and address many other 
social and economic issues (Wernstedt & Hersh, 1998; McCarthy, 2002).  Developers are 
increasingly attracted to brownfield sites due in part to these new liability protections and 
funding mechanisms (Alberini, Longo, Tonin, Trombetta & Turvani, 2004). In turn, new 
development can bring much-needed property tax revenue, jobs and overall economic 
revitalization to urban neighborhoods (Ross & Green Leigh, 2000; Wong & Owens-
Viani, 2000).  Along with economic growth, brownfield redevelopment clearly addresses 
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immediate and potential environmental risks to human health and the environment, 
particularly in neighborhoods with already increased health issues (Ringquist, 2003).  
Communities that clean and redevelop brownfields sites also, intentionally or not, 
contribute to “smart growth”.  Smart growth is defined asdevelopment that revitalizes 
neighborhoods, protects working lands and open space, keeps housing affordable, 
provides more transportation choices, and complements recent proliferation of growth 
management and planning legislation (Wolfe & Delecki, 2005; EPA, 2006, DeSousa, 
2006).  Brownfields often represent the last remaining land available for development in 
cities; smart growth advocates see these sites as a viable, sustainable alternative to 
developing virgin land on the outskirts of cities.  Smart growth combats urban sprawl and 
its associated negative effects, including climate change. 
 
Brownfields revitalization can also lead to unintended consequences, including 
gentrification, unwanted new land uses, and lack of benefits for residents (CPEO, 2005: 
Rast, 2006).  As will be shown in the case studies, community residents sometimes fear 
the effects of brownfields revitalization, from increased traffic congestion to 
neighborhood gentrification.  Brownfields redevelopment can either have a galvanizing 
effect on a community or be divisive due to conflicting visions and lack of stakeholder 
involvement (Bartsch, 2003).  And despite official proclamations of economic benefits to 
residents (EPA, 2005), bankers and developers are often the direct beneficiaries of 





Participation in brownfields: 
Brownfields programs and literature often tout the importance of public participation in 
the planning process to address issues such as gentrification and incompatible uses, yet 
evidence points to conflicting methods, rationales, and levels of involvement.  Officially, 
government programs promote public involvement throughout the brownfields cleanup 
and redevelopment process (EPA 2005) but participation policy is often no more than a 
set of recommended procedures and methods that, in practice, are not necessarily 
influential, legally enforceable or meaningful (Arnstein, 1969; Laurian, 2004; CPEO, 
2005; Solitare, 2005).   
 
For many reasons, stakeholder participation is more important to brownfields 
redevelopment projects than to a typical greenfield real estate transaction (Bartsch, 2003) 
but “the specific role of the public in brownfields redevelopment is unclear” (Greenberg 
and Lewis, 2000).  Brownfield sites are often in residential areas and areas of high-
minority and low-income populations who have traditionally been left out of the planning 
process.  These complicated sites represent the loss of economic vitality to a region but at 
the same time offer   the potential for numerous competing visions of new development 
and growth (Bartsch, 2003).  Relatively recent federal and state brownfield programs 
continue to test the waters in terms of program components and their effectiveness to deal 
with these distinctive sites.  Many state and local brownfield programs contain few or no 
provisions for public participation so program administrators are left to determine how, 




Public participation, therefore, should play an important role in brownfields cleanup and 
redevelopment due to the distinctive characteristics of these sites.  However, as noted 
above, the complicated and negative nature of brownfields can  create both unified 
visions and divisive consequences.  In the next section, I show how similar debates exist 
in many aspects of planning and that while public participation is considered a positive, 




Public participation is not only a brownfields issue: planning research and practice often 
advocates for increased public participation in planning decisions yet continues to 
struggle with participation methods, effectiveness, and meaning.  Scholars and 
practitioners call widely for public participation in planning and current developments in 
environmental policy are increasingly emphasizing public participation.  By involving the 
public, these scholars and practitioners argue, benefits will incur unto the community, 
government, and developers.  Despite these benefits, however, public participation 
continues to be an evolving subject.  While public involvement in planning projects is 
often considered “good,” debate continues about its very definition, the appropriate or 
best methods, the benefits and costs, and the extent of participation (Day, 1997; Chess, 
2000).  
 
These participation debates parallel changes in planning decision making over the past 
half-century.  Public participation in many planning decisions has evolved from technical 
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rationalization to grassroots power to meaningful involvement (Ross & Green Leigh, 
2000).  Much current thought on participation focuses on the planning process, meaning, 
diversity, and collaboration.  Today, planners and other government officials increasingly 
accept that there are other ways of knowing, many based in non-positivist social science.  
This knowledge can emanate from the community: local communities possess grounded, 
experiential, intuitive, and contextual knowledge which is more often manifested in 
stories, songs, visual images, and speech (Sandercock 1998).  Schneekcloth and Shibley 
remind planners that the “endless meetings” of the planning process are indeed an 
outcome – one of learning, deliberation, memory, values, respect, hope, and a host of 
other transformations (Forester, 1999).  Albrechts notes the change in approach to public 
involvement in which there is “learning from action not only what works but also what 
matters.”  Participation issues, according to the academic and practice respondents of 
Albrechts’ survey, “must be defined in a way that is meaningful for the groups concerned 
in their language and according to their perceptions of these problems and challenges.”  
 
To make participation meaningful, many scholars now advocate involvement in which 
citizens can actively take part in decision making, participate freely and equally, and 
engage in dialogue with other stakeholders (Burby, 2003; Solitare, 2005).  This approach 
distances itself from earlier Arnstein-style perspectives of overthrowing existing power 
structures (Arnstein, 1969).  Arnstein, it should be noted, remains highly influential in 
participation discussions.  Despite the urban renewal and weak participation context of 
the time in which she wrote, her ‘ladder of citizen participation’ continues to provide a 
yardstick by which many planning and environmental studies measure participation 
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quality.  Her ladder ranges from non-participation (‘manipulation’ and ‘therapy’) to 
tokenism (‘informing,’ ‘consultation,’ and ‘placation’) to citizen power (‘partnering,’ 
‘delegated power,’ and ‘citizen control’).  To Arnstein, citizen participation is a 
categorical term for citizen power (p. 216), and while some of her economic 
determinations are not necessarily relevant to this study (e.g. benefits like contracts and 
patronage), her inclusion of the ‘have-nots’ in information sharing, goal and policy 
setting, and tax allocation remains a strong principle among many who advocate for 
increased meaningful participation in planning processes and brownfields redevelopment, 
no matter what ‘rung’ they fall on.  As will be shown, some cases in this study exhibited 
what would have been called ‘non-participation’ or ‘tokenism’ in Arnstein’s time yet the 
interviewees often clearly felt satisfied with this level of inclusion.  Whether or not a case 
falls into the category of ‘citizen power’ may mean less than the level of citizen 
satisfaction with information sharing, goal setting and resource allocation. 
 
Despite increasing acceptance and advocacy, public participation in planning may not 
always occur.  Meaningful public participation that involves true partnerships between 
public agencies and local communities is difficult to achieve despite government-
mandated community involvement (McCarthy, 2002).   Some see technocrats as a 
benefit: Scientists and other ‘experts’ make many planning and environmental decisions 
based upon positivist scientific methods and some proponents view decisions in the 
environmental arena as a matter of professional expertise with no need for large-scale 
public involvement (Portney, 2005).  Some scholars have noted the efficiency of top-
down decisions and, at times, the public’s acceptance of, and possibly preference for, an 
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agency decision maker (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004).  As long as agencies are flexible and 
responsive, even tightly managed and strictly advisory processes can be successful 
(Beierle and Konisky, 2000) 
 
Politically, government officials may not be willing to give up power to the public.  
Individuals continue to demand greater involvement in planning processes, but planning 
establishments continue to ‘defend’ themselves (Alfasi 2003) and planning projects are 
often the site of political struggle (McCann, 2001).  Flyvbjerg’s (1998) account of 
planning in Aalborg, Denmark painted a stark picture of those in power rationalizing 
decisions and passing them off as reality.  He notes that those in power define what 
counts as rationality and knowledge and, therefore, reality (1998).  Those in power have 
often used planners and the planning process to justify and legitimize their agendas 
(Booher & Innes, 2002) and influence who participates in the planning process (Lowry, 
Adler & Milner, 1997).   
 
Power, however, can also be broken down into more nuanced factors.  Power, influence, 
and authority all exist in relational terms; that is, one cannot have power in a vacuum, but 
only in relation to someone else (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963),  The differences lie in 
whether the subject complies because of fear of deprivations (power), esteem for ‘higher’ 
values (influence), or recognition that the command is reasonable in terms of his/her own 
values (authority) (Bachrach & Baratz, 1963).  These factors can play out in various 
levels of interactions but, for the purposes of this study, many tend to see a concentration 
of power in governance, both process and culture (Yiftachel, 1998; Coaffee & Healy, 
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2003; Elwood, 2004).  Some have noted that the ‘mobilization of bias’ – organized 
institutional practices of those with power – rationalizes ‘knowledge’ of an issue, 
neutralizes threats to the power structure, and creates a situation of ‘non-decision’ 
making which prevents an issue from even becoming a question for decision (Bachrach 
& Baratz, 1963; Flyvbjerg, 2002; Coafee & Healy, 2003).  Planning is inextricably tied to 
governance and these power relations (Peiser, 1990; Yiftachel, 1998; Huxley, 2000).  For 
example, the Harborview case study in this research clearly had a very limited 
participation process that was tightly controlled by those in power at the Department of 
Neighborhoods and Harborview Medical Center, thus limiting the players and issues 
which would even be discussed..  Similarly, some saw the mayor’s stronger leadership 
style and pro-development agenda fortified by his dismantling of certain procedures that 
empowered neighborhood planning. In the Rainier Court case, the mayor’s agenda for a 
denser city ran up against a neighborhood that did not necessarily want density: a respect 
for influence and authority (for SEED and city officials), along with a rationalization of 
the need for higher density in the city, contributed to the relative lack of conflict in the 
case.  Sandercock (1998) argues that old styles of planning are concerned about making 
public decisions more rational, focusing on advanced decision-making, on developing 
blueprints for the future, and on an instrumental rationality that considers and evaluates 
options and alternatives.  However, the dominant societal forces continually attempt to 
discredit community participation (Bellah, 1991; McKnight, 1997).  Even when public 
participation processes are in place, some argue that participation methods are controlled 
and designed to elicit support for decisions and plans that those in power are promoting, 
particularly in light of increasing neoliberal governance tendencies which 
41 
 
professionalizes decision making and inhibits genuine public participation (Crowfoot & 
Wondolleck, 1990; Chess & Purcell, 1999; Faber & McCarthy, 2001).  Elwood (2004) 
notes the example of HUD’s EZ/EC program in Chicago as a prime example of retention 
of power despite the rhetoric of participation, an example very similar to the CAC in the 
Harborview case in this study:  
The entire governing board of the EZ/EC process in Chicago was appointed by 
the Office of the Mayor.  Only later after the fierce objections of community 
organizations was a governing body created to involve neighborhood residents 
and organizations.  While creation of this body, the Empowerment Zone 
Coordinating Council (EZCC), is an important move toward more participation, 
the powers of the EZCC are limited…The practice of citizen participation through 
the EZ/EC program’s application in Chicago, while it satisfies HUD’s expectation 
of ‘stakeholder involvement,” has not greatly altered the roles and relationships of 
state and civil actors in the community revitalization processes of the program.  
The pressure of local groups to create the EZCC introduced a somewhat more 
diverse voice into the mix, but primary power to control revitalization 
programming and funds is still vested in the Mayor’s office and City Council, as 
has long been the  tradition in Chicago.   
.  
 
Frequently used methods  may also actually prevent the public from participating, 
especially in a meaningful manner.  Some perceive public hearings and comment periods, 
for example, as reactive in nature, insufficient at deliberation, able to engage only a small 
number of participants, and weak at addressing dynamic and complex environmental 
issues  (Konisky and Beierle, 2001; Fiorino, 1990).  Citizen advisory councils (a key 
component of the Harborview case study in this research) may have the opportunity to 
influence decision makers but often do not have decision making authority themselves 




Defining Public Participation: 
Numerous definitions of public participation currently exist.  Several definitions of public 
participation are examined below which reflect a breadth of interpretations: like the 
discussions noted above, some incorporate deliberation and mutual learning and others 
adhere to traditional methods of involvement. 
 
The Environmental Protection Agency’s Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), commonly known as the Superfund 
program, provides a definition that reflects changing attitudes about public participation, 
acknowledgement of local context, and increasing transparency due in part to previous 
mismanagement and scandal (Daley, 2007): 
community involvement activities consist of incidental requirements for public 
notices and public comment on proposed response actions. In addition, structured 
programs designed to facilitate public involvement throughout the Superfund 
process such as community relations plans, TAGs, and the development of an 
administrative record file are required. The regulations are broad enough to allow 
flexibility for individual communities. It is the community's prerogative to choose 
how involved in the Superfund process it will be. Nonetheless, EPA or the lead 
agency is required to make announcements, organize public meetings, and allow 
for public comment on proposed remedial actions to ensure the process protects 
human health and the environment with public consent. (Environmental 
Protection Agency [EPA], 2006) 
 
This definition, however, also shows the continued use of traditional participation 
methods that are reactive in nature and reflect the rationalization of power described 
above.  One could interpret this definition as a public participation reinforcing the 




The Department of Energy’s National Environmental Policy Act’s (NEPA) definition 
adopts a more communicative, meaningful, and non-positivist stance: 
The Secretary’s Public Participation Policy Statement defines public participation 
as open, ongoing, two-way communication, both formal and informal, between 
DOE and its stakeholders—those interested in or affected by its actions. The 
purpose of such interactive communication is to enable both parties to learn about 
and better understand the views and positions of the other. Public participation 
provides a means for DOE to gather the most diverse collection of options, 
perspectives, and values from the broadest spectrum of the public, allowing DOE 
to make better and more informed decisions. In addition, public participation 
benefits stakeholders by creating an opportunity to provide comment and 
influence decisions. (Department of Energy, 1998) 
 
Some perceive participation as an issue of awareness and information sharing (Greenberg 
and Lewis 2000).  The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 identified 
participation as Principle 10 of its Agenda 21, a comprehensive plan of action to be taken 
globally, nationally, and locally by organizations of the United Nations system, 
governments, and the major groups in every area in which there is human impact on the 
environment: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens, at the relevant level.  At the national level, each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by 
public authorities, including information on hazardous materials and activities in 
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes.  States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available.  Effective access to judicial 
and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided. 
(United Nations, 1992). 
 
All of these environmental participation examples reflect a changed perspective of public 
involvement.  The term “public participation” and the definitions outlined above have 
evolved from a concept based on outcomes and methods to one of meaning, values, and 
process.  Shifts in concept and definition have coincided with changes in social, cultural, 
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and economic contexts, particularly during the turbulent second half of the 20th century.  
The growth of the civil rights movement, an increase and then subsequent decrease in 
federal programs and resources, and increases in issue-oriented groups and changing 
identification of “social” problems all contributed to the evolution of public participation.  
The changing nature of cities requires a continuous evaluation of the ways we define and 
attempt to solve shifting urban problems or risk being overwhelmed and outmaneuvered 
(Sandercock 1998).  Indeed, the threats facing contemporary cities are not what they were 
when people like Jane Jacobs formed her ideas about urban neighborhoods and urban 
planning (Ouroussoff 2006). 
 
Views among scholars about desirable types of public participation, at least theoretically, 
have generally evolved from a top-down, method-oriented approach to one that is more 
grassroots, process-driven, and searching for meaning.  However, not all view 
participation in this manner and reception of this participation evolution in practice 
continues to be unclear.  Whether by acceptance of technocracy, political control, or 
ineffective traditional tools, many individuals and community organizations remain 
outside the planning process for brownfield sites.  For the purposes of this research, I will 
often refer to the EPA definition, usually in the context of its adoption by the brownfields 
program in Washington State, as well as more meaningful participation methods, 
including Arnstein’s “ladder.”  EPA provides a relevant programmatic standard which 
can be clearly linked to participation efforts at individual brownfields projects but which 
still maintains traditional methods of participation that may not be effective and may only 
reinforce and legitimize the goals of those in power.  Arnstein and many others likely 
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would not consider the EPA definition to be public participation at all.  Arnstein, on the 
other hand, gives me a popular and influential normative base from which to compare 
case study methods but may also be seen by some as unrealistic and unnecessary (and not 
necessarily completely relevant to a brownfields study given the context in which 
Arnstein wrote).  For example, most of the ‘participation’ in this study would likely be 
considered tokenism.  While the primary purpose of this research is not to measure levels 
of participation and assign labels of “good” or “bad,” these definitions allow me to place 
participation efforts in perspective with programs at several governmental levels and 
other brownfields research studies.  
 
The Benefits and Costs of Public Participation: 
While the definition of public participation is still open to debate, many scholars and 
practitioners acknowledge the benefits of public participation in planning.  Yet negative 
consequences for the public, government, and planning projects may arise as a result of 
participation.  Many scholars and practitioners focus on, and even assume, an affirmative 
and normative view of public participation – the public should be involved, participation 
is always good, and more is always better – yet the difficulties of representation, group 
mentality, highly-technical language, and other issues often remain obscured in the name 
of inclusion.  This is not to say that these positive views of participation are wrong or are 
being seen through rose-colored glasses: the benefits of participation have been 
extensively documented and will be discussed below.  Rather, little attention has been 
paid to the notion that participation can have costs that are either unforeseen or not 
properly assessed by stakeholders.  Like the changes seen in the definitions of 
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participation based on the changing view of who, how, and why people participate, the 
perceived benefits of participation must also measure these same, shifting viewpoints.  
Some claim that the debate surrounding participation is, in fact, no longer about 
representative government versus citizen participation (Irvin & Stansbury 2004).  Yet 
these claims are countered by a growing cadre who state that public participation is either 
simply a complement to representative democracy (Kathi & Cooper 2005) or a hindrance 
to sensible governance and community goals (Follansbee 2006; Portney 2005; Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 2002). 
 
Benefits: 
Scholars and practitioners call widely for public participation (Berry, Portney & 
Thomson 1993; Renn et al, 1993; Greenberg et al, 1998; Sandercock, 1998; Laurian, 
2004; Kathi & Cooper 2005; Sandercock, 2005).  Relevant to this study, current 
developments in environmental policy increasingly emphasize public participation 
(Beierle & Konisky 2000; Chess, 2000; Wong & Owens-Viani, 2000; Hanks and 
Morrison 2003; Portney 2005; Solitare, 2005).  By involving the public, these scholars 
and practitioners argue, benefits will incur unto the community and government officials.  
On practical levels, participation can promise benefits for environmental, planning, and 
social service agencies and developers as well as for overall community well-being. For 
agencies and developers, participation is a method for planners to collect and provide 
information about community needs, identify attitudes and opinions, generate new ideas, 
and build constituency support.  For communities and citizen organizations, it can offer 
opportunities to gain representation and be heard, exercise political rights and influence 
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policy decisions.  Participation can also correct social inequities, fulfill roles due to shifts 
in societal responsibilities, and promote social capital and improved community 
institutions.  Without community involvement, standardized solutions (those that are 
developed outside the community) have sometimes been found to be notoriously 
unreliable because they reduce the reliance on local knowledge and skill and limit the 
flexibility of people at the front lines to solve the problems they encounter (Schorr, 
1997).  Indeed, enabling and empowering organizations and individuals working at the 
grassroots level can assist government programs with limited resources.  
 
Many environmental policies and programs acknowledge these benefits.  For example, 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) specifies five benefits from public 
participation:   
• Identify Issues: 
• Enhance Mutual Understanding:  
• Make Better Decisions:  
• Enhance Community Support and Minimize Delays:  
• Promote Environmental Justice:  
 
Like the definitions discussed above, this list exemplifies the emphasis of much current 
thought on participation in policies, programs, and scholarship.  Identifying issues 
through a diversity of opinion and backgrounds highlights the need for local knowledge 
and decision making through non-positivist means; mutual understanding and better 
decisions reflect deliberative, non-technocratic practice (Forester, 1999).Enhancing 
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community support and promoting environmental justice emphasizes meaningful and 
value-laden processes. 
 
Public participation can also address larger societal issues (issues that clearly manifest 
themselves in brownfields programs).  First, participation can counter social inequities.  
Minority and low-income communities often bear an unfair burden of contaminated sites.  
These environmental justice communities, by their very nature, lack resources, capacity, 
and access.  They are saddled with a history of outside decision-making, institutional 
racism, and discrimination.  Second, participation can help fulfill several roles and 
societal shifts.  As noted earlier in this study, previously-public responsibilities are 
shifting to local areas and top-down planning is increasingly unavailable (legally 
impossible, financially unfeasible, etc.).  Communities, through participation, may be 
able to shift the rationality used by the state which justifies top-down planning and create 
a new rationality based on local knowledge.  Third, social capital can increase through 
participation.  Social capital improves the quality of social institutions, helps 
communities function more effectively, and creates a direct and positive effect on 
economic development.  Improved social capital also balances the inequities that exist 
between races and classes.  Additionally, participation can change institutions where 
privilege has embedded itself in societal norms, roles and organizations.  Changing social 
institutions can also change the inherent biases in laws and policies. 
 
Public participation can therefore have many benefits to community residents, 
government, and project outcomes.  Deliberative and meaningful processes promote 
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shared values, equity, empowerment, streamlining, and hopefully better decisions.   
These are the benefits that much of the practice and scholarly literature promote.  Most of 
these same studies also assume that these benefits are universal and normative: the public 
should be involved and rarely is there a reason to justify public participation in and of 
itself.  But participation involve costs as well.  These costs are discussed below. 
 
Costs: 
Compared to the benefits of public participation, less has been written about the costs and 
much of the literature “romanticizes” communities as repositories of local democracy, 
local knowledge, and progressive potential (Sandercock, 2005).  Socially and 
economically, many communities may not be aware of or prepared to pay these costs.  
Involving the public in decision making can be a time consuming process and can 
possibly add to the costs of a project. For example, the passage of time creates negative 
impacts such as increased social and economic costs for displaced workers, further 
compromise of endangered species habitat, increased costs for staffing participative 
processes, and increased expenditure of time by involved publics (Lawrence & Deagen 
2001). 
 
Citizens can also become complacent or even angered with participatory processes (Day, 
1997).  “Theorists need to acknowledge that working out policy decisions and 
implementation details over a protracted series of meetings is an activity that most 
citizens prefer to avoid.” (Irvin and Stansbury 2004, p. 58).  When people are moved to 
involve themselves in planning processes, it is sometimes because they believe decision 
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makers have found a way to take advantage of their positions or because they distrust the 
governing authority (Greenberg & Lewis, 2000; Alfasi, 2003; Hanks & Morrison, 2003).  
Conversely, acceptance of government’s ability and legitimacy has been shown to be 
predicated on that government’s record of responsibility and accountability (Webler and 
Tuler 2000).  Low levels of participation may, in fact, be signs of the government’s 
success rather than failure at meeting citizens’ needs (Day, 1997).  Consequently, public 
participation in the United States is often connected to resentment, dissatisfaction, and 
puzzlement rather than to legitimacy, trust, and enlightenment. (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 2002, p. 10).  For example, interviewees for the case studies in this research – 
notably at the Olympic Sculpture Park -- overwhelmingly stated that they would 
participate and/or fight a brownfields redevelopment based on distrust or the feeling that 
an outsider (government, developer) was taking advantage of an individual or 
community.  
 
Costs can also adversely affect a community and project outcomes due to 
misrepresentation.  Ideal discursive democracy, in which all local residents would 
deliberate all matters of common concern, is often impossible due to large-scale impacts 
of projects (and therefore large numbers of residents affected).The scope of larger 
projects can result in a lack of time for residents to participate, a lack of interest, and a 
lack of resources for the state to facilitate widespread, in-depth discussion (Day, 1997; 
Davies, Blackstock, and Rauschmayer 2005).  Even assuming all residents of a 
community could deliberate about a matter of concern, the sheer size of the group could 
impact the quality of the discourse, with speech-making and rhetorical appeals replacing 
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conversation and reasoned arguments (Dept. of Energy/NEPA, 1998).  Additionally, the 
highly technical jargon used in many environmental topics, such as brownfields, often 
leaves citizens baffled, confounded, or uncertain as to where their interests lie: the extent 
to which citizens are participating in a meaningful way is thus questionable (Day, 1997).  
Also, strongly partisan members, whose livelihood or values are strongly affected by the 
decisions being made, may dominate the proceedings (Irvin and Stansbury, 2004).  
 
Community organizations may comprise one way to bridge the gap between ideal 
democracy and top-down decision making, yet they too are the subject of intense debates 
over representation, conflicts of interest, and project influence.  The following section 




As the role of federal and state governments has decreased in a variety of policy and 
program areas, community organizations are increasingly seen as an effective scale for 
planning and decision making.  The tacit acceptance of federal devolution and the 
ascendancy of local community-based strategies includes an expectation that local 
organizations, in general, and community development corporations, specifically, will 
play a more active role in planning and implementing community revitalization efforts 
(Gittell and Wilder, 1999).  Yet despite the assertions of many researchers and 
practitioners that participation by community organizations in planning is important, 




The mediating role played by community organizations, identified by many scholars, 
may indeed play an important part in providing access to the planning process.  They can 
provide access to power.  They can build social capital and yield other benefits from 
participation, outlined earlier, for those that often have the least access to such things.  
Mediating structures stand between individuals and larger institutions of public life 
(Berger and Neuhaus 1977; Williams 1985).  Mediating structures help community 
members relate to and gain protection from the large, impersonal institutions of public 
life.   
 
Mediating structures may also assist participants in defining and framing the realities, 
viewpoints, and problems of the community.  Mediating structures provide individuals 
with a framework in which they can experience the realities of community life and 
influence how the community defines its conditions and therefore its problems (Williams, 
1985).  Taylor claims that environmental problems are social problems since “groups in a 
society perceive, identify, and define environmental problems by developing shared 
meanings and interpretations of the issues” (2000, p. 509).  Therefore, environmental 
activists and government officials from outside the community can have vastly different 
perceptions from the local residents on what constitutes an environmental problem 
(McCarthy, 2002).  Some larger institutions appear to understand this concept: the 
Environmental Protection Agency envisions that relationships established with regional 
and community organizations will bring about a better understanding of environmental 
problems because of better access to local knowledge (EPA 1996).  And although 
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creating this framework is important and influences the likelihood that people participate, 
framing must be accompanied by social and institutional networks (like community 
organizations) in order to facilitate activism (Taylor 2000, p.517). 
 
Additionally, mediating structures may foster participatory democracy and empower 
people by helping them gain more control over their lives.  Berger and Neuhaus argue 
that public policy should protect and foster mediating structures and whenever possible, 
public policy should utilize mediating structures for the realization of social purposes.   
 
While mediating structures can be institutions such as churches and schools, community 
organizations can also fall under this definition and may play a strong role in public 
participation.  Berry, Portney and Thomson (1993) are quite clear on the influence of 
community organizations: 
The pattern of community participation is strong and clear for low- and middle-
SES (socio-economic status) residents.  People who live in neighborhoods with 
strong organizations tend to participate more, and people who live in 
neighborhoods with weaker associations tend to participate less…Stronger 
neighborhood associations, by definition, mean more extensive door-to-door 
outreach efforts, more frequent neighborhood events, more information going out 
to neighborhood residents, and more volunteers spending more time to make all 
of this happen.  A more active neighborhood group creates more opportunities to 
participate than does a weaker group. (p.95)  
 
In Laurian’s (2004) recent study of environmental decision making, she states that 
community groups provide opportunity structures that may facilitate participation.  She 
asserts that participation is least costly and potentially beneficial for the individual if 
active community organizations are in place to cover costs, such as monetary resources 
and time commitment, that may be more difficult for poor communities to bear. Kathi 
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and Cooper (2005) conclude that citizen organizations, such as neighborhood councils, 
have emerged as an appropriate vehicle for citizen participation at the local level; 
Kretzmann and McKnight (1993) have written extensively on the role of the association 
as facilitator between the individual and the state and claim that associations are “the 
vehicles through which citizens in the U.S. assemble to solve problems.”  The Portney 
and Berry (1997) study of five American cities demonstrates how a strategy of 
empowerment through neighborhood associations helps residents gain political capital.  
A study by Berry (2005) looks at the impact of non-profits in civic engagement and 
concluded that these organizations are highly efficient, low-cost, and staffed by 
professionals and volunteers who are passionate about their mission.  Neighborhood-
based groups can help government officials gauge local concerns and plan in a more 
even-handed fashion (Ross & Green Leigh, 2000).  Non-profits are also valued because 
they are seen as imaginative and flexible and can tailor national or state programs to fit 
particular local circumstances and needs. 
 
However, the scholarly literature on community organizations shows a lack of consensus 
on the specific roles of these groups in participation and a lack of clarity regarding group 
composition, representation, objectivity, and strategy.  Contrary to many researchers and 
practitioners who assert that participation by community organizations in planning is 
important, others fear that proposals that call for including citizen groups can lead to co-
optation of those groups by government or business as simply a means of rubberstamping 
plans and do not ensure that the interests of the group are truly represented (Crowfoot and 
Wondolleck, 1990).  Some researchers question whether individuals are able to leave 
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private/personal interests behind when participating in a community organization (Day, 
1997); whether individuals can take on a publicly centered decision-making perspective 
(Swindell, 2000); and whether factors such as organization leadership personalities may 
influence a group’s commitment to representativeness and basic democratic principles 
(Davies, Blackstock,Rauschmeyer, 2005). 
 
Strategically, researchers and practitioners disagree on whether community organizations 
should focus on conflict or consensus, reflecting some earlier views (e.g. Alinsky, 1972) 
of public participation.  Some see that citizen groups contending with powerful 
government agencies or large corporations often must take the hardest possible line – 
total victory – to keep the support of their members and maintain their momentum (while 
risking total failure) (Davies, Blackstock, Rauschmeyer, 2005).  Others maintain that 
community organizations are more effective, especially over a longer period of time, 
when taking smaller steps, conceding on some issues, working closely with government, 
business, and other organizations, and “recreating” themselves in order to maintain 
volunteer interest (Medoff and Sklar, 1994; Baum, 1999).  Closely related to this issue of 
conflict versus consensus is whether organizations are better serving local citizens by 
seeking project-specific outcomes or community empowerment: influencing project 
outcomes may show momentum and clear victories but not contribute greatly to 




Community Development Corporations: 
Related to this research, Community Development Corporations (CDC), identified in one 
of the case studies, exhibit some qualities distinct from other neighborhood organizations 
and are themselves the subject of continuing study.  CDCs are non-profit organizations 
that generally engage in comprehensive neighborhood development, often producing and 
rehabilitating housing and sponsoring economic development and social service 
programs in disempowered and disinvested neighborhoods (Stoecker, 2003; Bratt & 
Rohe, 2007).  Often community-based like the other organizations in this study, CDCs 
have grown significantly in number and importance in the last 30 years reflecting federal 
decentralization of programs to the state and local level.  Their growth signalsa 
commitment to providing services and leadership in communities that need help that 
other agencies cannot or will not serve (Vidal, 1992).  Unlike government, CDCs can 
respond to development opportunities, and they can more easily assemble and coordinate 
the disparate programs needed to respond to neighborhood problems effectively (Walker, 
2002).  
 
Some researchers have pointed to the inherent contradictions of a CDC to act as 
developer, landlord, and business owner while articulating ideologies of empowerment 
and local community control (Gittell & Wilder, 1999; Bratt & Rohe, 2007).  Although 
this may be seen as a success in partnering activities, residents in the Rainier Court case 
still have misgivings about the role that the CDC is playing.  According to Stoecker 
(1997), community misgivings are not unwarranted but may also be unavoidable due to 
the multiple roles that CDCs take on: 
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It is this insecure and unpredictable middle location that CDCs occupy.  CDCs 
manage capital like capitalists, but do not invest it for profit.  They manage 
projects but within the constraints set by their funders.  They try to be community 
oriented while their purse strings are held by outsiders.  They are pressured by 
capital to produce exchange values in the form of capitalist business spaces and 
rental housing.  They are pressured by communities to produce use values in the 
form of services, home ownership, and green spaces.  This is more than a “double 
bottom-line.”  It is the internalization of the capital-community contradiction and 
it leads to trouble. (p. 5) 
 
Indeed, the CDC can achieve success as an organization yet that success may not 
translate into direct benefits to the resident community and their definition of success 
(Twelvetrees, 1989).  
 
CDCs, occupying conflicting middle ground, may not necessarily be motivated to pursue 
public participation.  Although some researchers note that CDCs try to advocate for the 
neighborhood and encourage participation (Vidal, 1992, Glickman & Servon, 2003), 
Stoecker claims that CDCs are not adequate representatives of the neighborhood due to 
capital-community contradictions, and cites Bratt’s (1989) claim that CDCs do not 
necessarily aim for, nor achieve, widespread participation (Stoecker, 1997, Stoecker, 
2003).  Some researchers agree that organizations, generally, can exist and carry out work 
without broad community participation so long as they raise outside money, employ core 
staff, and occasionally seek broader community approval of such routine items as board 
directions and staff performance (Baum, 1999).  Indeed, some have observed that the 
more the CDC has succeeded to increase the economic development potential of a 
brownfield site, the greater the chance that environmental quality objectives and public 
concern/input may be muted (Wernstedt & Hersh, 1998).  To take this one step further, a 
CDC may never have the ability to ever achieve “good” citizen participation, from an 
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Arnstein perspective, or possibly even meaningful participation involving learning and 
deliberation.  If a primary goal of a CDC is to build housing, housing requires capital.  
According to Stoecker (1997), if CDCs work in poor communities, they therefore have 
little capital: CDCs must go outside the community to look for capital and thereby give 
up community control.  Others disagree: some researchers feel that to be effective, CDCs 
must draw strength by expanding their circle of financial supporters by attracting 
resources from outside their neighborhoods (Vidal & Keating, 2004; Bratt & Rohe, 
2004).  The Rainier Court case in this study may fall somewhere in between these 
arguments.  SEED never maintained community control over the cleanup and 
redevelopment process, despite being the developer of the site, yet it did manage to 
engage the community in multiple two-way dialogues about the project.  While SEED 
could not implement every recommendation and wish of neighborhood residents for this 
project, the residents felt that SEED listened to their concerns and did what was possible 




Community organizations and public participation play a role in communicative planning 
theory (Healy, 1996; Innes & Booher, 2002; Innes, 2004) and communicative planning 
debates inform this study in several ways.  Communicative action uses language and 
dialogue to achieve mutual understanding and consensus. It overcomes different validity 
claims from various stakeholders in the planning process (Innes & Booher, 1999; 
Takahashi & Smutny, 2001).  The “communicative turn” (Healy, 1996) has recently 
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shown up in the brownfields literature (Solitare, 2005), perhaps not surprisingly given the 
importance in the communicative literature of stakeholder equity, deliberation, learning, 
and promotion of social and environmental justice goals. 
 
Scholars and practitioners increasingly promote consensual approaches for developing 
strategic plans, particularly where complex environmental and social issues are being 
dealt with and where many different interests are likely to be affected by policy decisions 
(Connely & Richardson, 2004).  CDCs, possibly due to assimilation in the capitalist 
system of development while struggling for declining federal funding, increasingly shun 
the confrontational conflict-oriented approach to addressing poverty in favor of an 
approach that is more consensual and trust-based (Stoecker, 1997; Bratt & Rohe, 2004).  
The long-term efforts to democratize planning may be nothing more than an attempt to 
deal with the capitalist-democracy contradiction discussed above regarding CDCs 
(Sandercock, 2005).  The communicative style of planning may be nothing more than the 
latest adaptation of capital in its drive for new forms of urban development and profit 
(Sandercock, 2005).   
 
These debates provide guidance for some of my research questions.  To assume that 
participation in brownfields is a good, essential, fair, and meaningful notion (Solitare 
2005, Greenberg & Lewis, 2000) places us at risk of ignoring the following debates in 
communicative literature on stakeholder equity, spatial context, and political, social, and 




• Stakeholder equality – Communicative planning theorists insist that 
stakeholders in a planning process that is truly collaborative will not be 
dominated by powerful elites (Innes & Booher, 2002; Innes, 2004; Healy, 
1996) yet others claim that this perspective willfully ignores the power and 
context of political, economic, and social realities (Day, 1997; Fainstein, 
2000; Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000; Few, 2000; Abram, 2000). 
• Process vs. outcomes – Communicative planning primarily identifies and 
analyzes the process of planning and often is not concerned with outcomes 
claiming that the process can be effective even when it does not accomplish 
what its participants originally intended (Innes & Booher, 1999, Baum, 1999; 
Glickman & Servon, 2003).  A common mistake, they say, when a process 
fails to produce a plan or policy, is for observers to conclude that no 
significant agreement was reached, yet there may be intangible or tangible 
(albeit informal) second and third-tier effects (Innes & Booher, 1999).  Critics 
claim that the outcomes are indeed important, communicative outcomes are 
not of the highest quality, and ignoring the outcomes is yet another example of 
ignoring context.  Fainstein (2000) provides a useful comparison: 
The communicative theorists make the role of the planner the central element 
of discussion.  Both the context in which planners work and the outcome of 
planning fade from view.  Unlike the rational modelers, the communicative 
theorists have found a subject, but like them they lack an object.  Whereas in 
legal theory the object of analysis is the relationship between the legal system 
and society and in medical theory the concern is with the human body, in 
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communicative planning theory the spotlight is on the planner.  Instead of 
asking what is to be done about cities and regions, communicative planners 
typically ask what planners should be doing (p.455). 
 
Critics also wonder what the communicative theorists would make of unjust, 
yet collaborative, outcomes or outcomes that are not based on a 
communicative process, such as the outcomes in the Olympic Sculpture Park 
case study in this research, (i.e. bureaucratic, top-down decisions) and yet still 
produce desirable results (Day, 1997; Fainstein, 2000). 
 
• Space and Place – According to critics of communicative and planning 
theory, space and place provide a context and an outcome for assessing the 
influence of politics, economics, and social capital on the planning 
process(Neuman, 2000).  If planning is about the production of space and 
place, some wonder why communicative planning theorists have based so 
much of their thought in Habermas’ communicative rationality (despite Innes’ 
(2004) claims that this is not so) given that Habermas has, in short, no 
conception of how ‘places’ are produced and how that process is integral to 
the process of communicative action and valuation (Harvey, 1996).  “So it is 
ironic that his work has been taken up in the field of planning, a set of 
practices that above all else should be concerned with the production of space 
and place” (Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000).  Spatial context can also influence 
process and outcomes when conducted within narrow spatial boundaries, 
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opening up the possibility of NIMBY behavior. It can also be considered  
when looking at metropolitan-wide planning that may sacrifice the local-level 
familiarity and knowledge that is the rationale for participatory neighborhood 
planning, as will be shown in the Harborview and Olympic Sculpture Park 
cases (Fainstein, 2000).  Some researchers have also found the context of 
cities differing greatly, for example, with respect to the acceptability of CDCs 
and local governments working together closely (Glickman & Servon, 2003). 
 
I must reiterate, however, that my research is not examining communicative action but 
rather borrowing communicative action debates to provide useful comparisons to 
community organizations and public participation in my research.  Although the 
communicative debates may be oriented more toward the role of urban planners within 
the planning process, these same debates provided a useful framework for my interviews.  
And while this research used case studies and not direct observation, critics argue that 
case analysis, which places cases in a broader context and makes comparisons, can be 
useful (Fainstein, 2000).   And despite the focus of communicative action on language 
and dialogue to resolve conflicts, identification of others’ viewpoints also figures 
prominently in the communicative literature.  In my cases I found several instances 
among residents to appreciate other viewpoints. Several neighborhood residents, for 
example, stated that they understood the need for Harborview Medical Center and of the 
serious life-or-death cases that the hospital serves, despite the inconvenience to 
themselves of increased neighborhood noise from medical helicopters.  Like the critics 
(Abram, 2000; Fainstein, 2000; Huxley & Yiftachel, 2000), I focused on the arguments 
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of context, power, and individual/group/community interactions, rather than on the role 
of the planner and examination of dialogue.  Community organizations deal with the 
same issues of political realities, conflict versus consensual approaches, pressure to 
produce results, spatial and economic context, and outsider and elite control of resources.  
I address these factors in the cases studies to follow. 
 
In the beginning of this chapter, I explained that community organizations should play a 
mediating role but that numerous contradictions within brownfields, public participation, 
community organizations/CDCs, and communicative planning may make this role 
difficult to achieve.  Public participation in brownfields is seen by some as more 
important due to the distinctive characteristics of these sites, yet the role for the public in 
the planning process remains unclear.  Public participation, in theory, has shifted from a 
top-down, technical model to one of meaningful participation of all stakeholders but, in 
practice and definition, traditional methods and structures are often still in place.  In order 
to increase public participation, some scholars and practitioners point to community 
organizations (including CDCs) as mediators between individual residents, government 
and developers.  Community organizations can theoretically encourage individuals to 
participate in the planning process but face pressures from outside funding and political 
contexts to produce physical results.  Related to factors of meaningful participation, 
debates within the communicative planning literature informed part of this study, 




As shown, scholars and practitioners promote organizations as advocates for increased 
public participation but economic realities (e.g. outside funding for CDCs, increased land 
value with increased competition), political realities (e.g. city government context, 
political relationships), and social realities (e.g. fewer resources in poor communities, 
institutional racism) may not allow this role to be truly achievable.  Organizations may 
alter their mediating role in an effort to fulfill duties to their constituencies and accept the 
methods and means by which they feel they can make a difference in brownfields cleanup 
and redevelopment.  The following chapter discusses further the context of the EPA, 





EPA, Brownfields, and the Seattle Context 
This research examines community organizations and public participation using case 
studies in the Seattle/King County, Washington brownfields program.  The joint 
city/county brownfields program provides an appropriate setting for case study research.  
King County, a mix of urban, suburban, and rural land uses with a population of over 1.7 
million including the city of Seattle, experiences continued population and economic 
growth and increasing demand for land in a state with a Growth Management Act and a 
region with an urban growth boundary.  Brownfields are increasingly viewed as viable 
development sites in Seattle that are consistent with the mayor’s goal of increasing 
neighborhood density, neighborhood revitalization, and environmental sustainability.  
Based upon the activity of the Seattle/King County Brownfields Program, brownfield 
cleanup and redevelopment projects appears to be a growing interest. It may also be 
indicative of a shorter history of pre-environmental-regulation industrial uses and 
relatively recent attention to land conservation and urban density in western U.S. cities. 
 
Revitalizing these contaminated sites can be a controversial and drawn-out process.  
Decision making in Seattle, and the public’s involvement in this process, mirrors the 
debates over public participation covered in Chapter 2.  Many view Seattle’s political and 
planning decision-making – known locally as the ‘Seattle Process’ -- as ‘consensus-
loving and process-oriented’, to the point of postponing decisions (Galloway & Ho; 
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2006).  Others see the “endless public reviews” as a means for learning, organizing, and 
community-building (Sutton, 2004).  Seattlealso reflects changes that have occurred in 
federal environmental programs over decades.  As federal environmental programs have 
increasingly devolved to the local level, city government and community organizations 
have acquired new responsibilities for implementing brownfield programs.  Local 
government and organizations in Seattle, with loose and unenforceable policies from 
EPA as a guideline and a variety of local factors, have attempted to implement 
community involvement practices within the brownfields program with mixed results.   
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of 1) the context of the federal EPA brownfields 
program, the EPA’s public participation program, and its influence on local level 
programs.  2) Following this, I examine Washington’s cleanup, funding, and growth 
management programs and how these impact the brownfields program in Seattle/King 
County.  3) I conclude this chapter with a look at the influence of local factors on public 
participation in the brownfields program, such as increased population growth, the 
“Seattle Process,” the high-tech industry, and the design review process.  By examining 
influences at all levels of government, I provide several framework layers to analyze the 
case studies that follow. 
 
EPA & the Brownfields Program 
History: 
Industrial and commercial contamination go back as far as industry itself.  Contaminated 
output from industrial production was not widely considered a hazard as recently as the 
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mid-20th century.  Research and empirical evidence created new arguments for the ill-
effects of industrial production: Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring”, published in 1962, is 
often considered to be one of the first large-scale calls to the hazards of industry on 
human and environmental health.  Subsequent examinations and evidence over the past 
few decades increased public scrutiny of industry and led to major changes in the 
administration, enforcement, and reduction of hazardous industrial and commercial 
output and the relatively-new issue of polluted lands, or brownfields, left behind. 
 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was created in 1970 as a response to the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) recommendation passed by Congress late in 
the previous year.  President Nixon called for "a strong, independent agency."  The 
mission of the EPA would be to: 
 
• Establish and enforce environmental protection standards. 
• Conduct environmental research. 
• Provide assistance to others combating environmental pollution. 
• Assist the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), established by NEPA in 
developing and recommending to the President new policies for environmental 
protection (Lewis, 1985) 
 
The EPA, however, served primarily in a compliance capacity during this time – “to give 
real bite to the federal enforcement bark” (Lewis, 1985) – as well as in a technocratic 
capacity tackling complex scientific issues.  It would take another call from a concerned 
citizen to open up EPA to citizen involvement on a larger scale. 
 
In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) and its funding arm, known as Superfund, which addresses the most serious 
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hazardous waste sites, was passed largely due to the problems at Love Canal (Collaton & 
Bartsch, 1996; EPA, 2007 A).  “By 2000, 92 percent of the sites listed on the Superfund 
National Priorities List (NPL) were either undergoing cleanup, removed from the NPL 
because cleanup was complete, or were removed from the list because remediation goals 
were achieved” (House of Representatives, 2006, p.3).  The focus of hazardous waste 
cleanup thereafter turned to the less seriously contaminated sites: brownfields (House of 
Reps, 2006). 
 
EPA has shifted focus for dealing with hazardous waste sites since the agency’s inception 
and the days of Love Canal.  In the 1980’s and 1990’s, EPA changed its strategy from 
enforcement, oversight, and cleanup to liability relief and redevelopment.  The Agency 
recognized that lenders, investors, and developers – the private market -- feared that 
involvement with brownfield sites might make them liable for cleaning up contamination 
they did not create (Elliott and Bourne, 2005).  EPA (and municipalities) began to see the 
opportunities in brownfields: redeveloped parcels of land generate needed tax revenue 
and employment, curb urban sprawl, and remediate contamination that threatens public 
health and the environment (Yount and Meyer, 1999).  Developers were drawn to these 
sites by profit potential and legal protection.  The EPA also introduced more participation 
efforts to offset the strictly technocratic basis of decision making and to allow for more 
local knowledge, community support, and neighborhood prioritization of hazardous 
waste sites.  The Brownfields Program is evidence of this shift in strategy.  The 
Brownfields Program was introduced in 1995 under CERCLA and the new strategy 
quickly rippled down to state and local initiatives, notably through federal encouragement 
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of cleanup of sites under state Voluntary Cleanup Programs (VCP) (House of 
Representatives, 2006).  The federal government loosened enforcement regulations, 
perhaps not coincidentally with the decline of federal assistance and oversight since the 
Reagan era in many other programmatic areas, leaving state and local governments and 
community organizations to pick up the programmatic pieces.  Similar to the shift seen at 
the federal level, voluntary cleanup programs limited state oversight to the most 
hazardous contamination and shift the burden of responsibility to the site owner and the 
private sector. 
 
The Brownfields Program solidified in 2002 at the federal level and clarified the 
importance of state and local programs in the reclamation of contaminated land.  The 
Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 (HR 2869) 
gave the existing brownfields program independent legislative authority to add certainty 
to program authorities and improve funding and other cleanup and redevelopment tools.  
The Act initially increased a funding pool for cleanup, redevelopment, and job training 
programs, expanded site eligibility, and clarified liability relief, including some relief to 
small businesses from Superfund liability.  The Act, recognizing the primacy of states in 
the implementation and success of brownfields revitalization, established or enhanced 
state VCPs.  According to the EPA, and clearly reflective of larger shifts from federal to 
state and local level agencies, “state programs are at the forefront of brownfields cleanup 
and redevelopment, as both the public and private markets recognize the responsibilities 




The financial component of the federal brownfields program consists of several 
significant funding sources.  Initially, EPA provided small amounts of seed money to 
local governments that launched hundreds of two-year brownfield pilot projects.  
Through passage of the 2002 Brownfields Act, policies that EPA had developed over the 
years were passed into law (EPA, 2007 B).  Brownfields grants continue to serve as the 
foundation of EPA’s Brownfields Program. These grants support revitalization efforts in 
four areas.   1)  Brownfields Assessment Grants provide funding for brownfield 
inventories, planning, environmental assessments, and community outreach.  
2)Brownfields Revolving Loan Fund Grants provide funding to capitalize loans that are 
used to clean up brownfields.  3) Brownfields Job Training Grants provide environmental 
training for residents of brownfields communities.  4) Brownfields Cleanup Grants 
provide direct funding for cleanup activities at certain properties with planned 
greenspace, recreational, or other nonprofit uses (EPA, 2007 B). 
 
EPA brownfields funding is not without accountability requirements, including some 
public participation recommendations.  Citizen involvement began to be expressed in 
federal and state laws and programs in the 1960’s, notably the maximum feasible 
participation requirements of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Lowry, Adler, and 
Milner, 1997).  However, the discovery of hazardous waste at Love Canal in Niagara 
Falls, NY in the late 1970’s sounded a citizens’ alarm on toxic leakage into residents’ 
homes and yards adjacent to the abandoned canal, used for decades as a dumping ground 
for Hooker Chemical (Day, 1997).  This event galvanized public environmental concern 
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and intensified the demand for meaningful public involvement in decision making at 
contaminated sites (Wernstedt & Hersh, 1998).  In 1980, Congress passed the Superfund 
law and a year later EPA released its first participation policy. 
 
EPA’s original Policy on Public Participation (Federal Register, 1981) claimed to  
strengthen EPA's commitment to public participation and to establish uniform 
procedures for participation by the public in EPA's decision-making process. 
This in turn will assist EPA in carrying out its mission, by giving a better 
understanding of the public's viewpoints, concerns and preferences. It should 
also make the agency's decisions more acceptable to those who are most 
concerned and affected by them. (EPA, 2007 C) 
 
Despite these proclamations, the Agency endured severe criticism in the early years of 
the Superfund program due to scandal, mismanagement, and poor community relations 
(Daley, 2007).  Under the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Congress 
stipulated that the EPA must improve its community relations programs: numerous 
citizen and environmental groups were active in promoting improved community 
participation during the reauthorization (Daley, 2007).  EPA updated the policy in 2003, 
recognizing: 
• Changing needs of the public 
• New statutes and regulations (including CERCLA and Executive Order 12898 on 
Environmental Justice) 
• New and expanded public participation techniques 
• New options for public access to information and involvement through the 
Internet 
• EPA's emphasis on assuring compliance 
• Increased use of partnerships and technical assistance 
• Increased capacity of states, tribes and local governments to carry out delegated 




This policy, however, is not a rule and remains legally unenforceable.  Solitare (2005) 
claims that this policy limits participation in brownfields redevelopment for two primary 
reasons: 
 
First, the policy is only applied to the remediation of a brownfield site; it is 
not applied to the future use or redevelopment of the site.  Second, the policy 
was developed for only EPA staff use, not for use by state, tribes and local 
governments, which are the primary governments for brownfields 
redevelopment.  In addition, the EPA cannot require state, tribes and local 
governments to follow the policy. (p. 919) 
 
Thus in awarding brownfield grants, EPA applies ranking criteria rather than specific 
public participation requirements. The rankings criteria for public involvement break 
down into two categories, community notification and community involvement.  The 
grant applicant is responsible for providing community notification and opportunity for 
public comment about the cleanup plan.  The proposal must also demonstrate how the 
applicant was or will be involved in the community notification (e.g. attend a public 
meeting or respond to comments) (EPA 2007 D).  Several examples of specific activities 
include: discussing a brownfields proposal during an open government meeting (e.g. city 
council sessions); holding a public meeting; placing a public notice in a local newspaper 
or community bulletin board; notifying affected residents door-to-door; and soliciting 
public comment (EPA, 2007 D). 
 
Washington State/King County/Seattle: 
Washington’s brownfields program maintains consistency with the federal program 
primarily through the implementation of liability protections and financial incentives, 
administration of properties through the VCP, adoption of EPA’s “brownfields” 
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definition, and identification of ranking criteria for public involvement.  The Washington 
program developed over time through statutory and regulatory amendments to the state’s 
1991 Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA) rather than through specially designated 
brownfields legislation (as seen in other states and the federal government) (EPA, 2006, 
p.141).  The state provides liability assurances through prospective purchaser agreements, 
covenants not to sue, lender liability exemptions and a contaminated aquifer policy (EPA, 
2006). Generally, these assurances allow liability protection provided the site owner did 
not cause or contribute to the contamination, continues or completes a cleanup, and/or 
maintains institutional controls (proprietary or governmental controls often restricting 
uses on a property). 
 
King County and Seattle’s financial incentives, which all of the case studies in this 
research received in some form (not all received brownfields funding, per se), continue to 
grow through successive EPA grants.  In 1998, King County and the City of Seattle, 
operating as a single entity and in conjunction with the Washington State Department of 
Community, Trade, and Economic Development (CTED) received a $200,000 EPA 
Brownfields Assessment Pilot Grant to conduct environmental site assessments in King 
County.  Between 1998 and 2007, the county and the city received an additional 
$1,700,000 in EPA Assessment Grant funds, including $200,000 for the Harborview 
Medical Center expansion cleanup discussed later in this study (King County, 2007).  
The Washington State Department of Ecology provides technical review of the cleanup 




The objectives of the State’s RLF are: 
• Support self-sustaining efforts by local governments and private owners by 
offering low interest loans to clean up brownfield properties already assessed for 
contamination.  
• Leverage funds by linking loan recipients with assistance offered through the 
related brownfields programs. 
• Strengthen collaboration between the federal, state, and local agencies involved in 
brownfields cleanup and redevelopment creating a sustainable model of 
cooperation. 
• Create sustainable jobs by new or expanded businesses. 
• Increase tax base to local areas (Washington Office of Community, Trade, and 
Economic Development [CTED], 2007 A). 
 
Some grant funds have been used to contract with the Environmental Coalition of South 
Seattle (ECOSS) to run the Environmental Extension Service (EES). The EES provides 
free technical assistance to private individuals and businesses, nonprofit organizations 
and municipalities in assessing and cleaning up brownfields in the Puget Sound region 
(Environmental Coalition of South Seattle [ECOSS], 2007). 
 
The EES and the Brownfields Program were created out of the Duwamish Coalition, a 
public-private partnership that met from 1993 to 1997 to address economic development 
and environmental contamination at the Duwamish River Superfund site in South Seattle.  
The coalition was created to help implement the 1990 Washington State Growth 
Management Act (GMA) by developing strategies to encourage development in urban 
areas, reduce sprawl, encourage economic development and protect the environment.” 
(King County, 2007).  In 1990, the Legislature stated that “uncoordinated and unplanned 
growth” posed a threat to the environment, sustainable economic development, and 
health, safety, and high quality of life (CTED, 2007).  The Legislature also found it in the 
public interest that citizens, communities, local governments, and the private sector 
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cooperate and coordinate with one another in comprehensive land use planning (CTED, 
2007).  The GMA, by some accounts, demanded unprecedented cooperation between 
counties and their cities concerning what, where, and how development should occur 
(Porter, 2006, p. 143). 
 
Growth management, the state VCP, and the brownfields program appear, in some 
respects, to be cooperating and streamlining the brownfields cleanup and redevelopment 
process.  The GMA, the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) and the Shoreline 
Management Act were amended in 1995 “to better integrate long-range planning and site-
specific environmental review, and to explicitly allow development agreements as a tool 
for assuring long-term project planning which can allow for the complex mix of cleanup 
and development planning and approval presented by brownfield projects” (Wolfe & 
Delecki, 2005, p.4).  In addition, MTCA and SEPA revisions eliminated multiple layers 
of approval for projects with cleanup components.  Perhaps this streamlining should not 
come as a surprise: the GMA is administered by CTED, the same agency that administers 
the brownfields program.  Some redundancies still exist: a Washington state official 
closely involved in the brownfields program noted in an interview for this study that 
public involvement is required for both the brownfields program and SEPA and that 
developers have expressed discouragement over this redundancy. 
 
Public involvement requirements in the King County/Seattle Brownfields Program: 
The Seattle/King County Brownfields Program maintains some public participation 
criteria for applicants.  Applicants to the Brownfields Revolving Loan Fund must submit 
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a Public Involvement Plan (PIP) to receive funds.  The PIP follows guidelines laid out in 
the Public Involvement Manual created by the state in accordance with the federal 
Brownfields Act of 2002 and under the guidance of the MTCA public involvement 
requirements (see full PIP requirements in Appendix).  Generally, PIPs require several 
features:  
 
• interviews with local officials, residents, public interest groups, and other 
interested parties to facilitate public understanding of the project  
• designating a project spokesperson 
• creating an information repository near the site for all cleanup action 
administrative materials 
• publishing a public notice on the project 
• conducting a 30-day public comment period (Washington Brownfields Coalition, 
2004).   
 
The VCP and liability relief statutes do not require public involvement (EPA, 2006, p. 
142).  In fact, “public benefit” requirements under the MTCA were significantly relaxed 
in 1997 for Prospective Purchaser Agreements, one of the liability protections offered 
under the state Brownfields Program (Wolfe & Delecki, 2005, p. 5). 
 
Upon closer inspection, the public involvement requirements for Brownfields funding in 
Seattle actually “require” very little.  Much like EPA’s unenforceable public involvement 
policy, Washington’s program primarily “encourages” applicants to conduct certain 
functions under the rubric of involvement.  For example, the Manual encourages 
interviews with local officials and other stakeholders and states that applicants “may” 
conduct public meetings and “may” produce fact sheets, newsletters, and other 
documentation to keep the public informed (Washington Coalition PI Manual, p.3; EPA, 
2006, p. 142).  Further, what constitutes “appropriate” interviewees and “significant” 
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comments (to which the applicant must respond in writing and maintain in the public 
repository) appears to be at the judgment of the applicant (Washington Brownfields 
Coalition, 2005, p. 5).   
 
Seattle/King County context: 
Seattle and King County’s history and current growth constraints provide a rich 
background for brownfields redevelopment.  Seattle’s frontier-city roots (settled in 1852) 
placed a high value on land as a functioning commodity and source of wealth, rather than 
as a shared community asset.  Seattle, like most American cities in the time before 
zoning, mixed land uses.  Heavy industry, for example, could often be found near 
residential areas.  Seattle also changed the land to use as it saw fit.  The 19th century 
regrading of steep hills in the current downtown area (e.g. the central Seattle 
neighborhood Denny Regrade) through the use of hydraulic sluicing remains a proud 
achievement and a constant reminder of land commodification to many in the city.  Local 
industry began with lumber, manufacturing, shipbuilding, steel production, and coal 
mining followed by aviation manufacturing and more recently by high-technology 
industries, notably the 30,000 local employees of Microsoft (City of Seattle, 2007 A). 
  
The growth and subsequent growth-management mindset of local officials and residents 
alike reflects Seattle’s population shift.  The city’s numerous boom and bust periods 
currently appear stable.  The local population projections maintain adequate, if not 
impressive, increases and pressures of growth are mimicking these numbers (Puget 
Sound Regional Council [PSRC], 2007).  Auto traffic is among the worst in the nation 
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and has led many to question the advantages of the suburban, car-oriented lifestyle 
(Seattle Post Intelligencer, 2006 A).  Mayor Greg Nickels’ ‘Center City’ strategy focuses 
on encouraging economic growth, transportation, new housing, and revitalized urban 
neighborhoods through such tools as zoning changes, a new light rail line, and new 
mixed-use development.  The mayor’s urban agenda, sprawl, zoning changes, the Growth 
Management Act and the appeal of a newly-vibrant downtown has led to the construction 
of many new housing units and commercial spaces in the central city.  Generally, density 
has increased rather sharply throughout the county over the past 15 years (Porter, 2006, p. 
144).  The demand for land in the city of Seattle increased considerably in recent years 
and is seen clearly in the rising cost of housing.  The demand for land in recent years has 
become so high that formerly undesirable parcels, including brownfields, coupled with 
the prospects for increased profits, are now seen as viable options for development.  For 
example, continued development and rising home prices in the “up and coming” 
neighborhood of Columbia City and other areas of the Rainier Valley (where one of the 
case studies for this research is located) are a “foregone conclusion,” according to one 
local economist (Seattle Post Intelligencer, 2007 B). 
 
 
Within this dynamic setting, public participation in Seattle holds a curious position.  The 
region maintains a reputation for intensive public participation, fragmented decision 
making, and complex consensus-building processes (Bay & Parsons, 2000).  The “Seattle 
Process,” often cited by locals, appears to be an extreme form of community input whose 
ultimate effectiveness many question (Parrish, 2004; Faga, 2007; Westneat, 2007).  The 
increasing use of citizen ballot initiatives to overturn legislative and/or popular votes 
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often confounds even the heartiest of politician and populist (the Growth Management 
Act was the result of a citizen initiative to curb sprawl) (McGann, 2006).  Also, as the 
home of Microsoft and other high-technology companies, Seattle provides many city 
services, information, and access to public officials through the internet to match its 
status as one of the most wired cities in the world (Seattle, 2007 B) in the most wired 
region of the country (“Internet Use by Region in the United States”. 2006). 
 
Seattle’s neighborhood planning efforts in the 1990’s generated measurable successes 
and accolades, including efforts at increasing meaningful public participation (City of 
Seattle, 2007; Sirianni, 2007), and may partly explain the city’s active citizenry and 
extensive ‘process.’  Participation efforts grew out of the 1994 comprehensive plan, a 
requirement of the 1990 Growth Management Act, which involved little public 
participation early in the process.  Neighborhoods reacted confrontationally to the plan’s 
call for urban villages and areas of increased density but without local input for these 
programs.  The mayor and city council responded with a Neighborhood Planning 
Program in 1994 that established a new Neighborhood Planning Office (now defunct), 
funding for neighborhood planning, learning tools, a formal review of neighborhood 
plans by all relevant city departments, city staff accountability, and Neighborhood 
Planning Office project managers’ relational organizing.  The new participation efforts, 
like those discussed in Chapter 2, were largely based on ideas of mutual learning, 
relationships, trust, deliberation, asset-based community development, and understanding 
of others’ perspectives (Sirianni, 2007).  Other efforts complemented the 1994 changes.  
A City Neighborhood Council, comprised of 13 neighborhood district representatives, 
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provides coordination for distribution of the Neighborhood Matching Fund and budget 
prioritization (City of Seattle DPD, 2007).  Neighborhood coordinators, in every 
neighborhood and involved at some level for all of the case studies in this research, 
officially serve as a primary link to City government for individuals and groups in a 
specific neighborhood.  The coordinators’ work includes advising community 
organizations in interpreting and responding to City policies and providing staff support 
to community organizations, community councils, neighborhood associations and 
neighborhood district councils (City of Seattle, 2007).  Neighborhood residents, city 
officials, and others appreciated and praised this refocus on neighborhoods, public 
participation, and mutual understanding (Seattle Planning Commission, 2000; Harrell, 
2007; Seattle PI editorial, 2007). 
 
Participation efforts in Seattle have lost some steam, dedication, and direction in 
subsequent years.  The economic downturn in the early part of this decade forced budget 
cuts at the Department of Neighborhoods.  The current mayoral administration, which 
some praise for playing a long-needed and strong leadership role, appears to be 
attempting to undo many of the changes made in the 1990’s by such tactics as funding 
decreases, elimination of staff, and elimination of a grassroots activists leadership 
development program (Siriani, 2007, Seattle City Auditor, 2007).  The Neighborhood 
Planning Program also contained some inherent flaws.  A 2007 audit showed the 
weaknesses of the process 13 years on.  The process did not clarify how the plans would 
be implemented, many broad policies lacked specific goals, and participants did not feel 
that their enormous time investment was fully appreciated by the city.   Maintaining 
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citizen involvement has been difficult due to lack of commitment and resources by the 
city.A number of recommendations were beyond the control of the citizen groups or the 
city (this point is clearly seen in the concerns over the loss of affordable housing and 
gentrification in the case studies in this research) (Seattle City Auditor, 2007). 
 
Procedurally, Seattle planning projects generally require public participation through two 
routes: the State Environmental Policy Act and design review, the latter used most of the 
time.  The City of Seattle's Design Review Program provides a forum for citizens, 
developers and the City to review and guide the design of qualifying commercial and 
multifamily development projects (City of Seattle, 2007 C).  Each of the seven design 
review boards across the city consists of a design professional, a developer, a community 
representative, a local residential representative, and a local business representative (City 
of Seattle, 2007 D).  Most interviewees for this study responded that one of the few 
formal methods for input on a brownfields project was through design review public 
meetings.  A recent audit of the design review program noted the need to strengthen 
several key public involvement aspects of the program, including improving 
communication between developers and the neighborhood, improving communication 
between the neighborhoods and the city, and incorporating design review board 
recommendations into the final project construction.  Of these points, the notion of 
incorporating board recommendations scored lowest of the three rating categories, 
meaning that there may be significant opportunities for strengthening this aspect of the 
program.  Therefore, public involvement, even through official means, doesn’t 




As the case studies in this research show, community organizations and Community 
Development Corporations in Seattle voice strong opinions on a variety of issues and 
appear to have strong connections to city officials and other organizations but maintain 
muted connections and relevance to some individual residents.  City officials work 
closely with a number of CDCs to create affordable housing and new commercial space 
in distressed communities throughout the city (Seattle Office of Economic Development, 
2007) and Seattle’s CDCs rank high in terms of output, strength, and neighborhood 
impact (Walker, 2002).  The city also relies heavily on CDCs and community 
organizations for insight and input into community concerns and other forms of 
neighborhood information.  Developers of the brownfields sites in this study found that 
aligning with community organizations proved advantageous for gaining approvals and 
preventing future negative site impacts.   
 
Another city participation program relevant to this study is the Major Institutions Master 
Plan.  This program, aimed at hospitals and universities, creates local committees through 
special authority legislation.  The details of the Major Institutions designation and its 




As discussed in Chapter 2, the federal government has been delegating more programs, 
such as hazardous waste cleanup and brownfields, to state and local governments since 
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the Reagan administration.  In response, state and local governments have created new 
brownfields programs.  Yet, with very loose, EPA-staff-only, unenforceable policy for 
public participation, state and local governments have been left to figure out how and if 
to involve the public in brownfields revitalization projects.  Subsequently, government 
and community organizations, which have their own methods and means for involving 
the public (but not necessarily in an environmental hazard context), attempt to apply what 
they know to new brownfield programs in hopes of addressing community concerns. 
 
Seattle exhibits several factors that may influence citizen participation and collaboration. 
Seattle historically commodifies land for profit.  As shown in Chapter 2, real estate profit 
sets the stage for a capitalist-democracy conflict, particularly when a community 
development corporation, for example, finds itself pulled in many different directions.  
Additionally, the Seattle Process may also be reflective of a citizenry that distrusts 
government and feels that opportunity to be heard should be an overarching goal of city 
officials.  Citizens possibly participate more often and more effectively in planning 
processes, through such devices as citizen ballot initiatives and internet-based city 
outreach.  Seattle’s Neighborhood Planning Process in 1994 reflected many of the 
theoretical changes occurring in public participation by emphasizing mutual learning, 
deliberation, understanding, and relationships.  In practice, all of these efforts proved at 
least partly fruitful but recent economic difficulties, increased political control by the 
current mayor, and lack of coordination show that the Neighborhood Planning Process 
may not have been able to reach its full potential.  Finally, we see evidence of multi-
stakeholder environmental cooperation in the state and region (GMA, Duwamish, 
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coordination in 1995 of the three environmental regulations) so there may exist a history 
and pattern of cooperation in the area, in addition to the Neighborhood Planning Process, 
that could explain the lack of intense conflict surrounding the brownfield cleanup and 





Olympic Sculpture Park 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, I chose my cases based upon several criteria for study.  All 
three sites are completed or nearing completion, located in the city of Seattle, and funded 
(sometimes with technical assistance) from the county program.  These sites represent 
contrasting situations where, at times, the community organization appears to be integral 
to the planning process and resident involvement and other times does not.  These cases 
share many of the same economic, political, and social conditions, the same county 
program assistance, similar physical characteristics, and some of the same stakeholders, 
therefore making them appropriate for cross-case analysis.  I also chose these cases to 
enlighten this study’s central issues and debates of mediation and participation.  The three 
cases that follow are arranged from least to most public participation (Olympic Sculpture 
Park, Harborview’s Ninth & Jefferson Building, and Rainier Court) and ends with the 
organization (SEED) that exhibited the most effort to involve neighborhood residents in 
the brownfields redevelopment.  I have also highlighted prominent dates in the planning 
process section of each case to serve as a chronology. 
 
The Olympic Sculpture Park case provides a stark contrast to Rainier Court and 
Harborview. The Park is a Seattle Art Museum (SAM) project on contaminated industrial 
land near downtown Seattle and a burgeoning high-end residential district. This project 
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created a regional and national showcase for art on one of the last remaining waterfront 
parcels of land in downtown Seattle.    Private donors, notably one locally-prominent 
Microsoft billionaire, provided a majority of the funding for this very high-profile 
project.  SAM, government, and community leaders appear to have agreed almost 
unanimously on the park’s location, cleanup, programming, and benefit to the city.  
Neighborhood residents appreciate the park’s positive aesthetic and financial impact on 
their area. Unlike the other two cases, however, the Museum created no public advisory 
committee nor sought input, per se, from the Belltown neighborhood in which the project 
is located.  Community organizations and community residents felt no great need to 
provide input into this project because it had no apparent downsides, a respected 
developer, a large amount of official promotion, and significant private funding.  
Neighborhood organizations, in fact, provided a great deal of support to the Museum, 
primarily at the Museum’s request, and the Sculpture Park project, by most accounts, is 
held in high esteem.  This case examines participation and community organizations 
within the context of a rapidly changing neighborhood, private funding and land 
ownership, and trust in institutions and government. 
 
I interviewed 11 individuals for this case, including representatives of the Seattle Art 
Museum, the community organizations discussed below, the Department of Planning and 
Development, the Department of Neighborhoods, City Council Staff, former officials of 
neighborhood organizations, and two residents not affiliated nor referred to me by the 
community organizations or city agencies.  The community organization representatives 
and most of the former officials are also residents of the neighborhood.  As I note below, 
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I did not interview any homeless or very low-income individuals which may have 
resulted in some missing opinions, particularly about other needs for the neighborhood 
(e.g. affordable housing). 
 
Site History and Neighborhood Context: 
 
Figure 4.1: Olympic Sculpture Park site and neighborhood 
 
The Belltown neighborhood’s transformation from industrial grittiness to residential chic 
continues with the construction of SAM’s Olympic Sculpture Park.  In fact, the area’s 
transformation began not long after settlement with the regrading of several hills in the 
neighborhood to enable Seattle’s northward expansion (Crowley, 1999).  The 
neighborhood, which forms the northern edge of the downtown business district, is one of 
the oldest in the city, close to the site of Seattle’s original white settlers’ landing in the 
mid-1800’s.  As a waterfront neighborhood, the area contained numerous industries, 
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many related to the shipbuilding and shipping industries.  One of these industries was oil: 
proximity to Alaskan and Canadian oil fields and a sheltered, year-round, deep-water port 
made Seattle a natural site for oil refineries, transfer, and storage.  Unocal Oil found the 
location ideal for such activities and set up a facility for transfer and distribution of fuel 
oil in the early 1900s (Department of Ecology [DOE], 1999).  Unocal continued fuel oil 
activities at the site along Elliot Avenue and Broad Street until 1975, by which time the 
site contained a host of structures including numerous above-ground storage tanks, one 
underground heating oil tank, and above- and below-ground product pipelines (DOE, 
1999). 
 
During Unocal’s site occupancy, leaking tanks contaminated the soil and groundwater 
with petroleum hydrocarbons (DOE, 1999; Hansen, 2006).  Unocal discovered pollution 
problems six years later, in 1981, when the company sought to sell the land for offices 
and condominiums (Stiffler, 2007).  Unocal entered into an Order on Consent with the 
state Department of Ecology in 1988 and began in situ treatment using bacteria to 
essentially “eat” the oil.  This experimental treatment failed and, after threats from DOE, 
Unocal and the state resorted to traditional excavation of over 120,000 tons of soil and 
on-site pump treatments of groundwater.  Inaccessible pockets of oil pollution remain 
under Elliott Avenue and the railroad tracks that bisect the property but, according to 
DOE, pose no threat to human health and the environment. 
 
As Unocal and other industries moved operations out of the neighborhood, residents, 
artists, and business owners moved in, attracted to the location and existing buildings.  
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Former warehousing operations provided ideal space for artists while proximity to 
highways and downtown were attractive to commercial and light-industrial uses, such as 
graphics and printing concerns supplying downtown businesses.  A growing number of 
people also viewed the area as an attractive residential district, having witnessed 
“industrial chic” areas such as SoHo in New York City grow into viable, walkable, 
historic, and unique urban neighborhoods.  The area also offered an alternative to 
Seattle’s increasing auto congestion and longer commutes.  In the mid-1970’s, City 
Council approved new zoning measures to encourage high-rise residential construction.  
This measure has resulted in the intense and ongoing densification of the neighborhood: 
for example, in the years 1995- 2002, the number of residential housing units in Belltown 
increased by over 50% (DPD, 2005).   
 
Today, the neighborhood is a study in contrasts.  The population of just under 9,000 has a 
median household income of approximately $32,000 and a per capita income of over 
$46,000, significantly lower and higher, respectively, than the city average (PSRC, 
2003).  The neighborhood also claims renters, native born, and native English speakers as 
a high majority of the population (except for the high number of renters, this is fairly 
consistent with the city average).  Belltown’s population also mirrors the city in terms of 
racial and ethnic makeup: white residents constitute almost 75% of the population in the 
neighborhood with black, Asian, and Hispanic groups each making up less than 10% of 
the remaining population (City of Seattle DPD, 2006).  Poverty rates and income levels, 
however, show sharper contrasts.  The number of households in the neighborhood 
making over $100,000 per year compares similarly to the city average yet the number of 
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households in Belltown making under $10,000 per year is almost 20% of the household 
population, far above the 9% for the city as a whole.  The neighborhood, due to its 
proximity to shelters and transportation, still claims a high homeless population despite 
the influx of wealthy residents, shoppers, and restaurant goers.  The city’s demographer 
has stated that Belltown most likely has the “sharpest disparity” in factors such as income 
and real estate (Le & Parvaz, 2002).   
 
While densification and high-end residential condominium construction soared, the 
neighborhood saw little open space added to the urban landscape -- the neighborhood has 
one of the lowest ratios of park area to population within Seattle (DOE, 1999) -- although 
one idea that would have had great impact on the neighborhood was proposed amidst the 
residential building boom in the late 20th century.  Seattle open space proponents reached 
a watershed moment in the 1990’s with the idea of creating the Seattle Commons, a 
“Central Park” for the city just to the east of Belltown in the South Lake Union 
neighborhood (another formerly industrial area becoming newly chic).  A citizen floated 
the idea of the Commons Park idea in several columns published in The Seattle Times in 
the spring of 1991 and the idea became popular enough to be put to a vote in spring 1996.  
The measure failed due to what many perceive as a lack of understanding of density, the 
importance of urban amenities, and the overall elements of successful cities (Johnson, 
2006). The Commons project also represented a turn to professionalization for public 
projects: by looking to private developers to build and develop the park and its attendant 
amenities, the Commons effort was viewed as a way to raise land values and tax revenues 
without major public expenditures, something politicians found most attractive (Iglitzin, 
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1995).  In fact, many of the Commons’ neoliberal techniques and stakeholders were 
echoed in the ensuing Olympic Sculpture Park process: the ‘real work’ of developing the 
project was carried out by many outside professionals and experts; the potential success 
of the Commons would have been partially due to the informal and low-key support of 
the mayor and his top aides; and the Commons board remained in control of the vision 
for the site and the parameters for discussions.  Although the driving force behind the 
Commons was the a group of influential private citizens who set agendas and timelines, a 
groundswell of small business owners and local residents portrayed themselves as 
“powerless” against the “powerful movers and shakers” who threatened the area with a 
loss of affordable housing units and market considerations before the needs of low-
income people (Iglitzin, 1995). 
 
 
The failure of voter approval was also a failure for Seattle’s first attempt at a sculpture 
park: John Shirley, the former president of Microsoft, and his wife Mary had proposed to 
include an area of the Seattle Commons for sculpture, within which many pieces would 
be donated from the couple’s extensive personal collection.  The couple, however, kept 
the dream of a sculpture park alive and soon discovered an interested, and potentially 
better aligned party. 
 




Figure 4.2: SAM Director Mimi Gates (along with Seattle Mayor Greg Nichols and 
Washington Governor Christine Gregoire) on Opening Day, January 20, 2007 
 
On opening day, when SAM director Mimi Gates steps up to the microphone 
to acknowledge applause, the first things she should say is “Thank you, 
Microsofties. (Hackett, 2007) 
 
Although somewhat facetious, the above quote from an opening day special section of the 
Seattle Post-Intelligencer reflects the philanthropy, interrelatedness, familiarity, and 
greatly changing face of Seattle’s economy, civic pride, and urban planning.  
Stakeholders involved in the Olympic Sculpture Park are surprisingly few, considering 
the size and scope of the endeavor.  However, fewer stakeholders appear to represent the 
enormity of private wealth in the region, the impact of the technology sector on the 
transformation of the cityscape, and the ability to “go it alone” when resources are 
marshaled for a single purpose.  “Microsofties” refers to the many current and former 
employees of Microsoft who have earned millions, and sometimes billions, of dollars 
through stocks and options in the world’s largest software company, headquartered to the 
east of Seattle in Redmond, Washington.  Such intense wealth, often coupled with youth, 
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ambition, and a bit of cockiness, translates into many things in the Seattle region: locally-
owned professional sports franchises, restoration of historic theaters, and the 
revitalization of entire neighborhoods.  New wealth also translates into support for the 
arts. 
 
Virginia Wright, who with her husband, the financier Bagley Wright, has been at 
the forefront of collecting contemporary art in Seattle and has served on the 
museum’s board since 1959, credits the change in the art climate to locally based 
entrepreneurial companies. “There wasn’t much going on until the 1980’and 
1990’s,” she said.  “It’s companies like Microsoft, Amazon, and Starbucks in such 
a big way – not just for the people directly involved but all the others who 
invested in them.  That made us all have more money to spend on art.” (Sheets, 
2007) 
 
Additionally, Mimi Gates, not incidentally, is the stepmother to Bill Gates, the chairman 
of Microsoft and for many years the world’s wealthiest person.   
 
This combination of wealth, a new sense of philanthropy, interrelatedness (some may say 
incestuousness), and home-grown familiarity puts the major stakeholders of the Olympic 
Sculpture Park on a different plane, in one sense, from many other brownfield projects 
and certainly from the other two cases in this study.  However, in another sense, there are 
striking similarities in terms of common good, local connections, trust, and the freedom 
that certain resources afford which will be explored later in this study. 
 
The top contributors to the Sculpture Park include John and Mary Shirley, the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, and Charles Simonyi (all with Microsoft affiliations) as well 
as Jeff and Susan Brotman (co-founders of Costco, the largest membership warehouse 
club chain in the world), Bagley and Virginia Wright and Robert Arnold (local 
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philanthropists) and Ann Wyckoff, whose daughter Martha, a trustee of the Trust for 
Public Land, hatched the idea of the Sculpture Park in its current location with SAM 
director Mimi Gates. 
 
In addition to these financial contributors and SAM, the Park includes other stakeholders. 
The City of Seattle maintained interest in this project from the beginning since the Park 
would add to the City’s roster of open space through private funding and not take away 
from the shrinking budget of the City’s parks department.  The City and SAM developed 
an initial concept plan for the site which they then handed off to the Park’s designers 
once they were chosen.  The Park also includes project advisors such as the People for 
Puget Sound, Transportation Choices, the Washington Park Arboretum, and the Seattle 
Aquarium who give direction on aesthetic and ecologic factors but do not appear to have 
had greater roles than those in an advisory capacity.  
 
Community organizations in the neighborhood view themselves (and are viewed by 
others) as stakeholders in this project.  Community groups assisted SAM and kept abreast 
of the project’s progress but had little input into the actual redevelopment design or 
program.  The Belltown Business Association (BBA), the Belltown Community Council 
(BCC), and the Belltown Housing and Land Use Subcommittee (BHLUS) represent 
different, but not exclusive, interests in the neighborhood.  The BBA represents the 
business interests in Belltown and does not appear to concern itself with what it sees as 
more residential concerns.  The BCC involves itself in residential issues such as public 
safety, parking, traffic, and sanitation; provides a public forum to enhance the livability 
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and safety of the Belltown neighborhood; and serves “as a liaison between Belltown and 
the City of Seattle” (Belltown Community Council [BCC], 2007).  The BHLUS conducts 
the “heavy lifting” such as producing papers on policy issues and proposed developments 
that will impact the area (Z. Batchelder, personal communication, April 5, 2007) and 
appears to be very well-informed: 
 
BHLUS is keyed in on everything.  They’ve got a couple of retired architects and 
planners.  They know more about what’s going on at City Hall than I do [laugh].  
Comp plans, anything to do with land use…there’s been so much development in 
the last ten years. They’ve watched their neighborhood completely change and so 
they’ve made it their business to pay attention to everything…and people pay 
attention to them.  Nothing happens without them knowing about it! (Seattle 
Neighborhood Coordinator) 
 
The organization places priority on three areas: following current and proposed 
developments to make sure they are consistent with Belltown’s neighborhood plan; 
promoting more parks and open space; and improving streetscapes (J. Pehrson, personal 
communication, March 19, 2007).   
 
Together, these groups feel that they represent neighborhood issues from several 
standpoints and often referred to each other in the course of this research.  Many of the 
officials interviewed for this research have maintained positions in their respective 
organizations (and sometimes multiple organizations) and other neighborhood-related 






Olympic Sculpture Park Process: 
 
The Olympic Sculpture Park rose from the ashes of the failed Seattle Commons vote in 
early 1996.  John and Mary Shirley wished to see a sculpture park on the grounds of the 
Commons and maintained their desire for this in some capacity after the vote.  Their 
vision was well-known to their friends Virginia and Bagley Wright – the Wrights and the 
Shirleys sit on SAM’s Board of Trustees – and SAM director Mimi Gates.  Although the 
Museum maintains that the opportunity for the sculpture park was in accord with a master 
plan (which envisioned adding 300,000 square feet of space over 20 years), a sculpture 
park, per se, was not necessarily the planned embodiment of that vision (Russell, 2004).    
 
In the summer of 1996, Mimi Gates and TPL trustee Martha Wyckoff discussed the idea 
of a sculpture park while on a fly fishing trip in Mongolia (Seattle Art Museum [SAM], 
2007).  Upon their return, Wyckoff asked TPL senior project manager Chris Rogers to 
conduct an inventory of sites in the Puget Sound region for a possible sculpture park.  
Rogers, Gates, Wyckoff, the Shirleys, and the Wrights identified the former Unocal site 
as high priority in early 1998 and, despite the passing of a deadline for proposals, Unocal 
reopened the bidding process for the site after Rogers flew to California to meet with 
Unocal officials (Seattle PI, 2007).  Several developers had placed bids on the site.  
Significant cleanup had occurred after the DOE and Unocal excavated soil and treated 
groundwater, and cleanup to residential standards was considered within reach for 
whichever developer took control of the site.  During this time, the Shirleys agreed to 
fund $5 million of the purchase price and endow the park’s operations with a $20 million 
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gift if SAM and TPL could acquire and raise the rest of the money for the waterfront site 
(Sheets, 2007).  
 
Unocal accepted the SAM/TPL bid for the site in late 1998 with a $100 deposit and gave 
the organizations a reduced price of $17 million.  The parties negotiated a purchase 
agreement in February 1999.  Mayor Paul Schell enthusiastically supported the project 
and agreed to work with the Museum to address improvements to adjacent Myrtle 
Edwards Park and the Alaskan Way right-of-way (DOE, 1999; SAM, 2007).  Following 
the signing of the purchase and sale agreement with Unocal, SAM entered into 
negotiations for a Prospective Purchaser Consent Decree with the DOE to define the 
Museum’s remedial action obligations as a potential future owner of the site: SAM’s 
Board of Trustees demanded that the a decree was needed before private funds for the 
project would be raised (DOE, 1999). 
 
SAM publicly announced the project in 1999 as negotiations were being finalized.  Some, 
if not many, of the neighboring residents and businesses were surprised by this 
announcement, even those who had been involved in committees and downtown issues 
for a long time. 
 
I’m a board member of the BBA.  At the time this was proposed, I was [an 
official] of the BBA and [member] of the downtown district council and I was 
pretty close friends with Chris Rogers.  The decision made to proceed on this 
appeared to me was made with the TPL and John Shirley and the Art Museum 
and Mayor Schell, long before anyone knew what was happening.  Those people 
wanted to do this and this was the site that was chosen, this was the site that was 
available.  So then it was announced ‘a sculpture park is coming,’ the 
involvement of the community groups was really to support this, not instigate it, 
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because the instigation seemed to happen long before it was announced. (BBA 
board member) 
 
The neighborhood reacted positively on this news, in part because few people had 
thought about this parcel of land becoming permanent open space.  The Belltown 
neighborhood plan had identified open space as a priority, and it has been a high priority 
for the BHLUS, but the plan never looked at the Unocal site for this desired use (Tom 
Graff, personal communication, April 5, 2007).  In fact, some people did not believe that 
the park would happen at all, even after the announcement. 
 
He [Chris Rogers] came to our meeting in ’99.  He said to us ‘well, we’d like to 
buy this old blackstock lumberyard and turn it into a sculpture park and it’s going 
to cost $14 million’ and we were all like well there’s no open space in Belltown 
and if something in the interest of the city isn’t done with this land, it’ll be turned 
into condos which we already have plenty of.  So we were all like ‘yeah, manna 
from heaven. If you think you can make it happen, go for it!’  It was the dot-com 
heady days, and there were a lot of big numbers being tossed around.  I was 
almost disbelieving – ‘sure, if you want to make that happen, go ahead [said 
sarcastically].’ (BCC official) 
 
This was not a site, with Unocal here, that the community said should be a park.  
It’s not like they didn’t say it shouldn’t be a park but if you look at the Belltown 
neighborhood plan that we were doing in 1998 there was talk of more green space 
in Belltown but this was not a site that was looked at…it was never discussed as a 
Unocal park.  I think most people, if they thought about it, thought it would be 
sold to the highest and best use: the City of Seattle can’t buy that property without 
bankrupting the parks department or putting up another levy so it was never 
contemplated.  (BBA Board member) 
 
SAM embarked on a capital campaign to raise fund for three major projects: the Olympic 
Sculpture Park, the downtown museum expansion, and the Seattle Asian Art Museum 
renovation.  Although the bulk of the money for the Sculpture Park was raised through 
major gifts from museum board members, SAM aggressively pursued public donations 




They [SAM] clearly needed to engage people from a fundraising perspective.  
They were trying to raise a hell of a lot of money and needed to sell everybody on 
this idea, so they engaged people broadly, certainly for that reason [fundraising].  
(City official) 
 
In 2001, SAM encountered what would be the two biggest obstacles of the entire project.  
The state Department of Transportation (DOT), responding to the weakened Alaskan 
Way Viaduct highway damaged in the 2001 Nisqually earthquake, told SAM that a 
tunnel might be needed to go under the sculpture park should the state and/or voters 
decide to rebuild the much-reviled viaduct in such a manner.  According to Chris Rogers, 
planning for the tunnel to extend under the Sculpture Park postponed the project’s 
progress for eighteen months, “as designers from both sides sought creative solutions for 
incorporating a six-lane buried tunnel under the new park” (SAM, 2007, p.22).  A Seattle 
newspaper and others interviewed for this project perceive this search for a solution to be 
more aggressive: “With the DOT refusing to reroute the tunnel option away from the 
park, SAM delays construction and mobilizes board trustees, patrons, politicians, and 
environmentalists.  Rogers is in charge of the effort.” (Seattle PI, 1/18/07, p. F10).  The 
tunnel option, at least for the time, was dropped due to high construction costs.  The 
opening of the park, however, may have impacted a public vote on the viaduct 
replacement. 
 
The second obstacle for SAM was another site acquisition.  The Unocal site consists of 6 
acres of the approximately 8.5 acre park.  Mayor Paul Schell promised early on, through 
city parks department head Ken Bounds, that the city would transfer a parking lot and 
strip of land along the shoreline to the park.  A third piece of land, a billiards hall at the 
corner of Elliot Avenue and Broad Street, was already purchased and had been permitted 
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for a 13-story condominium tower.  As the city-side gateway to the Sculpture Park, this 
.33-acre piece of land was crucial for aesthetics and connections to the surrounding 
neighborhood.  SAM once again marshaled resources to try and purchase this parcel, 
realizing that the cost of the land was increasing since the property owner was aware of 
how much this piece meant to SAM.  The museum negotiated a difficult purchase and 
sale agreement with the land owner and used bridge loans provided by the city to fund the 
purchase.  One interviewee stated that his organization wrote a letter of support urging 
the city to provide this loan.  The city had also considered condemning the property and 
turning it over to SAM if negotiations failed (Bishop, 2000). 
 
From this point, progress on the Park proceeded with only minor problems.  The New 
York design team of Weiss/Manfredi was chosen from 52 applicants in a design 
competition sponsored by the museum.  The architects created a design that incorporates 
Elliot Avenue and the railroad tracks that bisect the property and recreates a portion of 
the old hill that was regraded over a hundred years earlier.  Additionally, a waterfront 
streetcar maintenance building on the city-owned portion of the property was demolished 
to make room for the park.  Waterfront streetcar service, without the maintenance barn, 
has been replaced by bus service.  Several parties opposed this move but the city backed 
SAM’s vision and ordered the building and associated rails removed in 2004.  The 




Figure 4.3: Olympic Sculpture Park 
 
Public Participation and Redevelopment Outcomes: 
 
By all accounts, SAM conducted extensive outreach efforts leaving neighborhood 
residents and business owners seemingly very pleased with the results of these efforts.  
Neighbors and officials, however, make no presumptions that whatever input they had 
made any difference to the project design.  Yet all interviewees for this research 
expressed overwhelming satisfaction with the outcome of the project -- much more so 




Public participation appears to have been motivated by three  distinct factors: official 
requirements, fundraising, and support.  First, the DOE required public outreach and 
participation efforts as part of the cleanup agreement with SAM.  The agreement clearly 
details the tools, purposes, and methods for facilitating public participation in the Unocal 
site cleanup: formal public comment periods, responses to public comment, information 
repositories, and mailing lists are some of the tools.  One may notice that these tools are 
very similar to the Public Involvement Plans of the other two cases in this research 
despite not being required for this project.  SAM received no brownfields assessment 
funding from Seattle/King County brownfields office and, therefore, was not required to 
conduct a PIP.  The Seattle/King County Brownfields Office provided the Sculpture Park 
with $34,500 in Underground Storage Tank cleanup grants (“USTfields”).  One may also 
notice that the DOE participation methods, similar to those discussed in Chapter 2, are of 
a very traditional nature and not necessarily conducive to meaningful, deliberative 
participation, indicative of the one-way output of information that SAM intended to 
control.  In addition to these required participation methods, SAM also sent out several 
direct mailings across the city of Seattle, created two programs for the city-operated 
television station The Seattle Channel, and maintained up-to-date project information on 
the SAM website. 
 
Participation in this case also appears to be clearly divided between outreach, support, 
and input.  Interviewees for this research often noted the efforts of SAM using the term 
“outreach” rather than “participation” and clearly used the former term to represent a 
one-way flow of ideas about the project.  Interviewees, including those from SAM, also 
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agreed that whatever ideas they may have had for the project would most likely have 
been overruled or ignored by SAM’s director, project manager, and the project’s major 
benefactors. 
You know it’s not like we weren’t kept informed.  Mimi [SAM director Mimi 
Gardener-Gates] briefed my committee, Mimi herself came out.  And their people 
talked to us, but it wasn’t like we were in on the decisions.  And I’m not 
expressing any bitterness. (Neighborhood resident/former organization leader) 
 
I don’t think we impacted it at all. (neighborhood organization leader) 
 
SAM had a vision of a sculpture park that would be funded essentially by the 
museum and be open to the public free of charge but it definitely would be a 
private facility therefore we were going to oversee the design as well.  But people 
would say to me ‘well what is that design process?  What’s the program?  It 
would be great if we could have ballfields, etc.’ Look, you know SAM’s mission 
is the visual arts and that’s really what it’s going to be.  But you know Seattle’s a 
very democratic place [laughs] and people would say ‘you know it would be great 
if you could do XYZ’ and I would remind them that this was a property that was 
purchased on the private market and it could be 125-foot tall condo buildings.  
(SAM official) 
 
They had decided on a lot of stuff already. (neighborhood resident) 
 
It’s not like you can really influence it.  And I was more involved because I was 
on that leadership committee and I attended a lot of press conferences and public 
hearings on this on behalf of the Belltown community and on behalf of the art 
museum and I told Mimi directly and designers directly things that would be 
helpful but it’s not like they are going to listen to me.  My impression is that they 
listened to John Shirley. (neighborhood organization leader) 
 
The client group was Mimi, John Shirley, maybe the board president.  That’s it.  
You couldn’t reach them to give input. Mimi talks a good story, she acts like 
she’s very interested in what people have to say.  But at the end of the day was 
this as much her vision too?  I don’t know.  These are very good questions.  This 
was a vision that John Shirley had, the art museum bought into, we implemented 




Despite having very few chances for input on this project, all interviewees for this 
research agree that input was not the focus of the outreach: outreach was conducted for 
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financial and political support.  SAM needed to raise massive sums of money for the 
ever-increasing price tag of the Sculpture Park, despite having major benefactors.  SAM 
also needed support from the City for two key pieces of land and a guarantee that certain 
negatively-impactful projects would not proceed.  Neighbors and neighborhood 
organizations gladly supported the project and provided letters of support, money, 
testimony, and other assurances that the neighborhood was in agreement with SAM on 
the Park. 
 
So when it was announced that a sculpture park is coming, the involvement of the 
community groups was really to support this, not instigate it. (neighborhood 
organization board member) 
 
I donated to put my name on the walkway.  That was a direct result of the 
presentation. (neighborhood resident) 
 
In fact, the role I played is Chris [Rogers] would contact me and say ‘we need to 
get this billiards site.  Some developer bought it because he knew the sculpture 
park wanted it.  So write a letter to the city of behalf of the neighborhood saying 
buy this piece of land so that it can be incorporated into the park.’  Things like 
that.  I went down to City Council chambers once to lobby with Mimi and Chris. 
(neighborhood organization leader) 
 
Once it was announced there’s this gazillionairre who’s willing to front the money 
and make this happen and has got the Calder piece, then it was a matter of ‘does 
the neighborhood support it and how much support are you willing to give to help 
create a public front for this project, not that they needed a front for this but Chris 
[Rogers] needed support for the art museum for federal and state grants and 
permitting with the City of Seattle and it helped if the neighborhood embraced it.  
So we were kind of used in that way. (former neighborhood organization leader) 
 
Without the city’s cooperation, I don’t think this would have happened. 
(neighborhood organization leader) 
 
We were certainly substantial community supporters.  We generated some 
fundraising activity on their behalf including a contribution from us on behalf of 
our members.  But probably our greatest contribution was in support as the art 
museum went through the travails of dealing with the transportation consequences 
and the general approval process of dealing with the city.  There were instances 
and sometimes at a very late notice to come to events that were being held by the 
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King County Council as they did an onsite hearing and things like that just to 
show our community support for the museum’s intention of converting the space 
to the sculpture park we now have. (neighborhood organization leader) 
 
The organizations provided a lot of support for some things that we were going 
after, so they were helpful there. (SAM official) 
 
SAM’s reputation proved to be a major asset in this project and influenced public 
participation and neighborhood organization reaction to the project.  Most interviewees 
for this research expressed negative views toward the City of Seattle Parks Department 
and an overwhelming opinion that this project could not have been accomplished if the 
Parks Department were in charge.  Ironically, the Parks Department has an extensive 
public participation process that would undoubtedly have allowed the public greater input 
and influence into the Sculpture Park’s final design.  In fact, interviewees often stated 
that the Sculpture Park, even with extensive funding, would never have happened with 
public input due to many competing objectives.  On the other hand, SAM’s reputation for 
quality and civic objectives created good will among stakeholders and a level of trust not 
seen with the Parks Department or other entities. 
 
The city [City of Seattle Parks Department] has shown a total inability of 
managing urban parks in Seattle. (former neighborhood organization leader) 
 
I mean if it was the Corps of Engineers, I bet we would have just ripped them 
because they don’t have a good reputation in this town.  God knows if it was 
Burlington Northern, forget it.  There would have been a lot of concern.  If it was 
a private developer, it would have gotten intense scrutiny. (former neighborhood 
organization leader) 
 
We were sure SAM was doing a good job.  We weren’t concerned that they were 
going to rape the area. (neighborhood resident and organization member) 
 
[What if the City Parks Department was doing the same project?] We would be in 





Finally, all people interviewed for this research consider this type of project to be 
essentially unobjectionable.  As opposed to more high-rise condominium development or 
office space, a park is a “no-brainer,” according to a city official.  Others uniformly agree 
that open space is warmly welcomed in a neighborhood that is sorely lacking in such an 
amenity. 
 
Although minor compared to the compliments received on this project, I uncovered one 
negative theme during this research related to the reputation of SAM and the aftermath of 
such a large project.  All parties, with the exception of the waterfront streetcar supporters, 
appear to be quite satisfied with the outcome of this project, yet a few interviewees 
commented that the aggressive and privileged attitude of SAM possibly damaged the 
museum’s reputation with city officials in the Department of Planning and Development.  
SAM approached several city requirements, such as permitting and getting access to the 
city-owned waterfront parcel, as something that need not be discussed due to the civic 
benefit of the park.  A senior city planning official commented that SAM “pissed off a lot 
of people at the city [Planning Department].” 
I heard that in terms of the whole permitting process that they [SAM] were a 
major pain in the butt to work with. (city official) 
 
It’s an elitist organization.  (former neighborhood organization leader) 
 
Residents and neighborhood organization officials indeed appear to view SAM as an 
elitist organization but do not seem to mind.  City officials expressed most of the negative 
comments and basically seemed bothered that SAM did not want to follow city planning 
protocol.  Whether or not this will affect SAM’s working relationship with the City of 




A multitude of factors affected public participation and the role of community 
organizations in the Olympic Sculpture Park project. Power, in this case, resided with 
essentially two entities: John Shirley and Mimi Gates (as representative of the board of 
SAM).  John primarily approved the site, chose the programming, and chose and 
approved the architects and designs.  He could exercise this power because of his large 
financial contribution and the threat of pulling this funding essentially forced concessions 
by other stakeholders: without his funding, the city would get no park, SAM would get 
no new exhibit space, and local residents would get no new open space.   
 
SAM also had some power but much more influence and authority.  SAM, in terms of 
project logistics and specifics, sometimes heavy-handed city officials in order to gain 
concessions (additional land, blocking tunnel plans, etc.).  SAM also had a great deal of 
respect from the public and used this authority to its advantage, particularly in 
fundraising. SAM’s reputation, private funding, strong outreach, and the benefits of open 
space (particularly when compared to additional condominium and office development in 
a neighborhood saturated with such uses) created an atmosphere of minimal participation 
yet strong community support. Despite the appearance of shared power with local 
organizations on certain project components, individuals Individuals and community 
organizations provided very little, if any, input into the Park design and space program 
despite having a history of strong community involvement on other projects and a 
reputation for keeping up-to-date on developments within the neighborhood borders.  In 
fact, several interviewees discouraged more public participation and noted that the design 
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of the park, and indeed the park itself, would have been compromised with extensive 
public input. 
 
When we hired Weiss Manfredi, we had a very public process, we had a 
committee that made the selection and did the interviewing but we also brought 
the candidates to town to do presentations, to respond to questions, we wanted to 
see how people would interact with the neighbors and others.  It was not a public 
committee, it was a SAM committee, with some community representation but it 
was very much a SAM-directed, controlled process.  My bias is that good design 
gets diluted through that democratic process.  You don’t want input.  It doesn’t 
serve the design process well.  This is not a public park but I can certainly tell you 
that I think a lot of public parks are really poorly designed because they are trying 
to achieve consensus and I think a lot of them are better driven by a vision that is 
smart and well-informed and certainly responds to feedback but you want to stay 
true to that vision.  And I think a public process will tell you whether you are on 
track or not to doing something that is the right thing for a certain location. (SAM 
official) 
 
It [the Sculpture Park] wouldn’t have been focused on art.  It would have been 
diffused into a bunch of other little needs for a bunch of other little constituents.  
It would have been fractured, it would have lost its cohesion.  There would be a 
hygiene center for the homeless, more parking, a City Light power station…  It 
would have become a tug of war between the mayor and council.  I don’t think 
there was any tug of war between Mimi and John and Chris over press coverage 
or anything like that. (neighborhood organization leader) 
 
Interviewees added that they not only trusted SAM and the design of the park but also 
distrusted the City’s efforts at public participation.  Interviewees feel that the city is often 
misguided in its efforts to engage the public and often gets caught up in bureaucracy and 
process.  Too often, interviewees explained, the city falls into the trap of the “Seattle 
Process” and attempts to please as many people as possible, at the expense of clear, 
quality design, programmatic goals, and a cohesive long-range vision for the future. 
But having exposure to the parks department, they struggle with bureaucracy and 
their own rules and regulations like any other department.  The benefit of a 
private organization is that while they have to meet all the standards that the city 
would establish, they aren’t tied up in their own underwear in terms of who they 




You know the city always struggles on outreach on whatever issues, on projects, 
on programs. (city official) 
 
I think this region doesn’t do a very good job with the ‘vision thing.’  We don’t, 
for whatever reason.  We’re not very successful at doing this kind of broad…even 
in our comprehensive planning, it was more about looking at elements: land use, 
public safety, and parks and open space, and then sort of planning neighborhood 
by neighborhood.  But we don’t create this vision of what the city or even the 
region ought to be like with broadly involving not only the key political and other 
leaders but the citizenry more broadly in terms of crafting a vision for a desirable 
future and moving forward together.  This area is notorious for being fractionated 
and doing things patchwork and the Seattle Commons was an attempt at it and it 
failed. (city official) 
 
Outreach is outreach: you don’t have to reinvent the wheel. But it’s the 
responsiveness and the decision making that would have been mired down [by the 
city].  There would have been too many people participating and I don’t mean 
activists.  Too much in city government would have been participating in it to 
allow things to move forward in a timely manner.  There’s a reason there hasn’t 
been another world’s fair in Seattle!  They’ve allowed the process to take things 
over.  (neighborhood organization leader) 
 
 
It is doubtful that organizations and residents had any real power in this case.  
Organizations and residents could not threaten to pull support since the region-wide 
scope of the project would have drowned out the dissent.  Organizations may have had 
some impact and power on getting some details worked (e.g. additional land parcels) but 
this probably would have happened anyway since city officials were strongly, but behind-
the-scenes, supportive of this project.  With no deprivations to inflict and no great 
conflict of interest, community organizations and residents had no real power in this case 
and, thus, no real participation opportunities and decision making ability.  City officials 
also wielded little power in this case despite having the ability to transfer land to SAM 
and alter other projects that would have negatively affected the Sculpture Park.  City 
officials also did not have any conflict of interest with SAM over this project: officials 
wanted this park as much as SAM and John Shirley.  This project was also a benefit to 
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city officials since the city did not have great authority in this case due to the low public 
opinion of the parks department. 
 
 
The neighborhood’s socio-economic dynamics do not appear to play a strong role in this 
case.  Despite a majority white and increasingly wealthy population (populations who 
have traditionally had stronger roles in planning processes), community organizations 
and individuals could not influence the design and programming of the Park.  The 
interviewees for this case, however, acknowledged that the fact that the project was a 
park greatly influenced their need to participate.  The area’s significant homeless and 
poor population did not have a significant voice in this project either but since I did not 
interview any homeless people for this research, I can not be sure of the their satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction with the Sculpture Park. 
 
The neighborhood’s rapid development and significant rental population may partly 
explain the neighborhood’s acceptance of the Park project and the absence of noticeable 
conflict in this case.  Residents and community organizations, used to years of 
condominium development and increased density, may have been more grateful for an 
open space project than other neighborhoods in Seattle.  Unlike the Rainier Court 
neighborhood, for example, which strongly supported increased affordable housing and 
commercial development, Belltown residents expressed an interest in open space (but as I 
noted above, my interviews may have missed homeless and/or low income individuals 
who would prefer affordable housing).  Renters, who constitute a large portion of the 
neighborhood population, may not have felt that they had a significant stake in the 
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neighborhood nor knowledge of neighborhood projects due to their new tenure.  Renters 
may also not have been aware of the community organizations in their neighborhood due 
to unfamiliarity with neighborhood resources. Framed by the literature debates in Chapter 
2, the Olympic Sculpture Park exhibits some clear characteristics.  SAM provided 
outreach (but not input) on the Park redevelopment and followed an already-existing 
cleanup plan with traditional roles for public participation, and those interviewed did not 
express a concern for the cleanup.  In one sense, community organizations played a 
mediating role by ‘defining realities’ and provided a framework for understanding the 
project, the cleanup, and the neighborhood’s needs.  They did this primarily by informing 
and educating (the BHLUS, more than the other organizations, advocated and seemed 
more adversarial for some projects in the neighborhood but it was unclear to me how 
much the group actually encouraged individuals to participate in the planning process).  
However, in their dissemination of infrmation, organizations downplayed the cleanup, 
whether by trusting the DOE agreement or by not fully understanding the severity of the 
contamination, and this translated into individuals’ lack of concern for the site pollution.  
The organizations also helped gauge the neighborhood’s concerns and supported the 
developer in this case.  Some could view this case as a cooptation of community 
organizations by SAM and city officials but organizations often fight other projects in the 
neighborhood (against the density-building stance of the current mayoral administration) 
and residents expressed a desire for open space before the idea for the project even 
existed.  Without a doubt, however, economic, political, and spatial contexts played a 
strong role in this case.  Private funding, private property, a respected and well-connected 
institution, government endorsement, and a dense, waterfront, upscale neighborhood 
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impacted the outcome and process of this project and produced very desirable results 
with very little meaningful public participation.  Compared to the other two cases that 
follow, input on the project was significantly less and the community organizations 
played essentially a non-adversarial role with the developer of the site yet interviewees 
overwhelmingly support this project more than Harborview’s Ninth and Jefferson 









Harborview Medical Center, Ninth & Jefferson Building 
 
 
As the second case, Harborview represented a kind of “middle ground” between the other 
cases in this study.  The developer (Harborview Medical Center), the neighborhood 
groups (some more active in this project than others), and the Citizens Advisory 
Committee played roles that contrasted with the Rainier Court and Olympic Sculpture 
Park cases with both lesser and greater involvement by individuals, influence by the 
community organizations, and satisfaction with the planning process and project 
outcomes. 
 
Harborview Medical Center, a quasi-public entity, cleaned up a former dry cleaning site 
for the location of a new clinic and office tower in the heart of a residential neighborhood 
with a history of large, adjacent, institutional uses.  Harborview’s redevelopment of the 
site maintained consistency with a master plan for the area.  Community organizations in 
the neighborhood conducted minimal outreach to residents on this project despite being 
active and powerful stakeholders in other neighborhood planning projects: individuals 
participated of their own accord primarily through the outreach efforts of the medical 
center.  Community organizations, however, maintained a pivotal link between the 
medical center, Harborview’s Citizens Advisory Committee, and officials with the city’s 
Department of Neighborhoods and Department of Planning and Development.  The 
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community organizations in the neighborhood did not have a great effect on the outcome 
of this project, specifically, but significantly impacted the creation of the institutional 
master plan, which guided the brownfields redevelopment.  
 
I interviewed 12 people for this case.  Interviewees represented the CAC, Harborview 
Medical Center, the Department of Neighborhoods, the Department of Planning and 
Development, the adjacent affordable housing development and various neighborhood 
organizations discussed in this case, and two residents who were encountered on the 
street and not affiliated with the neighborhood organizations (one resident occasionally 
attends meetings, the other rarely does so).  One, and possibly two, of the interviewees 
live below the poverty level. 
 
Site history and neighborhood context: 
 




Figure 5.1: Harborview Ninth & Jefferson Building site and neighborhood 
 
First Hill is one of Seattle’s oldest and most changed neighborhoods.  The neighborhood 
started out as a tony area of town for the late 19th century elite who wanted to escape the 
skid row and crowded conditions of downtown to the higher ground and better air quality 
of the Hill.  As residents continued to move east with the advent of better transportation 
and accessibility to the farther reaches of newly fashionable Capitol Hill, First Hill’s 
better air became attractive to hospitals.  By the early 20th century, the neighborhood was 
known as “Pill Hill” due to the concentration of hospitals: locals still refer to the area by 
this moniker.  Hospitals and medical-related services continue to constitute a major 
portion of the local economy and land uses.  The medical field makes up the highest 
percentage of jobs in the First Hill neighborhood and the hospitals are internationally 
renowned for treatment in many specialties (Seattle PI, April 26, 1997). 
 
The neighborhood underwent economic and residential transitions by the middle of the 
20th century, a transition that continues to the present day.  The elite residents who had 
first settled the neighborhood moved out and were replaced by a more economically and 
racial diverse populace.  The neighborhood’s residents are more economically 
disadvantaged, transient, and slightly more racially and ethnically diverse than the city as 
a whole.  The population almost exclusively (close to 90%) rents their housing and falls 
significantly below the city average for household and per capita income levels.  The 
poverty level for the neighborhood is twice the city average.  Residents are primarily 




Higher density residential construction continues to replace older, single-family 
residences and First Hill claims the second highest residential density in the city.  The 
First Hill Urban Village neighborhood plan of 1998 called for more housing and a 
preference for a variety of housing types, including affordable workforce housing (City 
of Seattle, 2008).  Despite these calls, some residents perceive a loss of affordable 
housing in the neighborhood, particularly rental housing (Seattle PI, 4/26/97; Debby 
Gibby interview).  As regional housing market costs have increased, along with the 
demand for affordable housing among the neighborhood’s economically disadvantaged, 
the number of affordable units in the neighborhood decreases due to condominium 
conversions and expanding institutional uses.  A large number of condominiums and 
market-rate apartments are currently under construction on First Hill (particularly on the 
west side of the Hill, surrounding the Ninth & Jefferson site) in response to the increased 
cache of city living and the inconvenience of long commutes, and apartment rents are 
rising as condo conversions sharply reduce the number of available apartments (Jones, 
2007).  Housing affordability levels in the Puget Sound region have dropped to an all-
time low (Prosperity Partnership, 2007).  Housing densities and the residential 
concentrations remain among the highest in the city and region, yet continue to compete 
for space with some of the largest institutions in the Pacific Northwest, which are 
expanding programmatically and spatially.   
 
How First Hill will grow into the future may depend in part on the First Hill Urban 
Village neighborhood plan adopted as part of the city’s comprehensive plan.  As part of 




First Hill envisions itself to be: 
• A home to people with a full range of incomes, abilities, and interests 
• A regional center for state-of-the-art health services 
• A dynamic neighborhood ready to meet the challenges of the future 
• A community that celebrates its rich history and cultural heritage 
• A premier city neighborhood with opportunities to grow 
• A premier business and employment center with opportunities to grow (“First 
Hill Neighborhood Plan” 2007) 
 
The visions and goals laid out in the plan, and seen clearly in this case study, reflect the 
constraints and tension witnessed today between institutional uses and residents, 
economic and community development, affordability and growth, and historic 
preservation and new construction. 
 
Harborview Medical Center and Major Institution designation: 
Harborview Medical Center began as a six-bed King County welfare hospital in a two-
story South Seattle building in 1877.  In 1931, when the center wing of the present 
hospital location was completed, King County Hospital's name was changed to 
Harborview (Harborview Medical Center [HMC], 2007 A).  Harborview Medical Center 
is owned by King County, governed by the Harborview Board of Trustees, and managed 
by the University of Washington.  The hospital serves as a multi-state regional level 1 
trauma center, able to respond to major catastrophic events, particularly earthquakes in 
the Pacific Northwest. 
 
Harborview lies in a Major Institution Overlay District, as designated by the City of 
Seattle’s land use code.  The Major Institution designation began in the early 1980’s in 
response to programmatic and spatial expansion by institutions across the city (Seattle 
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Planning Commission, 2000).  An official at the city’s Department of Neighborhoods 
summarized the origin and current structure of the designation in an interview for this 
research: 
 
Seattle found many years ago that there was a great deal of conflict, especially 
with medical institutions, related to the transition in Seattle between being a state-
serving city and a regional-serving city. After the 1960’s when Seattle began to 
explode, many of our institutions, or hospitals especially, began to be regional 
trauma centers, for instance for Harborview they serve Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho, Alaska.  Because of that, as a result they began to explode in growth.  And 
as they began to expand out into communities, the inevitable conflict between the 
scale and nature of development required to support a regionally serving hospital, 
like Harborview, and the existing development surrounding it, which was often 
very low density, often single family in many cases.  The city had a dilemma – 
how do we deal with that?  Some cities developed simply an institution zone.  We 
found that because of the way our city was oriented and the location of things we 
found that wasn’t very worthwhile because if you were looking at a specific 
institution zone using any kind of standard zoning or land use criteria, you could 
never justify the kind of transitions along the edges that you were getting.  So 
instead the city negotiated a compromise.  The institutions got the ability to 
almost virtually ignore zoning.  An overlay would be established.  They could 
propose to the city the changing of any development standards or criteria within 
that overlay zone.  The underlying zoning would continue: in some institutions 
it’s single family with a 37 foot height limit but their overlay zone may go up to 
250 feet. And they did – almost all the institutions did that.  In exchange for 
allowing that process the community was given a couple of assurances.  The 
community was told ‘we’re going to put a boundary around the institutions and 
they will not be allowed to grow without coming back to the city and asking for 
change in their boundary beyond that. But within that boundary, they could be 
quite intense.  And, 2, you will be involved and the city will play a brokering role 
with you, the community, and the development of plans and programs and the 
heights and everything within that zone.  And in order to do that we’ll form a 
formally civic-appointed citizens committee for each institution that oversees 
community involvement in the development of that plan. 
 
According to the city’s land use code, Major Institution overlay district rules supersede 
underlying zoning for the area (Seattle Land Use Code, 23.69.006).  Additionally, the 
design of buildings at major institutions (educational or medical campuses) or other 
governmental entities (county, state or federal) are not required to be reviewed by one of 
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the City of Seattle's boards or commissions, such as the design review process discussed 
in Chapter 3.  The “civic-appointed citizens committee,” the Citizens Advisory 
Committee (CAC), appointed for the creation of the master plan, has since morphed into 
the second, standing committee that is still in existence today.   
 
The land use code, as discussed above, dictates the composition of the CAC and the 
Department of Neighborhoods enlists a protocol for formation.  The Committee consists 
of approximately twelve individuals representing local residents, land owners, renters, 
and businesses, as well as users of the institution and the institution itself.  Solicitation 
letters go out to mailing lists for everyone that lives within two blocks of the institution, 
every community organization in the district, an institution-created list of possible 
candidates, and the neighborhood coordinators’ contacts in their jurisdiction.  Notices are 
also placed in the city’s land use bulletin, the paper of general record, and the local 
newspaper.  The Department of Neighborhoods also follows up with phone calls and 
emails to others that they feel may not be captured in the previous manner.  “We typically 
get, depending on if it’s a ‘hot’ institution with an issue or not, 50-60 volunteers for 12 
members plus alternates” (city official).  The land use code specifies that committee 
members should have some relevant experience.  The CAC, according to the city’s land 
use code and to city officials interviewed for this research, is “balanced, independent, and 
representative” (Seattle Land Use Code, 23.69.032) and, “at least if it’s functioning well, 
forms a bridge between the community and the institution. It doesn’t always happen.” 




A city official admits that the original master plan CAC contains much more influence 
than the standing committee.  The master plan CAC produces one of three documents 
(the others produced by Harborview and the city’s Department of Planning and 
Development) of supposedly equal weight for review by city council for final Master 
Plan approval.  “They have a lot of power at that point” (city official interview).  After 
plan approval and transition to the standing committee, the CAC is strictly advisory and 
no longer has the statutory role before the hearing examiner and the city council and 
“sometimes it’s a reality that people on the standing committee struggle with.” (city 
official interview).  A resident and member of the original and standing CAC agrees: 
“one thing you learn if you are on the citizens advisory committee is that the word 
‘advisory’ does not mean that you decide, and if you think that the word ‘advisory’ 
means that you decide you are going to be an even unhappier camper.” (resident/CAC 
member interview). 
 
Stakeholders & Community Organizations: 
In addition to Harborview Medical Center and the CAC, the Ninth and Jefferson project 
includes other neighborhood stakeholders.  The neighborhood supports several active and 
well-known neighborhood organizations involved in the Ninth and Jefferson (NJB) 
project: the First Hill Improvement Association (FHIA); the First Hill Community 
Council (FHCC), which was disbanded for a few years and only recently reformed; and 
the Yesler Terrace Community Council (YTCC).  I confirmed the relevance of these 
organizations to the NJB project with Ted Divina and Jose Cervantes, neighborhood 
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coordinators for the Central District and Capitol Hill/First Hill respectively, as well as 
with other interviewees.  
 
The Community Councils represent neighborhood interests to the larger neighborhood 
district councils.  The First Hill Improvement Association, founded in 1958 by a group of 
concerned residents, originally fought attempts by the State Department of Transportation 
to have just one overpass across the new Interstate 5 highway connecting First Hill with 
downtown Seattle. Their efforts brought 4 overpasses, and created the foundation for a 
community group that has fought for the interests of the area for over 46 years (First Hill 
Improvement Association, 2007).  The FHIA promotes the area, keeps citizens abreast of 
events in the community, and represents residents, business owners, the hospitals, and 
property owners (FHIA official interview): this differs from the First Hill Community 
Council which represents only neighborhood residents (city officials interviews).  
 
I would like to make a note about the FHIA at this point that may provide some 
explanation for the group’s involvement on the NJB project.  An official at the FHIA is 
also a senior project manager at one of Seattle’s largest real estate development firms.  
When I first contacted this official to request an interview about the NJB, she responded 
that the NJB was essentially of no concern for her organization, nor should it be a 
concern for the neighborhood residents: 
As far as I am aware, there has been absolutely no discussion of environmental 
issues regarding this site with our group.  As a developer in Seattle, the handling 
of environmental issues on any individual project is never cause for public 
discussion --- that is between the developer, lender, DOE, and any known 
adjacent property owner that is directly effected.   There is no "public comment 
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process," therefore we have nothing to offer on this site nor any knowledge that it 
was a brownfields issue. 
 
I received the following response after sending a second request for an interview: 
 
It’s not an unwillingness to talk -- we just don’t know anything about the site (at 
all).   The contact I gave you at Opus [the contractor] is much more familiar with 
that area and the development around Harborview Hospital (owned by the 
county).  Since it’s being developed as additional medical office support for the 
hospital, there isn’t much interface between the public and the development 
process. 
 
Further interviews and documentation research show, however, that there is indeed a 
public comment process, there was some interface between the public and Harborview, 
and the FHIA does have some concerns with new institutional development in the 
neighborhood, which will be discussed below.  Subsequently, this official contacted me 
several months after this email exchange to speak about the NJB and FHIA’s role in the 
neighborhood.  According to this official, FHIA views itself as “the conscience of the 
neighborhood” and the “enforcer of the plan” (neighborhood plan) and provides a 
“friendly reminder” about the provisions of the plan that developers, including 
Harborview, must follow. 
 
Ninth and Jefferson Building Process: 
The Ninth and Jefferson Building project continues the expansion of the Harborview 
Medical Center into the First Hill neighborhood (see Figure 5.2).  The NJB project 
involves the development of an entire block of First Hill with approximately 450,000 feet 
of space in a 14-story tower for the Harborview Medical Center.  The project is to house 
a center for infectious disease control, the King County Medical Examiner, laboratories, 
the Involuntary Treatment Act Courtroom, retail, and underground parking (HMC, 2006 
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B).  The Project is part of a larger HMC expansion and earthquake stabilization project, 
funded through a $193 million voter-approved bond issue.  Of the $193 million, $120.3 
million will be used for cleanup and redevelopment of this new facility.  In addition, as 
requested by the surrounding community, the new building will have 2,000 square feet of 
retail space and will create an estimated 220 temporary construction jobs and 40 
permanent retail jobs (Public Involvement Plan application). 
 
Figure 5.2: Harborview Ninth & Jefferson Building site and downtown Seattle (background) 
 
Residential uses occurred on the NJB site from the late 1800’s until 1960.  In about 1960, 
the residential dwelling was demolished and a commercial building was constructed at 
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the site.  Since that time, the site has been leased to a variety of commercial enterprises, 
including laundromats, dry cleaning, restaurants and a beauty salon.  The site contained 
rental housing and two businesses prior to NJB construction: the Happy Garden 
Restaurant and the coin-operated White Town Laundry (PIP document and Harborview 
official interview).  A former governor of Washington owned the site prior to purchase 
by Harborview.   
 
The NJB project falls within the purview of the Major Institution Master Plan (MIMP) 
for the area.  The project as such has been in the crosshairs of the Medical Center for 
several years and within the consciousness of the neighboring public and the CAC. The 
Plan called for construction on the Ninth and Jefferson site and allowed buildout of the 
entire block up to 11 stories.  The Master Plan originally called for a two-phase NJB 
project: construction of the underground parking garage and 5-story building base paid 
for by the original bond followed by the tower and, most likely, another voter-approved 
bond several years later.   
 
Input for the master plan and the NJB project began when the CAC for the Master Plan 
formed in 1994 or 1995 (city official interview).  According to King County’s Public 
Involvement Plan for the NJB project, “the primary mechanism for involving the local 
community in cleanup decisions and reuse planning” is the CAC.  The original CAC 
completed their charge with the plan approval by the City Council in 1999.  The original 
CAC included members of the FHIA, the YTCC, and the FHCC.  Only a member of the 




King County put the Harborview Bond Project bond before voters in November 2000 to 
fund construction of two adjacent projects: the NJB and the Inpatient Expansion Building 
and Seismic Upgrade (IEBSU).  Voters approved $193 million for both projects with 
NJB getting a majority of the funding.  According to the NJB project’s public 
involvement plan, Harborview held a community charette in 2001 involving the CAC, 
First Hill residents, former patients, social service agencies, King County and the City of 
Seattle (PIP, Attachment 5).  No one outside of Harborview interviewed for this research 
mentioned this charette. 
 
King County purchased the NJB site in September 2003.  The county conducted a Phase 
I site investigation, discovering past dry cleaning operations, and Phase II soil and 
groundwater sampling under the parking lot and sidewalks in anticipation of the 
purchase.  The Phase II sampling identified detectable levels of tetrachloroethylene.  The 
tetrachloroethylene contamination at the site is presumed to have originated from historic 
dry cleaning operations. 
 
King County, through the City and County’s joint Brownfields office, applied for an EPA 
brownfields cleanup grant in 2004 and received $200,000 for the removal of the 
tetrachloroethylene contaminated soil (EPA brownfields fact sheet, 2004).  Beginning 
approximately at the time of application for the grant, Harborview, DPD, and the CAC 
conducted almost all of the public participation efforts for this project.  The three groups 
met throughout 2004 to discuss and coordinate strategies on potential issues with the site, 
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primarily design changes from the original master plan and some traffic impacts.  
However, these issues were slight enough to warrant no further action from what was 
already designated in the master plan. (city official interview). 
 
DPD required standard notification procedures for this project: 
 
We typically do a public notice within 300 feet of the site, a mailing notice, and 
then we also put out the white board on the site itself.  And I think that maybe the 
way things are laid out up there that there aren’t very many residential units 
within 300 feet….we also do an online information bulletin. (city official 
interview). 
 
The general public could access and comment on the cleanup plan for the site, called an 
Analysis of Brownfields Cleanup Alternatives (ABCA), from May 2, 2005 to June 1, 
2005 (HMC, 2007 C).  The cleanup plan received no comments: 
 
I received absolutely zero comments…For whatever reason, we didn’t receive any 
comments on any issue related to Harborview.  Maybe the folks that were 
interested were well-informed early on by the CAC or maybe Harborview did 
some of their own outreach early on, which could have very well happened. (city 
official interview) 
 
The CAC and Harborview did indeed conduct their own outreach but whether that 
outreach focused on cleanup or redevelopment issues remains unclear.  The CAC’s 
outreach appears limited to reporting back to their constituents and gathering public 
sentiment regarding project issues.  Since the land use code states a preference for several 
CAC members with organizational and/or professional affiliations, there does appear to 
be a CAC link to community groups, property owners, residents, and business groups.  
Harborview, as part of their ongoing outreach for the Master Plan and outreach stated in 
the brownfields cleanup grant public involvement plan, utilized several participation 
methods.  Harborview conducted the aforementioned community charette in 2001 (which 
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ultimately resulted in the decision to not vacate neighborhood streets, much to the delight 
of neighborhood residents interviewed for this research), produces a quarterly newsletter 
on capital projects, sends emails to interested parties, maintains a website for capital 
projects, attends community meetings when asked, and “knocks on doors” of adjacent 
residents.  As part of the Master Plan guidelines in the land use code, Harborview also 
maintains a publicly-accessible data repository for the project.  Harborview officials told 
me that their “intent is for everyone’s voice to be heard clearly…we stay in touch with 
our neighbors” (Harborview official interview).  Harborview received several public 
comments and responded to each comment in writing (these comments will be discussed 
below). 
 
Cleanup activities commenced in August 2005 in accordance with the Washington State 
Department of Ecology’s Voluntary Cleanup Program and a determination of “No 
Further Action” was issued in the fourth quarter of 2006 (HMC, 2007 C).  
 
The NJB project encountered a major stumbling block in the course of redevelopment 
negotiations.  Turner Construction negotiated $15 million more to accommodate higher 
construction costs for the Inpatient Expansion Building and Seismic Upgrade project 
across the street.  This increase, coupled with an additional $15 million increase in 
estimates for the NJB, left a $30 million shortfall (Ervin, 2006; Cohen, 2006 A).  To 
address this shortfall, the King County Facilities Management Division proposed the 
option of using a lease-lease back approach for building occupancy and the Harborview 
Bond Oversight Committee developed a strategy to continue the project (County 
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Executive Correspondence 9/18/06).  Essentially, Harborview turned over construction of 
the NJB to the National Development Council, a private corporation, who then hired the 
project developer.  The National Development Council will technically own the building 
when it is completed and lease it back to King County/Harborview Medical Center for 
$13.6 million a year until construction bonds are paid off, at which point the county will 
take ownership of the building (Cohen, 2006 B).  The deal, which was approved by King 
County Council on October 30, 2006, also allows the NJB to be constructed in one phase 
and with three additional stories.  The design alteration allows greater setbacks from the 
street and seems to appeal to stakeholders involved in the project.  The Ninth and 
Jefferson Building project is scheduled to be completed at the end of 2008. 
 
Public Participation and Redevelopment Outcomes: 
Despite the appearance of extensive outreach efforts, both required and stakeholder-
initiated, stakeholders in the NJB project appear to have mixed feelings about public 
participation and the influence of community organizations in this process.  Stakeholders 
addressed several issues apparently to successful completion but others remain 
unresolved.  Perhaps the greatest feeling about this process from the residents’ 
perspective was summed up best by a local resident and member of the CAC: “part of 
[the planning process with Harborview] has to do with an awareness that stopping the 
train is not possible so let’s soundproof the station!”   Although Harborview officials see 
the planning process for the NJB as “completely collaborative,” many interviewees for 





Public participation for the NJB project occurred in two specific stages and this impacted 
the level and influence of participation efforts.  The CAC formed for the creation of the 
Master Plan exerted much more influence and appears to have had a great amount of say 
in the final Plan, given the constraints of the CAC’s regulatory origins (discussed below).  
All of the interviewees for this research agree that the Master Plan CAC was particularly 
influential in expressing the neighborhood’s concerns for the development of the 
Harborview campus and the NJB in particular: 
 
That’s the only way to have any community control of power – to be a part of the 
committee that forms and works on the original Master Plan and then get on the 
standing committee.  Those are the steps to power and influence. 
(resident/organization member) 
 
Obviously, the CAC would have had a venue for that early on [referring to public 
comments on the plan]. (city official) 
 
Yes, that committee [the CAC] was involved in monitoring a lot of things that 
were related to the institution’s plan, and brownfields, and to the general 
development of the NJB. (city official) 
 
It [the CAC for the Master Plan] has some fairly significant oversight functions, it 
doesn’t have control over anything but its opinions are taken very seriously by the 
mayor and city council and hearing examiner. (city official) 
 
But the nature of the discussions focuses on the impacts of the building itself, not 
necessarily the design of the building or whether the building should even be built at all: 
 
The concern was…they [the CAC] got involved in things like haul routes.  How 
are materials going in and out of the neighborhood?  Is it protected?  Are they 
adequately assured that contaminated materials are not going to be further 




Our concern is where the building meets the ground.  Issues like retail, parking, 
sidewalks, lighting, safety and traffic.  Traffic is a major concern. (organization 
official) 
 
No we don’t have the ability to stop projects – we do have the ability to move 
truck routes. (resident/CAC member) 
 
Most stakeholders view the CAC as reasonably representative of the neighborhood and 
neighborhood issues.  Only one interviewee for this research expressed some frustration 
with the composition for the CAC, stating that she believes the Department of 
Neighborhoods deliberately tries to keep her and the neighborhood organization that she 
represents off the Committee because she is viewed as a ‘troublemaker’ and someone 
who will cause disruption to the planning process (see quote below).  Most neighbors, 
community organizations and officials believe that the CAC is fair and as representative 
as it is allowed to be despite the fact that the city has the ultimate say in who is on the 
committee: 
 
I think it is now [representative of the neighborhood].  I think that in its original 
configuration it missed the north side.  You are aware that it is the city that puts 
together the CAC right? (resident/CAC member) 
 
This is very unusual: they have added people to the CAC when it became clear 
that there was a group in the surrounding population that didn’t get asked in the 
first place. (resident/CAC member) 
 
He [the director of the Department of Neighborhoods] may come back to me and 
say ‘hey, you don’t have enough diversity’ at the same time we’re trying to make 
sure that renters are represented and homeowners are represented, and property 
owners, and apartment owners, apartment renters…it gets to be a huge balancing 
issue to try and make sure that the diversity and full range of interests in the 
neighborhood are represented because it is a fairly formal committee. (city 
official) 
 
But one interviewee felt that the Department of Neighborhoods may not have wanted 




The major institution and the city has (sic) the right to decide who sits on those 
committees and if they think you’re controversial or you’ll put a spoke in their 
plans, the major institution will say ‘hey, I don’t think she’ll be a good candidate.’  
And while I may see their point of view, I also take the point of view that every 
time I have worked on a project that had contention, we’ve always ended up with 
a better product and it’s always to the benefit of the major institution.  They just 
need to be forced…this is where community involvement really makes a 
difference. (organization official) 
 
While the above interviewee’s opinion contrasts with the opinions of other organizations, 
hospital officials, and city officials on the issue of CAC composition, this opinion may be 
more reflective of the recent re-formation and spatial area of interest (several blocks 
north of this project site) of the group than with deliberate bias as a “controversial” 
organization.  I discovered members of the CAC who, according their own and others’ 
opinions, have controversial and strong opinions that may not agree with Harborview’s 
plans.  These members and other interviewees feel that their long history in the 
neighborhood and immediate spatial adjacency to the project site (adjacency as a resident 
or as the spatial focus of the organization) may matter more to Committee inclusion than 
their controversial views. 
 
Other Participation Efforts: 
 
Most interviewees for this research commend Harborview for its outreach efforts and the 
hospital appears to have made great strides in informing the community about the NJB 
and other capital projects on the campus.  In fact, Harborview received an award in 2001 
from the Planning Association of Washington for citizen involvement directly related to 
the NJB:  
 
Connecting the Visions: Harborview Medical Public Benefits Charettes was an 
Honor Award winner in the Citizen Involvement category.  This ground breaking 
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approach to defining public benefit for the purposes of deciding whether local 
streets should be vacated ‘set a new standard,’ according to one judge. (Planning 
Association of Washington, 2001) 
 
This may be related to Harborview’s status as a public entity: 
 
Well, Harborview is public.  And I really do think that because of Harborview’s 
public status it may have something to do with their better performance on 
neighborhood outreach than some other major institutions…better than a private 
institution. (resident/CAC member) 
 
And many people, though not all, believe that Harborview is becoming a better neighbor 
through such efforts: 
 
Our relationship to Harborview?  It’s a good relationship.  They come to us if they 
need support with something and also present to the group with a new project. 
(organization official) 
 
They [Harborview] attend community meetings when asked.  They have a hotline 
number and that number is available to people in the neighborhood: I think the 
number goes to the planning office and then the planning office goes to the 
construction people and say ‘no, no, no, you cannot start at 6am.’  They pass out 
flyers…they’re getting to be a better neighbor. (resident/CAC member) 
 
Harborview gets the best grade on keeping the neighborhood informed and doing 
what they can to ease the impacts of major construction on the neighborhood and 
there is no way that having major construction down the block or across the street 
is not going to be a big nasty deal. (resident/CAC official) 
 
They [Harborview] feel that they do a good job [with outreach] but I don’t feel 
that they do an adequate job. (organization official) 
 
Additionally, most interviewees for this research made a point of mentioning that the 
First Hill neighborhood may be less confrontational and  more accepting of new 
development than other, particularly less urban, neighborhoods.  This appeared, to me, to 
be a point of pride: 
 




Essentially, First Hill has been, I think, less confrontational with processes like 
this than some other neighborhoods. (resident/CAC member) 
 
You get the impression from me that everything is contentious here but the most 
contentious major institution master plans aren’t in the urban areas.  They are in 
places like Northwest Hospital, which is smack dab in the middle of a single 
family neighborhood.  There is actually more hostility in a single family 
neighborhood than in an urban area because a lot of it is difference in attitudes.  
They’re all ‘it’s all about me and my property’ and a person in an urban area they 




Finally, interviewees for this research often noted Harborview’s role in lifesaving and as 
a regional amenity.  This factor, and the others mentioned above, may explain a certain 
level of tolerance for Harborview’s development activities and a lack of significant 
conflict in this project.  Regarding a different Harborview project that involved the 
relocation of a helipad for emergency transport, one resident states “the neighborhood 
pretty much looks at it as providing a necessary service…you know that there is a large 
noisy something overhead and I’m on the flight path and it’s pretty obnoxious but on the 
other hand the person in that helicopter is probably seriously bleeding and needs to get 




The NJB project involved several of the neighborhood’s key stakeholders.  Overall, 
neighborhood stakeholders seemed mildly satisfied but not enthusiasticabout the 
outcomes of the NJB project and the Master Plan process generally.  City officials 
express surprisingly similar attitudes: 
 





If I had to sit down and measure what I thought about the Ninth & Jefferson 
project, I personally don’t think it’s the best plan and the best use.  I think they 
can do better, however, it’s not the worst thing I’ve seen yet.  It’s not something I 
can be happy with but I can learn to live with it. (organization official) 
 
The Major Institutions Master Plan is as good as it’s going to get and it’s a fairly 
good document. (organization official) 
 
 
Despite the fact that the NJB site is a brownfield, stakeholders expressed almost no 
concern about the cleanup of this site other than haul routes through the neighborhood for 
trucks carrying contaminated soil.  All interviewees stated that they trusted that 
Harborview and the state Department of Ecology would conduct a cleanup in accordance 
with state cleanup standards.  All of the concerns with this brownfield dealt with the 
redevelopment, not the cleanup, of the site. 
 
The project addressed several issues brought up by the neighborhood stakeholders and 
city officials but was not able to resolve the concerns of all involved.  The original plan to 
vacate 9th Avenue was met with opposition by the neighborhood and, through the charette 
process, Harborview and the neighbors were able to propose a skybridge as an alternative 
(the city planning department prefers not to allow skybridges but made an exception in 
this case and granted a permit).  Additionally, the neighborhood persuaded Harborview to 
change the truck haul routes for this project to go around the Yesler Terrace housing 
project and avoid a school and a nursing home, both with active street crosswalks.  And, 
as mentioned above and in the Public Involvement Plan submitted for the brownfields 
cleanup grant, the neighbors expressed a desire for street level retail that was lost when 
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the building on the site was demolished to make way for the NJB.  Harborview agreed to 
include street level retail in the NJB project. 
 
Two issues remain unresolved.  First, neighbors and city officials are concerned that the 
replacement street level retail at the site will not be affordable to residents or even to 
most users of the hospital, especially given Harborview’s significant treatment of un-
insured and low-income patients.  The EPA fact sheet for the cleanup grant paints a 
picture of neighborhood poverty and institutional responsiveness:   
 
Harborview Hospital is located in a federally designated Enterprise Community in 
the city of Seattle. While the hospital serves the entire city of 563,374, the 
neighborhood's immediate population of 6,025 is significantly more 
impoverished. Nearly 70 percent of Harborview patients are covered by Medicaid 
or other government programs, or are uninsured. These and other needy 
populations will be served by the clinics and other facilities to be housed in the 
facility. At the request of the surrounding community, the new building that will 
be built on the site after cleanup will have 2,000 square feet of retail space and 
will create 220 temporary construction jobs and 40 permanent retail jobs. 
 
As one resident explained: 
 
We’ve asked for street level retail.  I’ve seen an uncomfortable amount of street 
level retail around town…and it’s also real that the square foot costs of the new 
building is probably higher than the storefront of the coffeepot and toaster 
building [referring to the old building where you could not have the coffeepot and 
toaster plugged in at the same time for fear of blowing a fuse].  But the dry 
cleaner, shoe repair, whatever, are not likely to move in.  And how many poofy 
restaurants  per block can you put in? (resident/CAC member) 
 
The retail affordability issue echoes a larger, second issue that remains unresolved and 
caused probably the biggest upset both within the CAC and between the CAC, 
Harborview, and the neighborhood residents.  Interviews and documentation for this 
research repeatedly mentioned the loss of affordable housing in the city of Seattle and in 
the First Hill neighborhood.  The community councils and the city’s neighborhood 
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coordinators expressed great concern for the future of affordable housing and how the 
loss of this type of housing is going to affect the neighborhood’s diversity, considered a 
valuable asset by those interviewed for this research.  A number of affordable units (it 
was never made clear to me exactly how many) were destroyed when the old building at 
the site was torn down.  The agreement, according to a member of the CAC, was that the 
units would be replaced in kind.  Harborview, however, responded by saying that there 
was no way that they could replace the housing one-for-one.  A CAC member recalls the 
controversy: 
 
They [Harborview] were to have replaced them one for one, but they came up 
with this ‘alternate’ arrangement whereby they had replaced it with fewer units 
but for a longer period of years and the units that they had replaced them with are 
senior housing rather than workforce housing.  I don’t remember if it was the 
entire, but it was a strong, strong majority of the CAC that were miffed to the 
point of frothing at the mouth….So a majority of the CAC said ‘you said that you 
were going to replace it, you promised.  This is not what we call a replacement.  
This is not one for one.’  And Harborview said ‘we’ve been looking and looking 
and looking,’ which was true, ‘and this is the best we can do and according to the 
agreement we can’t proceed until we replace it with something and so we’re 
going to do it.’  And that was the end of it. (resident/CAC official) 
 
Some neighborhood residents viewed this as a betrayal by the CAC against the 
neighborhood: 
 
There are a lot of rumblings because they [Harborview] took down a lot of 
housing units.  There are people in the community who feel that the people on the 
standing committee betrayed the community.  And knowing how many 
[affordable] housing units we’ve lost over the years and the lack of affordable 







As mentioned above and detailed throughout this chapter, the CAC is without a doubt the 
primary access point to influence decisions about the NJB and other capital projects at 
Harborview.  Community organizations, however, play an important role in the NJB 
process, notably through the dependence of city officials, neighborhood coordinators, and 
Harborview officials on the organizations for gauging the concerns of the neighborhood 
and recruiting new members to the CAC.  Neighborhood coordinators and city officials 
all stated that they “rely” on community organizations for accessing and involving 
neighborhood residents in the planning process.  While NJB project decisions are 
influenced mainly by the CAC, filling the CAC appears to be placed, both procedurally 
(through neighborhood coordinators and city officials’ outreach methods) and 
legislatively (through CAC member requirements in the land use code), primarily in the 
hands of the neighborhood organizations.  Aside from the CAC, however, community 
organizations and individuals have few venues or more direct access for influencing 
decisions at Harborview. 
 
Public participation in this case was generally somewhat similar to the Olympic Sculpture 
Park.  Access to decision making bodies was tightly controlled by those in power (in this 
case, the Department of Neighborhoods and Harborview administration controlled access 
to the CAC) and traditional methods of public participation were used.  However, this 
case offered residents and community organizations some access to the CAC, which was 
the only real venue for influencing major decisions for this project. Specifically, public 
participation only had some real power in the formation of the Major Institutions Master 
Plan.  The CAC, with some representation by local residents, influenced the size and 
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scope of the Plan.  The CAC exercised this power through the land use code which vested 
authority for creation of the Master Plan in three ostensibly equal branches: the CAC, 
Harborview officials, and the Department of Neighborhoods.  Outside of the CAC,   
residents were able to interact with the planning office and contractor at Harborview and 
their input changed certain procedures (truck routes) and project plans (the skybridge). 
Residents also attempted to influence larger issues at the site.  Although residents did not 
gain back the affordable housing that was lost in the building demolition, many (but not 
all) felt that Harborview and the CAC listened to their concerns and attempted to provide 
for the lost housing. 
 
The fact that this site was contaminated mattered little to residents and community 
organizations.  Organizations, like at the Sculpture Park, did not view the cleanup as a 
concern and one even considered it not cause for public discussion.  An official at the 
city’s Department of Planning and Development offered that community organizations 
and Harborview may have done a good job informing residents about the cleanup. 
 
Community organizations in the neighborhood varied in their efforts to promote 
residents’ participation in the planning process, ranging from no involvement to 
encouraging individuals to participate in this and other neighborhood projects.  The 
organization that perhaps best exemplified the mediating possibilities of community 
organizations, however, was largely left out of the planning process and the CAC, 
although I am unclear whether this had to do with the group’s ‘troublemaking’ reputation 
or primary focus on issues in other sections of the neighborhood.  All community 
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organizations in this case played a mediating role in the sense that they gauged public 
concern for city and Harborview officials, worked with the hospital for some changes, 
and assisted in providing a framework for the neighborhood’s concerns by informing and 
educating.  In defining realities, however, at least one organization felt that contamination 
issues (and some redevelopment issues) were essentially not a neighborhood concern.  
Although it may have appeared that the community organizations were co-opted by 
government officials and the hospital, organizations in this case have conflicted with 
Harborview and city officials on other issues and other neighborhood groups on First Hill 
have fought hospitals outside the CAC and have emerged, at least temporarily, victorious 
(Eskanazi, 2004). 
 
Context and neighborhood dynamics played an important role in this case.  Politically, 
Harborview remains an important and powerful player in its own development and 
participation methods (as witnessed by the approval of CAC members) and the 
Department of Neighborhoods enforced this limited participation structure. Harborview 
senior executives (the president himself, according to one city official) were intensely 
interested in this project and held the true decision making power in this case.  The 
decision to build this structure, remove the existing uses, and install new amenities was in 
the hands of senior hospital officials.  As opposed to the Olympic Sculpture Park, the 
power in this case was not given to Harborview officials by virtue of money but rather by 
virtue of authority.  Residents, organizations, and Harborview officials had, and continue 
to have, a conflict of interest over several issues but Harborview could not impose 
sanctions or deprivations on the neighborhood.  Instead, Harborview used the Master 
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Plan as justification for the project, backed up by the authority of the Department of 
Neighborhoods and Department of Planning and Development.  Organizations and 
residents basically shared the belief in this authority, thus justifying it.  Harborview 
officials also rationalized information that, at least according to some interviewees, won 
out against other arguments.  This rationalization was most apparent in the decision to not 
replace all of the affordable housing lost in the demolition of the old building.  
Harborview said, and the CAC and many others ended up believing, that it had tried to 
find replacement housing but could not do so.  Whether by authority or a better argument, 
many believed this opinion and conceded, although the issue still remains.  
 
Residents greatly feared the economic impact of neighborhood gentrification and loss of 
affordable housing.  Their fears were increasingly realized as many were re renters of low 
income whose apartments were being converted to condominiums as downtown living 
became increasingly popular for middle and upper income professionals.  The next case 
in this study, Rainier Court, addresses many of these same fears but with a different 








The Rainier Court case highlights the potential and pitfalls for Community Development 
Corporations that take on brownfields cleanup and redevelopment projects.  Unlike the 
neighborhood organizations in the Harborview case, the Southeast Effective 
Development Community Development Corporation (SEED) maintains a very strong 
presence within the Rainier Valley neighborhood. Until recently, its strong ties to Seattle 
City Hall has helped the organization accomplish many projects and still retain local 
respect due to strong public involvement efforts and consistency with the neighborhood 
plan.  Neighbors have expressed mounting concern, however, that increasing density and 
rising home values, partly due to SEED’s development work, may be forcing them out of 
the neighborhood.  The following case exemplifies the capital/community debate 
discussed in Chapter 2 and sheds light on the vital yet delicate role that the CDC plays in 
this changing neighborhood. 
 
Rainier Court is a former vehicle storage lot (and site of much illegal dumping) 
redeveloped into affordable housing and commercial space.  SEED, a long-standing and 
respected organization, owns the site in a low-income, high-minority and, until recently, 
low-demand area of Seattle.  SEED involved community residents according to the 
requirements of the Brownfields Redevelopment Loan Fund (BRLF), and also has a 
history of communication and outreach with neighborhood residents.  The organization’s 
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vision, site control, longevity, and strong political connections greatly affected the 
outcome of this project.  SEED officials saw themselves as playing an advocacy role for 
community residents in local brownfields projects; my research identified other roles for 
the organization as well. 
 
Site History and Neighborhood Context: 
 
Figure 6.1: Rainier Court site and neighborhood 
 
The Rainier Valley neighborhood of Seattle bears the scars of long-term economic 
decline and neglect but is currently witnessing a rebirth due to community reinvestment, 
rising real estate values, large-scale transportation improvements, and gentrification.  The 
Rainier Valley has been the city’s most diverse neighborhood for the past 40 years, with 




with the rest of Seattle, the Rainier Valley contains the greatest concentrations of low- 
and moderate-income people in the city, and many pockets of poverty.  Seattle’s two 
largest public housing projects are located in this neighborhood, and 15%-20% of 
residents receive food stamps.” (Southeast Effective Development [SEED], 2005).  The 
neighborhood contains almost equal proportions of white and non-white residents and has 
owner-occupied housing rates almost equal to the city as a whole.  The neighborhood’s 
household and median income levels fall below the city average and approximately 22% 
of the population lives below the poverty level. 
 
The 13 people interviewed for this case included representatives from government (EPA, 
DPD, Office of Economic Development, Office of Housing, City Council, Department of 
Neighborhoods); SEED and other neighborhood and business organizations; a SEED 
board member; and two residents living near the project (one recommended to me by 
another interviewee and one not recommended to me by any of the other interviewees).  
Interviewees reflected the diverse racial and ethnic makeup of the community but may 
not have been representative of the neighborhood’s lower-income residents (I did not ask 
interviewees for their income level). However, SEED would likely have addressed any 
representation that I may have been missing in my interviews: this development was 
specifically addressing the needs of lower-income individuals. 
 
The Rainier Court cleanup and redevelopment exemplifies community-based initiative 
amidst negative economic conditions and rapid neighborhood change.  For years, the 
neighborhood’s lower income translated into lower rents and lack of development due to 
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negative return on investment for developers.  The Rainier Court site’s mix of dilapidated 
building, fenced-off lots, and overgrown weeds reflected environmentally harmful past 
uses (Baerny, 2004).  Since the 1940’s, the site has been used for commercial purposes, 
including vehicle storage, welding, office space and a mortuary (SEED, 2005).  The site 
also suffered from legal and illegal dumping of construction debris and contaminated fill. 
It housed a number of industrial businesses, such as electrical maintenance and auto 
repair, with activities that may have contributed to soil and groundwater contamination 
(Cook, 2004).  The 7-acre site has been blighted for the past 30 years and has been used 
not only for illegal dumping but also criminal activity.  In 1997, the City of Seattle 
assisted neighborhood volunteers in removing tons of garbage, including furniture, cars, 
baby diapers, tires and drug paraphernalia from the site.  Cleanup and redevelopment of 
the site, according to SEED, will result in new housing and jobs and serve as a catalyst 
for additional investment in the area. (SEED, 2005). 
 
In recent years, Southeast Seattle has indeed witnessed significant redevelopment.  The 
Rainier Valley Square shopping center opened in the late 1980’s with 104,000 square feet 
of new commercial space and successful retail outlets.  Since then QFC grocery store, 
Lowe’s Hardware and Starbucks have opened successful stores in the area.  The two local 
public housing projects are being redeveloped into mixed-income neighborhoods with 
increased density and quality design, through U.S Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) Hope VI Grants (SEED, 2005).  In addition, the Sound Transit Link 
light rail project located along Martin Luther King Way South, less than a mile from the 





Southeast Effective Development formed as a community development corporation over 
30 years ago to address neighborhood disinvestment and economic decline.  As stated in 
the original mission, the organization strives to improve the quality of Southeast Seattle 
neighborhoods, businesses, and public institutions (SEED, 2006).  SEED maintains 
current networks and relationships that stretch back to the organization’s genesis: current 
King County Executive Ron Sims and former Seattle mayor Norm Rice are both founders 
of SEED; Earl Richardson, the current director of SEED, was once the director of the 
Seattle Office of Housing.  According to a SEED official, the organization’s business and 
political relationships with the city and county are quite strong, partly due to connections 
with Sims and Rice (SEED official interview).  This official added that the ability to stay 
high on the agenda of successive mayors is “critical” to SEED projects.  
 
SEED works toward several broad and long-range goals in order to achieve its mission.  
Similar to the apparently conflicting goals of the First Hill neighborhood plan discussed 
in Chapter 4 and the capitalist/democracy debate discussed in Chapter 2, SEED hints that 
it may be dealing with contradictory issues: 
 
SEED’s enterprise is consistent with trends in areas that are not often found 
working in tandem: affordable housing, economic development, arts and 
cultural programs.  In Southeast Seattle, SEED has proven to be effective by 
influencing these community-based business dimensions through stewardship 
resulting in: 
• Increased affordable housing stock 
• Improved and additional retail and commercial enterprises, and 
• Increased cultural facilities and entrepreneurial opportunities 
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Additionally, SEED provides support and fiscal agency services for new and 
emerging coalitions and grass roots organizations.  SEED seeks to build upon 
existing successes and extend our reach through expansion of housing, 
economic development, arts and cultural opportunities.  The phases of this 
strategy include continuous improvement to the infrastructure of the 
organization, systematically adding housing programs, and expanding of 
retail, cultural, and commercial ventures. (SEED, 2006). 
 
SEED engages in numerous projects throughout the community and has, according to the 
organization, brought over $200 million into the Rainier Valley for economic 
development, affordable housing, and arts programs (SEED, 2007 A).  Interviewees for 
this research concur with this assessment and often note that initial contact with SEED 
was through previous neighborhood projects and events, not the Rainier Court 
redevelopment project. 
 
Stakeholders and Community Organizations: 
Many neighborhood and city stakeholders contributed to the Rainier Court project 
although the extent and influence of involvement appears quite mixed.   SEED worked 
closely with the Seattle/King County brownfields office and the Washington Department 
of Community, Trade and Economic Development to secure funding from EPA grants 
and revolving loans for site sampling and cleanup.  The Seattle Office of Economic 
Development (SOED) offered a Community Development Block Grant low-interest loan 
to SEED and the Environmental Coalition of South Seattle, with partial funding from the 
County’s EPA grants.  SOED also provided technical assistance, soil and groundwater 
sampling, and underground storage tank removal.  Although the project lists EPA and the 
Senior Housing Assistance Group as additional partners, involvement by these entities 
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appears to be limited to grant oversight and housing management respectively.  No other 
community groups, other than SEED, are listed as partners in this project. 
 
Rainier Court Process: 
The Rainier Court project consists of a four-phase development (Phase I is the primary 
subject of this research) on 7 acres in the heart of southeast Seattle.  The project began in 
the mid-1990’s on the heels of a commercial redevelopment SEED was completing only 
a block away.  SEED’s development of the Rainier Valley Shopping Center was a 
blessing to a neighborhood that, to this day, suffers a dearth of retail opportunities.  The 
Rainier Court site, at a prominent bend on busy Rainier Avenue South, consisted of 
several parcels of light industrial, commercial and residential land uses with almost 20 
separate landowners.  A number of operations on these parcels contributed to the 
extensive and varied site contamination, including: metals and polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons (PAH) related to dumping and contaminated fill; perchloroethene (PCE) 
and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB) related to electrical equipment maintenance and 
cleaning; and petroleum hydrocarbons leaked from the six underground storage tanks on 
the premises.  SEED approached the Rainier Court project unaware of the extent of 
contamination. 
 
Rainier Court, or at least the concept of neighborhood redevelopment in this area, grew 
out of ongoing neighborhood planning occurring as a result of state’s Growth 
Management Act requirements.  The city’s 1994 Comprehensive Plan designated the 
North Rainier area as one of seven “urban villages” with the intent of encouraging 
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“growth in areas with the infrastructure, services and zoning capacity to handle it.” 
(Seattle Comprehensive Plan).  The Plan, prescient at the time, stated that “North Rainier 
needs to face the challenges of population and employment growth through the year 
2014…the City’s designated growth targets for the North Rainier Valley Hub Urban 
Village are 3,500 new jobs and 1,200 new households,” a 50% increase from current 
household figures (Seattle Comprehensive Plan). 
 
Many community members were actively engaged in neighborhood planning during this 
time and SEED was a part of the process.  At the same time, however, SEED had set its 
sights on the collection of underutilized and likely-contaminated parcels of land at the 
intersection of Rainier Avenue South and 33rd Avenue South, adjacent to the recently-
completed Rainier Valley Shopping Center.  SEED benefited from neighborhood 
dialogue that took place as a result of the Urban Village plan.  Open channels of 
communication with a community who was engaged and knowledgeable about 
neighborhood planning issues and opportunities gave SEED clear direction for the 
location, size, and type of redevelopment: 
There was a group of folks...who had spent the last two or three years already 
talking about those kinds of issues, asking questions like ‘how could we 
support the development of housing in a way that would produce quality 
affordable housing, that would create some activity in these places, that could 
support retail.’  There was a vocabulary that was established, there was a 
familiarity with some core concepts, they had worked through some of the 
more challenging issues that typically eat up a lot of your time when you’re 
working on a specific project.  It seems impossible to me to imagine that an 
organization like SEED could have proceeded on those projects without some 
significant opposition that may not have carried the day but it would have 
been something that they would have had to deal with if the neighborhood 




SEED began assembling land in 1994 and took almost eight years to complete this task, 
one of the biggest challenges to the organization but also a key to its success.  
Interviewees suggest that SEED’s ability to wait six years to assemble the project site 
would have been difficult for a private developer. 
 
The project encountered a major obstacle that forced a complete shift in project strategy.  
Up until this point, SEED envisioned a completely commercial enterprise for the Rainier 
Court site, much like the shopping center it had just completed on the nearby block.  By 
1999, SEED realized that landowners of two key pieces of land could not be persuaded to 
sell.  These street-front pieces would be crucial to attracting commercial tenants to the 
project.  A local resident and community organization official interviewed for this 
research noted the difficulty in acquiring these pieces: 
I wish they [SEED] could get control of the piece that’s sitting in front of the 
building.  We have a little bit of old ownership in Rainier Valley left over from 
the bad old days where people sat on property for years: there wasn’t enough of a 
market and they just continued to not do much with their properties and that’s a 
prime example there.  The project would be so much more but the years of 
assemblage on that, quite frankly, have a lot to do with what the outcome is 
because money gets funny when it takes that long.  I mean, it’s really difficult. 
(community organization official) 
 
Without street-front access and visibility, SEED shifted the project to instead build a 6-
story, 230-unit affordable senior housing rental complex with 15,000 square feet of retail 
uses on the first floor.  Design and permitting of the project occurred through most of 
2003.  Although neighborhood residents still desired the original commercial 




The residential environment comprises multi-family, single-family, and mixed-
use housing in clean, safe neighborhoods affordable to a broad range of people.  
Housing density increases near the core of the urban village and around 
transportation hubs.  Multi-family housing is not concentrated in one area, 
allowing increased density while not overwhelming the community. (Department 
of Neighborhoods, 1999, p.34) 
 
Neighborhood residents and city officials remained supportive of the project despite this 
shift in strategy since affordable housing was one of several goals to come out of the 
neighborhood planning process.  SEED’s ability to keep the neighborhood informed of 
these major changes throughout the long development process will be discussed below. 
 
SEED found financing of the project to be another major challenge but had several 
advantages: the organization owned the site, which developers found attractive; SEED 
had a track record of successful construction projects in the neighborhood, which added 
to the group’s credibility; and the city was “highly supportive” of the group, according to 
SEED and city officials, and was committed to assisting the organization through 
financing and expediting the permitting process.  Despite these advantages, SEED still 
struggled to attract private investors to the project: 
 
It was very difficult to attract private capital to the project.  The Rainier Valley is 
one of Seattle’s poorest and most ethnically-diverse areas.  Persuading investors 
and developers to back the Rainier Court project was a tough sell not only 
because the acreage sat on contaminated land, but also because of its location: no 
one wanted to invest in an area with low rents and high crime…[land] purchases 
were initially funded by a series of grants and low-interest loans from government 
sources.  No private investor would take on such a risk until momentum had 
developed in 2004. (Phoenix award application, p.6) 
 
SEED’s funding challenges, however, didn’t completely overshadow the group’s desire 




…for Rainier Court, they [SEED] purposefully didn’t go after city [housing 
office] funding and wanted to go it alone to avoid a lot of the city’s requirements.  
Our funding comes with a lot of bidding requirements, wage rates to be paid, and 
lots of different things.  So to the extent that he [SEED executive director Earl 
Richardson] could do the project without that, like any private developer, pick 
whoever he wanted to be the architect, pick whoever he wanted to be the 
contractor, pay whatever wage rates the contractor was going to pay, and not have 
to deal with strings… (city housing official) 
 
Although other forms of financing, such as tax credits, contain many requirements 
(Washington State Housing Finance Commission [WSHFC], 2007), these requirements 
often lie on the tenancy side of the redevelopment process (e.g. the number of housing 
units dedicated to low income families; the number of years a unit will be dedicated to 
low income families) or with market and contractor feasibility (e.g. housing market 
studies; the financial capacity of the development team).  SEED managed to avoid city 
hiring requirements by not accepting funding from the Office of Housing, requirements 
which would have likely slowed down the redevelopment process, which was already 
under a tight schedule due to the low income housing tax credit timelines.  SEED finally 
managed to attract capital to the project and fully finance the remaining construction: 
SEED provided limited equity, the Washington State Housing Finance Commission 
provided low-income housing tax credits and bonds, and US Bank provided conventional 
financing (Phoenix award application, p. 12).  Phase I of the Rainier Court project was 
completed in late 2004 and the first occupants moved into the building in December 
2004 (see Figure 6.2).  The EPA recognized the Rainier Court project with the 2005 
Phoenix Award, the highest honor for a project of this kind, and the award committee 




Figure 6.2: Rainier Court, Phase I 
 
Public Participation and Redevelopment Outcomes: 
Public Participation: 
SEED actively engaged neighborhood residents, businesses, and community 
organizations in the Rainier Court project and also had to navigate through a variety of 
requirements that sometimes put the group at odds with neighbors.  SEED’s initial 
involvement in the mid-1990’s neighborhood urban village planning discussion provided 
a dialogue and a platform from which to focus on site-specific projects: 
There was a pre-made process, if you will.  They didn’t have to create the avenues 
through which they would make contact with key folks involved and the questions 
about how the neighborhoods would develop over time.  So if we were engaged in 
decisions about zoning in the neighborhood planning process that, while the area I 
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was focused on didn’t exactly include the Rainier housing development, a lot of 
the neighborhoods were dealing with similar issues, and were making zoning 
recommendations that would make it easier to do housing development in 
Southeast Seattle. (resident/SEED board member) 
 
 
Overall, residents, other community organization leaders, SEED board members and city 
officials interviewed for this research seem pleased with the Rainier Court project and 
with SEED’s outreach efforts.  Unlike the distinct participation phases seen in the 
Harborview project, SEED maintained a continuous dialogue with the community and 
city and county officials.  SEED continues to attend neighborhood community 
organization meetings to update members on project progress and to address 
neighborhood concerns (Phase II is now complete; Phases III and IV are currently under 
construction): 
They [SEED] continually got to us and some of our meetings were kind of tense, 
but they kept coming back.  And I can’t speak for other neighbors but I felt like 
they were really trying to work with us and kind of trying to give us what we 
wanted. (resident) 
 
I don’t think SEED can be faulted for lack of public input because when they did 
go through a lot and when they were trying to get these plans moved forward, the 
neighborhood groups were really wanting to see something move forward so they 
were very happy that SEED was taking this on and doing something there.  I think 
SEED probably did more than what others would have done in terms of 
neighborhood input. (city economic development official) 
 
They [SEED] have been very good at engaging the neighborhood. (resident) 
 
The project has also gone through the city’s design review process, which includes public 
comment.  Public comment focused primarily on density and massing of the building but 
also addressed traffic, streetscape, and owner occupancy issues.  Several interviewees for 
this research also noted a lack of design attractiveness for the exterior of the building, 
especially given the building’s prominent location.  Like Harborview’s Ninth and 
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Jefferson Building, SEED maintains an information repository for interested community 
members to review and conducted the required 30-day public comment period on 
remediation plans.  SEED also conducted monthly updates (in writing and in person) on 
the planning and cleanup process to community groups in the neighborhood.  A SEED 
official stated that she felt SEED educated the community on the contamination at the 
site.  Whether as a result of their outreach efforts or not, the SEED official stated that 
neighborhood residents expressed little concern for the site contamination (I received the 
same lack of concern from other individual interviews for this research). 
 
Issues and Outcomes: 
The neighborhood expressed several concerns about the Rainier Court project which, to 
date, have not been completely addressed.  Neighborhood residents, community 
organizations, and business groups identified issues related to increased traffic, parking 
difficulties, adequacy of streetscape improvements, and owner-occupied units:   
Overall, it was a fairly positive process.  There were definitely strong feelings on 
the part of the neighbors.  We wanted owner-occupied units, we wanted attractive 
units, we wanted something that would blend in with the existing neighborhood 
and we worked very, very, hard to push that agenda. (resident) 
 
Interviewees expressed a desire for environmental cleanup in the area but did not 
necessarily rate it as a concern:  
The neighborhood residents were more interested in redevelopment issues. (SEED 
official) 
 
The brownfields portion of it, I think, was a non-issue frankly because I don’t 
think many people knew about it.  I think people saw it as a collection of parcels, 
usually with a single-family home on it or nothing, that was in pretty poor shape 
for years and years, maybe with junk cars or garbage, individual ownership by a 
lot of different people and essentially it looks like nothing’s going on there.  So to 
have a redevelopment, I think people see it as ‘hey, something’s happening here, 
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finally!’ so I don’t think the brownfields aspect of it came into play really at all. 
(community organization official) 
 
The biggest issue to come out of the Rainier Court project concerned the density of the 
building.  Residents not only expressed concern about the density of the building itself 
during design review meetings, community meetings, and interviews for this research but 
about how this project will serve as a harbinger for the future buildout of the 
neighborhood: “there have been some negative comments, I think, because people would 
have like to have seen a less-dense project” (SEED board member).  Neighbors link the 
Rainier Court project with increasing neighborhood gentrification and, consequently, 
with SEED.  A SEED official expressed concern that for “the first time ever” there is a 
“backlash against density” and that “gentrification is a big issue now.”  When I asked a 
resident if SEED is seen as part of the gentrification problem, she replied “I think so.  I 
think to some extent it is possible that they are seen like that.” 
 
Despite being linked to density and gentrification issues, many people think that SEED 
officials were doing the best they could in a difficult situation.  Interviewees almost 
unanimously claim that they truly believe SEED is doing what’s best for the 
neighborhood but must make decisions, at times, for political or business reasons that 
may not mesh completely with neighborhood desires.  For example, neighbors and city 
officials understand that the funding requirements for this project essentially dictated the 
high density and large profile of the building: 
It’s a tough balance – we want to get something done, but you want to get 
something that the community desires too.  Would it be nice for it to be less 
dense? That would be nice but for them to feasibly develop something here, they 
had to rely on housing tax credits and the scale of it to make it feasible.  If the 
environmental wasn’t an issue and these other cost factors weren’t an issue, it 
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might have been less dense. So it’s pretty intense here, the density, but part of it is 
because there’s not much going on around it.  So as this starts to fill in, I think the 
stark density there will blend in a little better. (city economic development 
official) 
 
I feel that overall they were trying to do what they could to help us but they still 
had a business to run and a project to get done.  I know that they are supposed to 
be proponents of low-income, good, affordable housing.  I think that there 
definitely is a business side, I don’t think they make a lot of money, I think that 
they have a lot invested in seeing their projects be successful and I think there is 
the whole political thing of getting stuff done.”  Is it for community benefit or for 
keeping themselves alive?  I think it’s for community benefit and it’s a very tough 
position.  They need to build lots of units for very little money and I think that 
because they have a lot of federal grants, the restrictions are even tighter but I 
think they see themselves doing what they do for the community. (resident) 
 
But you [SEED] are living in two different worlds.  You’re living in the 
community and you’re living in a larger political process that is designed to get 





SEED initiated and greatly influenced almost every aspect of this project.  Rainier Court 
would most likely not have been built if it had not been for the efforts of SEED.  The 
organization maintains a long-standing presence in the community, expertise in real 
estate transactions, and close ties to city leaders.  All interviewees for this research 
concur that SEED is the driving force behind the Rainier Court project: 
SEED was instrumental in helping to redevelop this section [of the Rainier 
Valley].  Nothing happened there for years just because the cost for a typical 
developer to go in and not only buy all these parcels but to do the cleanup was 
prohibitive to redevelop.  That’s why a neighborhood group like SEED was very 
useful to work with. (city economic development official) 
 
No one, however, believes that SEED maintains total control or has any real power in this 
project: 
Power is always an issue.  Regulators and financiers have a great deal of power.  




It’s a very important balance but it’s not an equal power environment.  I think 
SEED had the drive and the interest to get the project built and without that you 
don’t get projects built.  But they needed to be funded by a city agency and that 
was aligned with some national objectives that was channeling funds from the 
federal government.  And it had to be broadly in line with what the surrounding 
neighborhood wanted…you can’t do projects like that with full opposition of the 
community. (SEED board member) 
 
This case, however, exhibited the only real decision making power held by organizations 
or residents in this study.  SEED executives, notably, Earl Richardson, and the board of 
directors determined the exact site, the use, the financing, and basically all outcomes.  
Like Harborview, SEED could not truly withhold anything from residents in order to gain 
concessions to a common point of view.  Overall, SEED, other organizations, residents, 
and even city officials were of like mind regarding the need for neighborhood 
improvement.  These same stakeholders, however, differed in their opinions on the 
specific vision of the neighborhood, particularly in terms of density (a city goal) and 
gentrification (a developer and real estate industry goal).   
 
Despite a perception of unequal power, SEED maintains a symbiotic relationship with the 
city’s leadership that enables both parties to get many tasks accomplished.  As shown in 
Harborview, the Department of Planning and Development relies on community 
organizations to engage neighbors in order to uncover and resolve issues.  More 
importantly, in this case, however, is that DPD, the Department of Neighborhoods, the 
Office of Economic Development and other city agencies rely on SEED (and other 
community based organizations across the city) to help achieve community and economic 
development objectives.   
This is a good example of how we try to approach community development in 
Seattle, which I think is a lot different from other cities where I think in a lot of 
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cities it tends to be more centralized where you’ll have a city department that goes 
out and says ‘this is what we want’ and we’re going to get money for this 
particular purpose and we think we know what the community wants in this area. 
Where in Seattle we really try to work closely with community groups. So we try 
to find CDCs who have a much closer on-the-ground feel for what the 
neighborhood wants, what are the priorities for development, what are the key 
areas to redevelop, what kinds of development do they want to see. (city 
economic development official) 
 
SEED, in return, relies on the city for funding, assistance through the development 
process, and overall visibility.  Both parties, at least in interviews for this research, appear 
to believe that this relationship is a good one. 
 
While SEED plays a functional role with the city of Seattle in order to get economic and 
community development projects done in an often-neglected neighborhood, SEED’s role 
as a mediator between the city and local residents remains a little more ambiguous.  The 
organization conducted outreach for the Rainier Court project that all parties interviewed 
for this research appear to approve of.  Residents feel that their comments were, for the 
most part, taken into consideration by SEED, if not fully implemented.  Additionally, 
SEED’s development of the Rainier Court project coincides clearly with the goals of the 
neighborhood plan.  However, neighborhood residents rely less on SEED to mediate with 
city officials.  Southeast Seattle residents directly engage with city personnel on a regular 
basis on a variety of matters.  The transparent government discussed in Chapter 3 
facilitates regular interaction between the active Southeast Seattle citizens and official 
often without a need for a community organization mediator.  Officials with the city and 
SEED hold no pretense that much of the citizenry is unaware or too intimidated to 
contact the city directly: 
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It’s possible, especially in a place like Seattle – it’s a different environment here – 
if you want to be involved and especially if you just want to stop something from 
happening it’s easier here than in a lot of places. (resident SEED board member) 
 
One person can oppose it and cost a developer millions of dollars. (CTED 
official) 
 
They contact the mayor’s office.  They contact city council members who then 
contact us.  They contact us directly.  They email.  It’s pretty easy.  Yeah, they let 
us know.  Sometimes it’s individually, sometimes it’s through a community 
organization.  (city housing official) 
 
If this wasn’t a SEED project, we wouldn’t have worked with SEED.  I think we 
would have worked the political route, so we probably would have worked with 
the Department of Construction and Land Use.  We were working really closely 
with members of the city council…the police department.  I think we had a whole 
coalition of regulating and various city agencies, so we would have worked 
through them. (resident) 
 
As vocal and active as the neighborhood residents are (Harrell, 2007), this same activism 
may have been a reason for a long period of no construction, according to one long-time 
resident and SEED board member: 
The historical context for the southeast was one where the existing community’s 
set of desires for what the community would look like and be like in the future 
largely dictated a set of technical constraints on development, through zoning 
predominantly, that were unrealistic and that we hadn’t accounted for the nature 
of the relative market attractiveness of our environment.  And the question was 
were we going to wait 20 more years for any real interest under the current zoning 
rules to make some housing happen or were we going to be a little bit more 
proactive to get something to happen.  So there is a long history of real 
involvement in southeast and the assumption is not ‘well, if anybody is interested 
in doing anything here, we want it.’  Just the opposite.  That led to largely, 
inadvertently, 20 years of almost no activity occurring.  The only reason a project 




Indeed, interviewees expressed a common respect, though not necessarily trust, for 
SEED.  City officials and neighborhood residents count on the organization for initiating 
development projects, especially housing projects since cities are forbidden to directly 
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invest in housing in Washington State: “We have a state constitution that mandates 
against the city being direct investors in housing, so SEED will have a huge role to play” 
(community organization official).  Neighbors seem to have a regard for the role that 
SEED has been playing for over thirty years and perhaps mitigate their vocal nature due 
to this: 
I think the fact that SEED was the developing agency…I think we all like SEED 
for the most part, we like Pat (SEED’s Economic Development Director), she’s a 
really nice person, and we probably went a little easier than we might have if it 
was some out-of-Seattle private developer that came in and we felt like it was 
purely for profit.  But I think it was that they are a part of the community and not 
someone coming from outside trying to ram something down our throat.  They 
were dealing with similar issues to what we were all dealing with.  [Being a local 
organization made a difference?]  Yeah, that made a huge difference. (resident) 
 
SEED, however, walked a fine line in this case between using its decision making power 
for influence, authority, and rationalization of outcomes.  Because of its mission to the 
neighborhood, SEED was viewed as a trusted authority by neighborhood residents; 
because of its political connections and business experience, SEED was influential in 
obtaining financing and city approvals.  Yet SEED also relied on its authority to 
rationalize the density of the project and possibly keep gentrification talk out of project 
discussions.  SEED officials claimed that the financing of the project dictated the unusual 
density for the neighborhood and neighbors claimed that they understood the bind that 
SEED faced.  However, SEED also owned many parcels of land and would have been 
stuck with them had the organization not shifted from the original commercial 
development to higher density housing.  By assuming that it would convince the owners 
of the streetfront parcels to sell (which they did not), SEED had to use its authority and 




Rainier Court primarily reflects many of the mediating and meaningful participation 
possibilities of community organizations discussed in Chapter 2 and can possibly serve as 
a model for brownfields cleanup and redevelopment.  Although the public participation 
plan for this site employed a number of traditional mechanisms, SEED maintained an 
ongoing, two-way dialogue with residents going back to the Neighborhood Plan 
formation of the early 1990’s, exemplified by the monthly updates on the project 
planning and cleanup to neighborhood organizations and residents.  These updates may 
have affected the low level of residents’ concern about the project contamination 
(although some interviewed for this research believe that, despite their own knowledge of 
the contamination, other residents may still not have been aware of site pollution).  The 
economic and political context of the development also played a strong role.  Despite 
being politically well-connected and having the respect of many leaders in the city 
administration, outside funding requirements dictated much of what SEED could do to 
placate neighborhood residents.  Yet SEED’s decision making power allowed the 
organization to create a development that addressed neighborhood needs and provided 
residents an opportunity to give input on the building’s final design.   Economically, this 
poor neighborhood has until recently welcomed new development as a potential source of 
employment, needed retail opportunities, and affordable housing for residents.  Yet as the 
neighborhood’s fortunes have changed, so too have the definitions and opinions of 
neighborhood needs and development (Langston, 2006).  As the developer in this case, 
the ‘mediating’ role between individuals and government and/or developer is not entirely 
applicable; however, SEED educated, informed, framed, and allowed as much 
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neighborhood resident input into the project as possible.  While this might not be seen as 
true ‘citizen power,’ this amount of access and input into this brownfield project is far 
more than the other two cases in this research and certainly reflected the principles of 




SEED’s redevelopment of the Rainier Court site represents a crossroads of sorts for the 
organization and for the neighborhood.  As the technical challenges of tackling a 
brownfields cleanup fade, and as confidence in the organization’s ability to achieve 
results increases, the effects of the redevelopment and what it symbolizes to a 
neighborhood undergoing rapid economic and social change are undeniable.  SEED’s 
“one-of-us” image is no longer as impenetrable as it once was:  the more SEED 
accomplishes, the more it becomes associated with neighborhood change and 
gentrification.  SEED played a very important role in the cleanup and redevelopment of 
Rainier Court – probably the biggest role of all the stakeholders – and there are many in 
the neighborhood and at city hall who appreciate the work that the organization does.  
Neighbors and city officials view SEED as a voice, but not the only voice, of 
neighborhood concerns: as a SEED official expressed to me, “I see us as a broker, 
diplomat, and advocate for the neighborhood.”  SEED, however, faces the difficulty of 







In chapters 4, 5, and 6, I examined three detailed cases on brownfields cleanup and 
redevelopment in Seattle.  I will now use these cases to identify factors affecting public 
participation and the mediating role of community organizations in the cleanup and 
redevelopment process.  Identifying these factors across the cases will help me answer 
my research questions from Chapter 1. 
 
I organized this analysis based on the data categories outlined in Chapter 1.  I begin with 
a summary table looking at the categories affecting participation and mediation and 
identifying how the cases responded in each category.  I added several factors that 
became visible during the course of research.  Following the table, I discuss specific 
examples, nuances, and major findings from across the cases which subdivide each 
category, consistent with my discussion in the introduction of this research that 
“participation” cannot be a generic, catch-all phrase.  I also discuss how my findings 
compare with and support the literature review in Chapter 2.  I end the analysis by 
answering my research questions and identifying some areas for further research. 
 
The table below outlines the factors discussed in Chapter 1 that influenced community 
organizations and participation in the case study brownfield projects. I have highlighted 
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the factors that were important for both greater and lesser participation by placing an 
asterisk in the appropriate box.  For example, I marked “site ownership” for both Rainier 
Court and the Olympic Sculpture Park because, as seen in the case studies, this factor 
allowed a certain amount of control over participation.  This chart is primarily for quick 
reference purposes. 
 
Following the chart, I briefly discuss the findings of each factor and then delve into 
greater detail on the major findings of this research. 
Factor Harborview Rainier Court Olympic Sculpture 
Park 
Stated participation mission 
 
 *  
Previous relationships with developers, 
government, institutions 
 




 * * 
Redevelopment plans consistent with 
organizational expertise 
 
* * * 
Equity and power 
 
* *  
Large size and scope, high-demand 
context 
 
 * * 
Existing neighborhood master plans 
 
* *  
Brownfield Status 
 
   
Site Specific Impacts 
 
* *  
New Use 
 
 * * 
Funding/Regulatory Requirements 
 
* *  
“Local” status & trust 
 
 * * 
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Table 7.1  Factors influencing community organizations and participation 
 
Participation Mission: 
In all of the cases, neighborhood organizations stated, either in writing or verbally, that 
they have a mission to involve the public.  Their methods were similar and often took the 
form of regular meetings, newsletters, websites, flyers, and sometimes mailings and often 
word-of-mouth.  Some organizations felt that they had a specific participatory role to play 
in redevelopment projects, whether or not they were brownfields. 
 
Even without a formal mission to involve individuals in the planning process, all 
neighborhood organizations interviewed for this research stated that they would involve 
themselves in a redevelopment project that affected their constituents.  However, as site 
developers, only SEED stated that public participation was essential to the planning 
process and the organization would face great opposition to the Rainier Court project if 
participatory actions had not taken place.  Harborview officials were bound by the 
regulations of the Major Institutions Master Plan and stated that the views of the CAC 
were taken into consideration, yet those on the committee (and those not on the 
committee) do not believe that their recommendations are necessarily heeded by the 
hospital.  SAM did not feel that participation, for input’s sake, was necessary at all in 
terms of a mission or as a responsibility to the community.  The museum felt that 




Perhaps the most important aspect in this category is that all of the organizations in the 
cases had maintained some kind of participatory role in the community prior to the 
brownfield project, crossing over with the ‘previous relationships’ discussion to follow.  
The community organizations in these cases primarily educated and informed their 
constituents and often gathered input on neighborhood concerns, which was relayed to 
city officials.  Regularly scheduled meetings were the most popular method of outreach.  
Some organizations sent out mailings on neighborhood issues, wrote articles for the 
neighborhood newspaper, and posted information on websites or on community bulletin 
boards.  One of the organizations in the Olympic Sculpture Park case produced policy 
papers and conducted analyses on proposed developments in the area.  Overall, 
community organizations employed fairly traditional methods of participation with only 
one organization leader (in the Harborview case) stating that she pushed the members of 
her group to go out and participate in neighborhood issues.  Generally, the methods used 
by organizations in this study educated and informed neighborhood residents but rarely 
resulted in individual involvement in these or other planning issues.  Residents felt that 
they were informed and often seemed satisfied with the participation methods used by 
community organizations (given the low number of residents interviewed for this 
research, however, overall resident satisfaction with these traditional participation 
methods is difficult to gauge). 
 
Previous Relationships: 
All of the cases in this research exhibited a reliance on relationships to a great extent to 
achieve project goals, however, these relationships do not necessarily translate into 
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increased public participation.  Organizations, individuals, and government officials in 
each of the cases built ties with each other over many years, some positive and some 
negative.  For example, SEED built strong ties with city and county government officials, 
partly due to the past involvement of current government leaders and partly due to 
SEED’s willingness to work in a section of Seattle with little development.  SEED 
needed government cooperation for funding, expedited permitting, and other hurdles.  
SEED’s record of accomplishments impressed not only government leaders but also 
neighborhood residents.  Because of past interactions, residents felt that SEED was often 
acting in the best interest of the neighborhood even when the outcomes of certain 
decisions weren’t always to the neighbors’ liking.  Additionally, many residents in the 
cases often felt comfortable contacting government official directly, rather than acting 
through an organization like SEED, since previous projects had often brought residents 
and officials together.   
 
In fact, direct contact with city officials became a common theme throughout the cases.  
As noted in chapter 3, Seattle prides itself on a transparent government structure and one 
that is accessible and accountable to the public.  The changes and enhancements made to 
neighborhood planning in the 1990’s appears to allow individuals and organizations to 
feel comfortable enough to make direct contact with officials and express opinions on 
redevelopment projects.  
 
Not all relationships, however, are positive: some negative relationships had blossomed 
out of previous collaborations.  Neighborhood individuals and organizations warily 
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watched both Harborview and city agencies such as the Parks Department.  In fact, the 
Belltown neighborhood’s relationships with, or at least perceptions of, the Parks 
Department were fragile enough to warrant a general distrust of any project that the 
agency might have undertaken.  All interviewees in Belltown expressed a glaring lack of 
confidence in the Parks Department’s ability to achieve the same results as SAM, even if 
the Parks Department had access to the same funding.  Interviewees agreed that if the 
Parks Department had indeed taken on a similar project, individuals and organizations 
would have pressed heavily to be involved.  In contrast, SAM achieved a level of trust 
with the community through years of contributing to a civic artistic vision for Seattle, yet 
often without any public participation or outside input. 
 
Ownership: 
Two individuals, one closely related to the city/county brownfields program and the other 
a neighborhood organization leader, stated to me early in this research that the public 
may not have any right to participate in many brownfield cleanup and redevelopment 
projects due to these parcels often being private property.  The three cases show that most 
interviewees believe the opposite to be true. 
 
Interviewees overwhelmingly felt that they could, should, and do participate in many 
development projects, regardless of ownership.  However, interviewees also admitted that 
their participation might not make any difference in the outcomes of private property 
development.  Although this issue does indeed get at the heart of private property rights 
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in the United States, from a participatory viewpoint these cases seem to downplay the 
role of property ownership. 
 
Site ownership played somewhat of a factor in participation.  Developers felt that 
ownership of the site did indeed give them the right to do what they wanted without 
having a great sense of accountability to the community (if that was not in their mission).  
SAM admitted that their site was private property and that determination of the vision 
and project logistics was essentially theirs: outside input was not needed or wanted.  If 
the Olympic Sculpture Park was planned for public land, it is quite likely, according to 
interviewees, that the project as it is now would never have happened.  On the other end 
of the spectrum, SEED felt that ownership allowed them to make more decisions with 
input from the public than would have possibly happened if a private developer was 
conducting the project.  Despite public ownership of the site, First Hill organizations felt 
no greater need or right to participate in the Harborview project. 
 
From a neighborhood point of view, individuals and organizations responded strongly to 
the suggestion that private property may not require neighborhood intervention.  Almost 
all respondents claimed that they often comment, protest, or support private 
developments in their neighborhoods.  Interviewees were split on the effectiveness of 
voicing their opinions: some feel more strongly than others that developers actually take 
their input into account and change designs or programs.  One neighborhood organization 
leader told me emphatically that development is mostly a private property matter and not 





Organizations appear able to react and respond to a variety of redevelopment outcomes in 
this research.  SEED, the one organization that actually did develop a brownfield, 
switched from developing a purely commercial site to developing a housing site after 
negotiations for the final streetfront parcels failed.  SEED’s success with commercial 
property development was one of the factors in drawing support for the Rainier Court 
housing development.  SEED continues to promote a variety of program areas rather than 
focusing on one specific theme, such as housing.  All interviewed for this research 
expressed satisfaction with SEED’s other program areas as well as with housing and 
commercial development. 
 
Other organizations felt qualified to respond and participate in brownfields 
redevelopment at Harborview and at the Sculpture Park, whether or not they actually had 
the chance to do so.  Some, such as the BHLUS, aggressively stay informed of all 
developments in their neighborhoods and even go so far as to publish papers or 
newspaper articles on such matters.  The often long-standing leadership and experienced 
boards of these groups provide a wealth of knowledge on a variety of land use issues 
from which to draw conclusions and express neighborhood opinions.  Also, 
neighborhood residents and individuals do not appear to participate at any varying rates 






Stakeholder Equity and Power Influences: 
Most stakeholders in each of these projects expressed great awareness of the imbalance 
of power in the decision making process.  Notably, however, Harborview saw the 
decision making process surrounding the Ninth and Jefferson Building as “completely 
collaborative” yet the evidence in the case study showed that decision makers rarely 
employed two-way, meaningful participation.  And while SAM officials never said 
directly that they are in control of this project, it was often assumed and hinted during 
interviews.  Others interviewed for the Olympic Sculpture Park stated this point more 
directly. 
 
For some stakeholders, the appearance of power, or at least an equal place at the decision 
making table, was illusory despite some favorable conditions, such at site ownership.  
SEED, for all of its connections, experience, and land ownership, still feels that they did 
not have a powerful hand in the decisions that were being made at Rainier Court.  SEED 
stated quite clearly that without independent funding or the power to make regulations, 
the groups was dependent on outside entities for completing projects and therefore, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, had to give up a certain amount of community control.  SEED 
also expressed the importance of maintaining awareness of the political and economic 
context within which it works.  Without staying on the agenda of successive mayoral 




Other community organizations in these cases felt even less powerful, often despite 
having the ear of city hall and other government officials.  Yesler Terrace Community 
Council, for example, boasts a long-standing leadership and a respected place in the city 
housing department and in the neighborhood, including acknowledged respect from 
Harborview officials.  YTCC could not, however, prevent the destruction and most likely 
permanent loss of affordable housing in the neighborhood 
 
Size/Scope of Project: 
Each case, although approximately the same size, had a different scope that affected the 
type of stakeholders involved in the project and the way that individuals and community 
organizations perceived the project.  All interviewees considered their respective cases to 
be a significant size for their neighborhood – SEED added that this was the largest 
project to date for the organization and a great challenge – and the size of the project was 
at least a factor in the awareness of the neighborhood: residents could not ignore Rainier 
Court’s prominent location and activity after years of neglect.   
 
More importantly, the scope of the project influenced participation.  Two factors were 
significantly in play.  First, the regional draw for the project contributed greatly to the 
importance placed on the project by the developer and the public, thereby diluting the 
influence of  local neighborhood participation, had there been any.  Second, the 
importance of the function, often with larger scale impact, often lessened criticism and 
made the political context of the site much more apparent.  For example, the regional 
draw for the Olympic Sculpture Park – indeed, the project has since received national and 
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international press coverage and accolades – made it a high priority for the City of Seattle 
and prompted the possibility of using eminent domain to gain control of the billiard hall 
parcel for SAM.  Interviewees doubted their impact if they were allowed to provide input 
due to the importance and large-scale visibility of this project to the current mayoral 
administration and to SAM.  From a different perspective, First Hill residents and 
organizations often noted in interviews the importance of Harborview’s mission to the 
community and the entire Pacific Northwest.  One low-income housing resident stated 
that she felt she couldn’t complain too much about helicopter noise near her apartment 
when someone in the helicopter was possibly bleeding to death. Yet, the Ninth and 
Jefferson building’s size appears not to be an influential factor for organizational 
participation, possibly due to the neighborhood’s acceptance of large-scale institutions. 
 
Existing Plans: 
Existing plans for a neighborhood played a major role in two of the three cases.  SEED 
received guidance and justification for the location and space program of the Rainier 
Court site from the North Rainier Valley neighborhood plan conducted ten years prior.  
When SEED found that the commercial aspect of the site was not feasible due to a lack of 
street front visibility, the group found that housing, and in particular lower income senior 
housing, was a justifiable and needed resource outlined in the plan.  As important as the 
plan was for guiding and justifying SEED’s development, the neighborhood plan laid the 
foundation for neighborhood redevelopment dialogue and identification of stakeholders.  
Stakeholders were already discussing issues of housing and commercial needs when 




A plan also influenced Harborview’s Ninth and Jefferson project.  The Major Institution 
Master Plan laid out very specific functions, programs, and spatial needs for the hospital 
and guidelines for how the decisions on these factors would be made.  The MIMP created 
the Citizens Advisory Committee, intended to be the neighborhood voice for 
redevelopment decisions.  The existing plan, in this case, not only guided the type and 
location of development, but also overruled existing zoning and created a neighborhood 
committee that was never conceived or approved by the neighborhood.  The CAC 
received approval from the City’s Department of Neighborhoods but with strong 
membership suggestions from Harborview’s top leadership.  The role of the Major 
Institution Master Plan in the Harborview case was undeniable: the Plan called for a 
“citizens” advisory committee, which is essentially the only formal line of input for 
neighborhood participation, yet concentrated the creation of that committee in the hands 
of the city and the hospital. 
 
The Belltown neighborhood plan lacked an overarching vision, catching  neighborhood 
organizations by surprise.  Belltown’s neighborhood plan never received special status, 
like Harborview, or specific guidelines, like SEED, and provided only general 
recommendations for open space in the neighborhood.  As a result, the largest 
undeveloped parcel in the neighborhood, the Unocal site, was never even considered for 







A brownfields designation barely influenced participation in this study.  Almost 
everybody I interviewed considered contamination essentially a non-issue.  All 
interviewees stated their awareness of the contamination at each of the case study sites 
yet all had confidence that the cleanup would proceed and risk would be kept low.  
Harborview area residents and organizations expressed some concern for the trucks that 
would be passing through the neighborhood with excavated contaminated soil but 
primarily noted that the issue was the traffic, not the contaminated soil.  I will discuss this 
major finding in greater detail in the ‘summary of influential factors’ section to follow. 
 
Site-Specific Impacts: 
Immediate impacts, such as design, density, traffic/parking, and issues of gentrification 
and loss (of housing) greatly affected participation.  Neighbors felt that these issues 
impacted them directly.  Some or all of these issues appeared in every case.   For 
example, the only negative comments I received about the Olympic Sculpture Park, a 
nearly issue-less case for residents and organizations, concerned increased traffic and 
potential parking difficulties.  All respondents in the other cases mentioned traffic and 
parking.  Individuals and organizations in the Rainier Valley mentioned the design and 
massing of Rainier Court, often referring to the impact that the density of the site could 
have on the neighborhood.  Developers in each of the cases seemed to consistently 
respond to and ameliorate these issues, finding them much easier to address than other, 
larger issues.  For example, Harborview changed the truck routes after neighbors 
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complained yet the hospital could or would not replace the affordable housing that was 
torn down for the Ninth and Jefferson Building despite vocal complaints from the CAC, a 
group that supposedly had the strongest link to neighborhood input. 
 
New Use: 
The new use of the redevelopment greatly influenced participation.  None of my 
interviewees could deny the benefit or desirability of a park and, therefore, did not feel a 
great need to participate if given a chance to do so.  However, new uses also represented 
larger issues of change and possibly gentrification and loss to a neighborhood.  Residents 
view the Rainier Court development as both a needed amenity and as a precursor of 
changes to come to the neighborhood.  Residents often equated density with 
gentrification and placed at least some of the blame for change on SEED.   Brownfields 
cleanup and redevelopment are two very distinct issues and interviewees overwhelmingly 
responded in these cases to the redevelopment aspect of brownfields. 
 
Funding/Regulatory Requirements: 
Developers, individuals, and organizations also participated in these case studies largely 
due to requirements established in brownfields funding, design review, and Department 
of Ecology cleanup agreements.  As noted above under ‘participation mission and 
methods,’ many stakeholders participated not only out of a mission to involve community 
members in the decision making process but also to fulfill funding or regulatory 
requirements.  The organizations and developers in these cases were motivated by 
regulations and programmatic guidelines as well.  SEED and Harborview indeed 
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followed their Public Involvement Plans for brownfields funding, even though the 
brownfields program only suggested certain actions (using the term ‘may’ instead of 
‘will’ in submission instructions) and SAM conducted involvement actions in order to 
comply with environmental cleanup agreements with the state.  Outside of these 
requirements, I witnessed little in terms of additional participation efforts except for 
SEED.  As mentioned above, however, there are those who had been conducting 
participation efforts prior to engaging in a brownfield project and many of those efforts 
coincided with requirements for funding. 
 
“Local” Status and Trust: 
Interviewees consistently expressed a strong desire to keep outside developers from 
taking advantage of the neighborhood.  Respondents expressed a strong desire for ‘locals’ 
to conduct the cleanup and redevelopment and stated that neighborhood participation 
would have been different if a developer from outside the neighborhood had conducted 
the project.  SEED earned enormous trust over the years among the residents I spoke with 
for this research, many of whom claimed that they would have reacted differently to an 
outside developer (and often do).  SEED’s local status helped the group proceed even 
when certain decisions, such as the density and design of the building, were not 
necessarily in line with the neighbors’ visions for the site.  Neighbors therefore possibly 
participated less in this case due in part to their trusted and local view of SEED.   
 
Familiarity may bring about a certain level of trust.  Consistent with authors in Chapter 2 
(Day, 1997; Greenberg & Lewis 2000; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002), neighborhood 
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residents and organizations often participated depending upon the reputation and trust of 
the developer.  For example, neighbors would have participated much more in the 
Olympic Sculpture Park if the Parks Department were conducting the project, partly 
owing to a lack of trust in the Department’s ability to complete the project properly.  An 
outside developer building the Rainier Court project, or something similar, would most 
likely have received far more input and opposition from residents. 
 
SAM exhibited a distinctive rationale for participation: fundraising.  The Museum 
admitted, and others interviewed for this research confirmed, that outreach was a 
fundraising tool.  SAM, as a respected local institution, needed to raise millions of dollars 
and did so by essentially advertising the project using direct mailings, presentations to 
community organizations, television shows, and other methods.  The public responded 
enthusiastically to this approach and donated millions of dollars, despite not having any 
input on the project. 
 
Summary of Influential Factors: 
These three cases present a number of factors influencing participation.  Residents and 
organizations involved themselves primarily over site-specific matters, such as traffic, 
parking, and design, often because these were the issues that residents felt they could 
influence.  Although residents expressed equal or greater concern over other factors such 
as density and loss of affordable housing, they were also realistic that there was probably 




Developers appear primarily influenced by funding and regulatory requirements for 
involving the public in the cleanup and redevelopment process and, to a lesser extent, by 
maintaining good neighborhood relations.  SAM, on the other hand, proceeded with 
massive outreach efforts mainly as a way to raise millions of dollars for the Sculpture 
Park. 
 
Residents also participated due to a sense of accessibility to city officials and a set of 
relationships built with developers and others through previous projects.  Residents felt 
comfortable contacting city officials to express opinions, placed a certain level of trust in 
local developers, and often relied on a developer’s reputation when determining how 
much they were willing to participate.  Despite the non-profit/civic-oriented nature of the 
developers in these cases, residents have clashed on other projects with these developers 
or with other civic-minded developers.  Finally, residents appear greatly influenced by 
the end use of the project.  Interviewees could not come up with a strong reason for 
objecting to the Olympic Sculpture Park, despite having very little, if any, input on the 
project.  On the other hand, residents and organizations at least partly objected to certain 
aspects of both Rainier Court and the Ninth and Jefferson Building, despite a more 
concerted two-way participation effort and a partial ‘public good’ sense to both projects. 
 
The conditions mentioned above overshadowed other factors, such as ownership, 
mission, and expertise.  Ownership of land itself is not enough to determine whether a 
developer will pursue intense public participation in a project and will not keep the public 
from expressing opinions and becoming involved.  A developer or organizations with a 
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mission to involve the public may make a difference but could not be determined clearly 
in these cases.  The developers that maintain public involvement missions, SEED and 
Harborview, also accepted brownfields funding that includes specific public involvement 
activities.  SAM, which does not have an involvement mission in sites like these, did not 
accept funding with public involvement strings.  
 
Overall, a major finding of this research is that contamination was not an issue in any of 
the cases and that community organizations may be partly responsible for this lack of 
concern.  Contrary to Bartsch’s (2003) claim in Chapter 2, stakeholder participation in 
these brownfield projects does not appear to be any more important than participation in 
non-brownfield projects.  Almost all interviewees were aware of the soil and groundwater 
contamination yet expressed trust that the sites in these cases would be cleaned up or 
capped to protect them from harmful exposure.  Traditional methods of informing 
neighborhood residents about cleanup plans were often met with little or no response.  
Several factors may explain why these brownfield projects were met with so little 
concern.  First, the new uses likely dictated concern about the cleanup and SEED’s 
residential project meant more education on cleanup issues than a clinic building or open 
space.  Second, community organizations, in their education roles, consistently stated that 
they told their constituents that the cleanup was not a concern (one organization leader 
even told me that “environmental issues on any individual project is never cause for 
public discussion”) and neighborhood residents likely trusted these organizations and 
expressed similar viewpoints.  Whether correctly or not, organizations interpreted risk of 
harmful exposure in a way that deemed the contamination non-threatening.   Third, with 
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no visible signs of pollution or harmful effects on residents’ health, some individuals and 
organizations likely thought that the contamination was contained and not affecting them.  
And fourth, interviewees may simply accept that a certain level of pollution exists in their 
neighborhoods.  Several interviewees stated that they assume that there are many 
contaminated sites in their neighborhood. 
 
Related to this finding, individual and community organization participation 
opportunities in the brownfields process focused on the cleanup and not the 
redevelopment yet the redevelopment was the issue that generated the most concern.  
Although traditional, methods for public participation existed mainly on the cleanup side 
of the project.  As noted above, residents had very few issues with the contamination 
itself.  Residents were dealing with a variety of issues in their respective communities 
and some felt that their voices were either not being heard or made little difference in 
neighborhood outcomes.  For example, affordable housing was a major concern for the 
residents of First Hill and the neighborhood plan called for more housing to include 
affordable units.  Harborview, however, did not replace all of the affordable units that 
were torn down for the new Ninth & Jefferson Building.  The CAC was the only real 
venue for expressing concerns and even then only in an advisory capacity.   
 
From a contextual standpoint, the cases are partly a product  of their individual settings 
yet may be applicable to other areas with similar characteristics.  As noted in Chapter 2, 
participation is often linked to resentment, dissatisfaction, and distrust.  Seattle’s 
Neighborhood Planning Program, which drastically changed the way city officials 
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approached public participation, grew out of dissatisfaction with the 1994 
Comprehensive Plan.  If the Neighborhood Planning Program did not create a sea change 
to more meaningful participation, at the very least the city government’s enhanced 
participation efforts changed citizens’ attitudes toward their involvement in the planning 
process.   City initiatives included a new Neighborhood Planning Office, funding for 
neighborhood planning, and increased city staff accountability.   Most interviewees felt 
that they had a right to voice their opinion and provide input on planning projects in their 
neighborhood.  To be sure, traditional methods of public participation are still in place 
and the current mayor and what some see as his pro-development stance are dismantling 
some 1994 changes.  The “Seattle Process” of protracted consensus building never really 
materialized in this study.  The public involvement plans and the design review process 
basically proceeded as usual and did not appear to be any longer or more drawn out than 
those for other projects.  Because of the efforts that city officials implemented in the 
1990’s, citizens may trust that the participation process for development projects works, 
whether or not it is meaningful and whether or not they actually participate.  As shown in 
Chapter 2, low levels of participation in these cases may, in fact, be a sign of success and 
trust in the participation process and in the developers of these particular projects.  
Interviewees stated that distrust in other developers or city agencies, such as the Seattle 
Parks Department, would have resulted in greater public participation.  Seattle’s 
technologically advanced and “wired” status may also facilitate direct accessibility by the 
public, allowing residents direct access to government officials and information and  




In certain circumstances, more participation, and participation that impacted outcomes, 
would have been useful to address larger, neighborhood-wide concerns.  Residents and 
organizations in these cases often felt no great need to provide input on the 
redevelopment itself – some even stated that public input would have produced an 
inferior product – yet many individuals and organization leaders felt that larger issues of 
affordable housing, gentrification, and density were not addressed.  These larger concerns 
may be distinct to brownfields since brownfield sites are often found in communities that 
have witnessed little redevelopment over many years.  Such communities are now faced 
with increasing social and economic change, often as a result of growth management 
priorities, scarcity of developable land, and new tools that facilitate brownfields cleanup 
and redevelopment.  For example, the Belltown neighborhood had been witnessing 
dramatic neighborhood change for years but the Rainier Valley was only recently seeing 
the changes of gentrification and density and many interviewees of the latter 
neighborhood expressed fear about these changes.  Public involvement plans could be 
changed to provide a better outlet for concerns on the redevelopment side of brownfield 
projects and to place them in a more comprehensive neighborhood context.  Additionally, 
residents need a tool for implementation that tries to guarantee that their concerns are 
actually addressed.  For instance, residents of First Hill could have benefited from some 
kind of guarantee that they would have received in-kind affordable housing units after the 






Community Organizations, Their Role, and Research Questions: 
 
From the literature discussed in Chapter 2, I expected community organizations to play a 
mediating role in their respective neighborhoods but encounter challenges to this role by 
political, economic, and other contextual factors.  I expected organizations to try and 
gather residents’ opinions, mobilize individuals, and access government officials and 
developers on behalf of neighborhood residents.  Mostly, however, I expected community 
organizations to foster participation by residents in each brownfield project.  However, I 
also expected mediation to be complicated by the contradictions discussed in Chapter 2.  
Whether or not community organizations could or would be influential, representative, 
objective, and consensual remained to be seen. 
 
Research Question Results: 
My first research question asked “how do community organizations involve individuals in 
brownfield cleanup and redevelopment sites in King County?”   Organizations involve 
individuals in a variety of ways, both formally and informally, but rarely involved 
individuals in the cleanup issues at these sites.  All organizations in this research held 
regularly scheduled meetingsopen to the public, to present and discuss neighborhood 
issues, including projects such as the ones in this study.  Organizations printed and 
distributed newsletters, maintained websites, and sometimes canvassed the neighborhood 
by going door to door.  One organization occasionally wrote a column for a 
neighborhood newspaper.  Informally, organization leaders stated that they often inform 
individuals and receive feedback by random encounters in the neighborhood and often 
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rely on word of mouth for these same duties.  As discussed above, however, 
organizations often did not feel that the contamination at these sites were a cause for 
concern and passed this sentiment on to neighborhood residents.  SEED, with the 
assistance of ECOSS, felt that it provided some education to neighborhood residents on 
the issues of contamination and used ECOSS’s services to provide interpretation of 
technical issues, yet residents provided no comment on the cleanup plan. 
 
Although my cases exhibited a wide range of participation methods and fulfilled federal 
and state requirements, many would not qualify as meaningful and would rank low on 
Arnstein’s ladder of participation.  Developers in each of the cases conducted a variety of 
‘outreach’ efforts, most often including presentations to various groups (some, like 
SAM’s presentations before hundreds and thousands, being quite large), websites, 
newsletters and mailings.  Yet, ‘outreach’ is quite different from ‘input’ and only in 
certain ways did some developers heed the advice given by residents and organizations.  
SEED, as a developer that received Seattle/King County brownfields funding, involved 
individuals primarily based upon the Public Involvement Plan submitted as a requirement 
for funding.  SEED does maintain fairly strong outreach efforts that began before Rainier 
Court and continue to this day on a variety of projects. 
SEED and Harborview both gathered neighborhood input and attempted to make 
changes, to varying degrees, to the projects based upon this input yet neither developer 
addressed all of the important neighborhood issues. For example, SEED never reduced 
the density of the building and Harborview never replaced affordable housing with an in-
kind amount.  SEED claims that the requirements of funding forced the Rainier Court to 
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be the size it is, while Harborview stated that it tried but ultimately could not find equal 
affordable housing space in the First Hill neighborhood.  Residents still appear somewhat 
satisfied with the outcomes. 
 
SAM, as site developer, made no pretense that it was looking for input on the Olympic 
Sculpture Park yet residents appear to be very pleased with the outcome.  SAM’s 
methods would likely rank very low on both Arnstein’s ladder and EPA’s participation 
definition.  Yet the residents and organizations in this case were by far the most satisfied 
of the three cases.  Although the new use is desirable, satisfaction and lack of 
participation may not be completely a factor of the project being open space: 
interviewees consistently stated that if the Parks Department was conducting this same 
project, more participation and input would likely have resulted but the outcome would 
likely have been far less satisfying than the Olympic Sculpture Park. .  This case, 
however, highlights the decisions and ‘non-decisions’ made by those in power and the 
benefits lost as a result of low/meaningless participation processes.  Residents in this 
case, particularly, can hardly be said to have been empowered or even moved toward a 
greater sense of citizenship and community: the interviewee who stated that she did not 
even know that her community council existed exemplifies this missing piece of 
participation.  Overall, developers in each of the cases met their respective requirements 
for public involvement but, as noted in Chapter 3, loose “requirements” for public 
involvement by EPA translated into loose “requirements” in Washington State and often 





The second research question, “how does community organization involvement affect the 
outcomes of these brownfield projects?” reflects whether an organization had any power 
in decision making for a project.  In the case of SEED, the primary community 
organization was the instigator and developer of a site in a long-neglected part of town 
and had the authority to make many of the project decisions, supported by local residents, 
other organizations, and city officials..  The project itself most likely would not have 
happened without the involvement of SEED.  Other organizations in the neighborhood, as 
non-developers, supported SEED’s efforts and allowed SEED to develop this project 
essentially without any other organizations’ assistance. 
 
As non-developers in the other two cases, community organizations affected outcomes in 
different ways.  First, the organizations in all cases placed a lot of importance on site-
specific issues, such as traffic and parking, and they were greatly influential to these 
ends.   For example, due to the CAC, Yesler Terrace Community Council and other First 
Hill organizations, the Ninth and Jefferson truck routes were moved away from the 
middle of the neighborhood and a school and nursing home.  The groups also heavily 
lobbied and ultimately supported, in person, a skybridge rather than vacating streets for 
the Harborview project. 
 
Indeed, community organizations influenced the outcomes of projects due to their support 
rather than their opposition.  SAM repeatedly asked local Belltown organizations to 
support efforts to acquire land, receive funding, endorse right-of-way changes, remove 
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unrelated uses, and oppose tunnel and street reconstruction.  Community organizations, 
both business and residential, wrote letters and testified in person alongside SAM.  
According to SAM officials and organization leaders, local organization support was 
extremely important to achieving these goals and possibly achieving the Sculpture Park 
as seen in current form. 
 
However, without decision making power or even the ability to expand the dialogue of 
project issues, community organizations failed to influence the larger issues related to the 
outcomes of these cases, notably the loss of affordable housing, increasing density of the 
neighborhood and an advancing fear of gentrification.  Changing truck routes or asking 
for construction to start later in the morning appeased neighbors, which are easier issues 
for a developer to address.   Generally, community organizations could only achieve 
smaller victories in issues with which they opposed the developer (even if the developer 
was another community organization) and achieved larger victories by supporting the 
developer in issues with which all parties agreed. 
 
 
My third question asked “what role do community organizations play in the brownfields 
cleanup  and redevelopment process in King County, WA?”  This question focuses on the 
“mediating” role discussed in Chapter 2.  Community organizations play a type of 
mediating role in brownfields redevelopment in Seattle (but not cleanup, as discussed 
above) but the role is as much for the benefit of city officials and developers as it is for 
individual neighborhood residents. Neighborhood-based groups in these cases indeed 
189 
 
helped government officials gauge local concerns and attempted to plan in a more even-
handed fashion (Ross & Green Leigh, 2000).  However, residents often dismissed the 
need for a community organization and one interviewee did not know that her local 
community council even existed.  Mediating structures may help community members in 
other cities relate to and gain protection from the large, impersonal institutions of public 
life, as noted by Berger and Neuhaus (1977) and Williams (1985), but community 
members in this study did not feel they needed protection from institutions that may not 
be that impersonal.  Contrary to these authors, community organizations in these cases 
did not provide increased access to the planning process or facilitate activism.  Also, 
organizations in this study exhibit mixed tendencies at framing issues in their 
neighborhoods: BHLUS produced papers and analyses based upon neighborhood 
concerns but SEED and FHIA sometimes disagreed with neighbors over issues and 
priorities.  Community organizations informed and educated more than mediated: 
organizations regularly informed their constituents and gathered input and opinions but 
residents also felt able to directly contact officials and developers. 
 
I would like to say that there is mediation going on but it’s much more education. 
Bringing people to the information and getting them to figure it out in their minds.  
That’s my main role.  (Belltown community organization leader) 
 
From a city official perspective, community organizations provided an extremely 
valuable avenue for accessing individual neighborhood residents to gauge community 
sentiment, gain local knowledge, and recruit for local boards, such as the Harborview 
CAC.  City officials admitted that they relied heavily on community organizations for 
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these functions and could probably not achieve the same results without local 
organizational assistance. 
 
Community organizations also played a consensus role rather than a conflicting role in 
this study.  As noted in Chapter 2, some scholars feel that community organizations are 
more effective, especially over a longer period of time, when taking smaller steps, 
conceding on some issues, and working closely with government and business, while 
others believe that consensus by organizations is simply a matter of assimilation into the 
capitalist system.  In particular, CDCs, possibly due to assimilation in the capitalist 
system of development while grasping for declining federal funding, increasingly shun 
the conflict-oriented approach in favor of an approach that is more consensual (Stoecker, 
1997).  These debates highlight the capitalist-democracy contradiction discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
   
SEED dealt with this contradiction: it shunned some funding from the city housing office 
in order to maintain control over certain project components yet could not fulfill all of the 
community’s wishes, such as a lower density project, due to the requirements of other 
outside funding and general business goals.  One could clearly see the conflict between 
‘SEED the community organization’ and ‘SEED the business.’  As discussed in Chapter 
2, Vidal (1992) notes that CDCs try to be a neighborhood voice yet Stoecker (1997) 
claims that CDCs are not adequate representatives of the neighborhood due to capital-
community contradictions, and cites Bratt’s (1989) claim that CDCs do not necessarily 
aim for, nor achieve, widespread participation.  I offer that the CDC in this case may be 
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somewhat representative of the neighborhood but may not always be able to act in the 
best interests of the neighborhood, despite the organization’s beliefs.  From a 
participation standpoint, SEED conducted more two-way participation efforts than other 
organizations in this study, and certainly more than SAM and possibly more than 
Harborview, the other developers.  But just because SEED conducted participation efforts 
does not mean that those efforts will always make a difference to the project outcomes. 
 
The First Hill Improvement Association may stand as a better example of Stoecker’s 
misrepresentation and the “rubberstamping” of plans that may not ensure that the 
interests of the group are truly represented (Crowfoot and Wondolleck, 1990).  My 
interaction with a leader of the FHIA could call into question whether the individual in 
the Harborview case is able to leave private/personal interests behind when participating 
in a community organization, whether this individual can take on a publicly centered 
decision-making perspective, and whether factors such as organization leadership 
personalities may influence a group’s commitment to representation and basic democratic 
principles (Day, 1997; Swindell, 2000; Davies, Blackstock, Rauschmeyer, 2005).  I 
received a blanket statement from this leader offering that no public comment was 
required nor needed in this case, primarily due to the private property status of the site.  
The leader showed a blatant disregard for the facts (public comment was indeed required 
and the property, owned by a King County entity (at least initially), is arguably public).  
This leader’s viewpoint may be understandable given her position with a large private 




Finally, my fourth research question “under what conditions do community organizations 
play a role in brownfields cleanup and redevelopment?” relates closely to the factors 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Community organizations play a role in brownfields cleanup and 
redevelopment primarily when there are strong ties to stakeholders and an understanding 
of neighborhood concerns. 
 
Community organizations benefit from site ownership simply because it allows the group 
to conduct as much public participation as it sees fit.  This fact, however, underlies 
organizations’ need to seek outside funding and adhere to regulations that are out of the 
group’s control and may limit the influence of the input the group has sought from 
neighbors.  SEED, for example, received substantial input from residents and other 
organizations about the Rainier Court site but could only implement what was financially 
and politically feasible.  That said, an organization’s participation mission plays a factor 
whether or not the group owns the site.  Organizations in each of the cases felt it was 
their duty to inform and involve individual residents regardless of ownership or type of 
project.  For example, organizations stated in all cases that they have and will continue to 
provide input on, and possibly protest, new condominium developments, office space, 
and retail establishments from private developers. 
 
Community organizations play a strong role when the new use is one that the 
organization and residents support.  The community organizations in these cases provided 
valuable support to developers when the community valued the project or project 
component.  The Sculpture Park and the skybridge in the SAM and Harborview cases, 
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respectively, show the importance of a community organizations literally standing beside 
a developer when asking for city approval or funding.  Organizations also benefited from 
existing plans in one of the cases yet were somewhat left out of the decision making 
process by another plan.  SEED benefited greatly from both the specific directions for 
housing and commercial space on a specific piece of Rainier Avenue as well as from the 
dialogues that the neighborhood planning process fostered years earlier.  Generally, 
neighborhood residents understood that SEED’s project fit in with community goals and 
were able to express any concerns through the relations that had been established by the 
process.  To the contrary, the Major Institutions Master Plan, originally intended to 
protect neighborhoods from wanton institutional development as well as protect 
institutions from neighborhood interference during development, essentially kept 
community organizations out of the planning process if they were not on the CAC, a 
group whose membership is controlled by city and Harborview officials.  Neighborhood 
residents had less access and possibly less influence with a master plan for the area.  
Belltown organizations were caught off guard by SAM’s project since the general nature 
of the neighborhood’s plan for open space never considered the Unocal site for open 
space, something that the neighborhood, ironically, desperately wanted.  Community 
organizations could have possibly taken the lead on this project, such as SEED did in the 
Rainier Valley, if the direction had been laid out in the neighborhood plan. 
 
Finally, and possibly the most important factor, community organizations played a strong 
role when previous relationships had been built.  This factor takes on several meanings in 
this study.  First, relationships between the organizations and their constituents allowed a 
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certain level of trust to enhance support of an organization’s actions, even when those 
actions do not necessarily coincide with neighborhood goals.  Second, organizations 
benefited from relationships with officials in city government.  SEED, for example, 
maintained high-level status on the agenda of several mayors partly due to former SEED 
members now in high-level government positions.  City officials respected and sought 
out the opinions of many organizations in the city due in part to their long-standing 
working relationships and local knowledge: the Belltown Community Council maintains 
close ties with city hall and its letter of support for SAM’s acquisition of the billiards hall 
and waterfront parcels most likely mattered more to city decision makers than that of an 
unknown organization.  Third, many community organizations have become trusted 
sources that the city mines for knowledge, neighborhood sentiment, and personnel for 
boards such as the CAC.  Even though the community organizations in First Hill may not 
have easy access to higher-level decision making at Harborview, they are sought after for 
CAC membership and are the only real primary access points for neighborhood 
influence. 
 
As seen at various points in this analysis, the role of trust is closely related to 
relationships and reputation in this study.  Although there is extensive literature on this 
subject and not necessarily the primary subject of this study, community organizations 
(as well as government, developers, and others) gave and received certain amounts of 
trust that possibly influenced participation levels.  SEED most likely benefited from a 
neighborhood trust that the organization works, most of the time, in the neighborhood’s 
best interest: if not, neighbors trust that SEED essentially had to act to fulfill financial or 
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political obligations in order to complete a project or maintain healthy relationships with 
city officials.  In some cases, neighborhood residents and organizations may participate 
less because they either see no inherent downside to a project or do not fear that a project 
developer will cause harm to the neighborhood.  Neighborhood residents and 
organizations trusted SAM to create a successful outcome yet did not trust the City Parks 
Department to do the exact same job, partly because public participation and multiple 
agendas would have led to a ‘least common denominator’ outcome.  In addition, 
community organizations, and others, earned neighborhood trust simply by being labeled 
as a ‘local:’ SEED and SAM exemplify this phenomenon.  Some organizations and 
developers, however, cannot always expect this trust just by proximity alone.  
Neighborhood residents appear to trust Harborview and the CAC (which consists of 
many local residents) less than others in this study, mainly due to poor, but improving, 
relationships.  From a cleanup perspective, case study interviewees trusted that DOE and 





Participation:  The three case studies exhibited a wide range of what can be called 
“public participation” but most often the exchanges and interactions between developer 
and resident were one-way or outreach.  Community organizations accepted more input 
on projects to varying degrees of success.  SEED appears to have conducted the most in 
terms of two-way exchanges of information by attending meetings and giving 
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presentations, asking residents what their issues were with Rainier Court and attempting 
to address those concerns.  SAM officials were not looking for input or for residents to 
influence the outcomes of the Olympic Sculpture Park.  Participation by individuals and 
organizations most likely would never be considered true participation from a meaningful 
participation perspective yet many in this study were satisfied with the level of outreach, 
and sometimes input, that occurred.  Many interviewees in this research consider the 
public participation in this study to be adequate and, at times, exceptional.  Others from 
outside these cases, and from the literature in Chapter 2, would most likely designate 
these projects as ‘poor’ participation.  These cases tend to agree with those authors in 
Chapter 2 pointing to at least one result of responsible, trustworthy, and accountable 
government: that is, lower levels of participation.  The cases also agreed with authors 
promoting mutual understanding as part of meaningful participation.  For example, city 
officials tapped community organizations to gauge the community sentiment on issues.  
Residents also tried to understand why an action was happening even though it might not 
be in their best interest. These cases, however, also support the scholarly literature that 
points to the problems with power structures that limit dialogue and opportunities for 
participation before projects even begin.  The cases in this study have shown that project 
frameworks were already established prior to project initiation by various levels of 
governance and decision makers: EPA, Washington State, Seattle’s Brownfields Office, 
and even civic-minded developers all placed limits around the issues and the participants 
in each case.  In particular, this research contributes to the brownfields literature by 
highlighting the inherent and structural problems embedded in the program from the 
highest to the most local of levels.  Stating that participation should happen does not 
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overcome the difficulties and frustration that will appear after efforts produce no 
discernible results for participants.  The overarching control of state and private decision 
makers – particularly in light of increasing neoliberal governing tendencies – will likely 
never allow local residents to retain any significant decision making control in its current 
state.  In many cases, community organizations, and CDCs in particular, found 
themselves bound by requirements outside of their control yet these requirements were 
essential for the organizations’ existence.  Recommendations that call for greater 
participation and decision making control may not be realistic, feasible, or desirable.  
This dilemma that Stoecker discussed in Chapter 2 is indeed a real issue for these groups 
as shown and supported by this research.  True community-controlled decision making 
may not be in the best interest of the community and a collaborative or other approach 
may be better suited for many stakeholders.  Brownfield programs may find use in 
customizing participation requirements to fit the needs and desires of the community 
rather than applying a blanket approach to all projects.   
  
My research also questions the true opportunities that community organizations provide 
for participation by highlighting the importance of context, nuance, and institutional 
constraints.  This research clarifies and defies the notion in some of the literature which 
makes the assumption that organizations are always involved, facilitating, and effective.  
The cases support the ‘mediator’ role in theory but the role is more nuanced that what 
many scholars state.  Organizations were just as effective and useful for city officials and 
developers looking for community sentiment and support.  This research also adds 
evidence to some scholars’ concern about whether community organizations can leave 
198 
 
personal and private interest behind and take on a publicly-oriented decision making 
perspective. 
 
Perhaps Taylor’s assessment that environmental problems are socially constructed 
extends to defining ‘good’ participation: residents in these cases considered public 
participation to be, generally, sufficient.  Yet residents and officials alike should realize 
locally-constructed definitions are at least partially the result of social control by those in 
power.   I feel that this conclusion requires additional research since the focus of the 
research is to identify the roles of community organizations and not necessarily to 
uncover how participants and non-participants feel about or rate the participation process 
in these cases. 
 
 
Priorities, relationships and reality:  Community organizations faced a daunting list of 
issues in this research and ones that must be prioritized based not only upon 
neighborhood importance but also on resource availability, funding requirements, 
relationship maintenance, and situation realities.  Organizations faced tough obstacles and 
would be hard pressed, even in the best of circumstances, to address issues like 
gentrification and affordable housing loss within the context of site-specific brownfields 
redevelopment.  Organizations and developers met on issues that were easily addressed, 
such as truck routes, but often could not, or would not, tackle larger issues affecting the 
neighborhood.  Sometimes the stakeholders in these cases needed to maintain 
relationships and risked being left out of this and other processes if thought to be too 
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“radical:” for example, one of the First Hill community organizations felt deliberately left 
out of the Ninth and Jefferson project and the CAC because Harborview and the city did 
not want the activist group disturbing the process.  In some cases, the community 
organizations had to make decisions based upon funding requirements and other 
resources (as seen with SEED).  Organizations may be able to play a strong role in 
forming realistic community priorities and relating these issues to developers and 
government officials. 
 
The cases in this research confirm the clear concern in the literature about power 
imbalances and their relationship to the growing impact of neoliberal tendencies in public 
programs and public participation.  As state and local governments continue to accept the 
devolution of federal programs, and decreasing federal funding, they are forced to rely on 
financial efficiency, ‘business-friendly’ attitudes and streamlining of programs and 
personnel despite calls for public participation.  Amidst the rhetoric of increasing citizen 
voice and democratic power that emanates from various levels of government launching 
participatory initiatives, the actual power of neighborhood residents to influence the 
planning and revitalization processes that are transforming their communities are 
frequently pre-determined within a variety of constraints posed by neoliberal urban 
policy (Elwood, 2004).  In Seattle, public and private were often at odds, even within the 
brownfields program office itself: an initial interview with an official in that office stated 
that perhaps the public does not have a role in the redevelopment process of private 
property.  Outside of this office, there was plenty of evidence to support these concerns.  
The Washington State brownfields program sits in the Office of Community, Trade, and 
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Economic Development and, through interviews for this research, officials in that office 
see the brownfields program as a tool for economic development, adopting an 
entrepreneurial stance often espoused by neoliberal policy.  Government officials 
predetermined the process for public participation and, especially in the Harborview case, 
predetermined the primary stakeholders, setting the stage for ‘non-decisions’ to be made 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1963) Developers and government officials often co-opted the 
language of inclusion and participation but remained firmly in control of the workings of 
the cleanup and redevelopment process.  On a larger scale, community needs and issues 
were often not addressed because of a lack of opportunity for meaningful involvement, 
the inherent short-sighted nature of having to produce financially viable outcomes, and 
the projection of current dominant interests.  Perhaps most disturbing in these cases is the 
public’s lack of seeing their non-involvement as a problem and government officials 
concurrence with this attitude.  Despite having few objections to these projects, citizens 
rarely felt empowered as citizens or truly in control over the decisions that were affecting 
their lives and their neighborhoods.  Government officials often did not see the need to 
empower their constituents and thus legitimize their own professional existence.  Citizen 
acceptance of the current participation process all but assures that the status quo will 
remain in place and that brownfield cleanup and redevelopment decisions will be made 
by a few dominant stakeholders. 
 
This point brings up the role of politics in the planning processes in these cases.  The 
mayor’s agenda, city officials, and others in power often exhibited the rationalization of 
decisions discussed by Flyvbjerg and others in Chapter 2 and often defined what counted 
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as reality.  Participation processes were often traditional in nature and used to legitimize 
the goals of those in power.  For example, Harborview and Department of 
Neighborhoods officials tightly controlled the primary public participation venue – the 
CAC – and those who sat on it.  And SAM, while calling what it did ‘public 
participation,’ was never looking for input on the Sculpture Park, which had already been 
designed.  Even the definitions of public participation used by Washington State and the 
EPA, and the standard for the Public Involvement Plans for these cases, were a reality 
created and maintained by those in power. 
 
 
Cleanup and redevelopment:   
This study was never about brownfields, per se.  Community organizations and individual 
residents in each of the cases felt that the environmental contamination that makes a site 
eligible for a brownfields designation was not a great concern and therefore did not feel a 
need to participate early in the projects.  This is not to say that neighborhood residents 
were unaware of the contamination: interviewees expressed knowledge of some kind, if 
not the specific source, of contamination at their respective case study sites and at other 
locations in their neighborhoods.  Some, such as First Hill residents, noted that they often 
expect the ground in their neighborhood to have some kind of contamination.  
Community organizations may have influenced these opinions, however, by not 




Like the shift in EPA and state brownfield programs, community organizations focused 
almost exclusively on the redevelopment in each of the cases yet the requirements for 
participation in the redevelopment side of the brownfields process are weak and fairly 
unenforceable.  Organizations, if they had focused as heavily on the cleanup of the site, 
probably could have gotten more residents involved earlier in the process but the extent 
to which that would have made a difference in the outcome  of the projects remains 
unclear.  With weak participation requirements for brownfields redevelopment, 
community organizations may not impact a site despite their best intentions and abilities. 
 
Mediators:   
Community organizations played a strong mediating role in many situations across the 
cases in this study but often from a top-down perspective.  The organizations relayed 
information to their constituents and played an education role in many cases, often 
alerting residents to site plans, meetings, and sometimes the cleanup and redevelopment 
process.  Organizations also gathered neighborhood input and relayed that information to 
developers and city officials.  Officials, mainly used organizations for their input 
gathering abilities, knowledge of local issues and individuals (who could participate on 
boards and committees), and ability to advertise information.  City officials felt that 
organizations were a strong connection to neighborhood residents and used the mediating 
(and ‘local’ affiliation) of organizations to access individual residents.  Organizations, for 
their part, rarely felt used by the city and indeed often felt that city officials greatly 
respected the neighborhood groups.  Local community organizations may be the link 





Policy Implications, Recommendations for Practice, and Future Research Areas: 
This research has shown that, for several reasons, community organizations often do not 
provide the opportunity structures that allow local residents the chance to participate in 
brownfields decision making.  In particular, two findings related to this were quite 
striking: the lack of concern about brownfields contamination and the lack of input 
pathways for public participation.  To address these findings, I would like to provide 
some policy and practice recommendations for current environmental program officials 
as well as others in federal, state, and local government. 
 
First, the glaring gap between the cleanup and redevelopment sides of brownfields, while 
not a new phenomenon, is still occurring.  Policy makers have yet to find an appropriate 
mix of economic development ambition and environmental cleanup enforcement despite 
more than a decade of experimentation.  In the present cases, the only real venue for 
public input – the environmental cleanup side – is virtually ignored while the 
redevelopment side remains mostly untouchable by local residents due to the structure 
and control of decision making.   
 
Policy makers would be well-advised to initiate closer ties between these two sides of the 
brownfields program.  The EPA, Department of Ecology and the Office of Community, 
Trade, and Economic Development should be integrated on this program much more than 
their current operations.  Each sees the other as a separate entity with distinct goals yet it 
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would be the integration of these goals that could address the common and long-term 
visions that these sites need.  Rather than treating, for example, cleanup plans and density 
as separate items, the new integration could provide a newer and larger framework for 
examining change in neighborhoods. For example, the Department of Ecology could 
better emphasize the importance of cleanup standards through the lens of a high-density 
residential building or a public open space.  EPA, which had basically no involvement in 
these cases, could use its authority to shine a light on the redevelopment outcomes of 
these projects in addition to promoting cleanup standards in a more public and two-way 
forum. 
 
Second, the participation requirements and evaluation components of both programs and 
policies reflect this same cleanup/redevelopment gap.  Brownfields are almost always 
measured in quantitative terms: numbers of acres cleaned up, numbers of jobs created, 
amount of tax revenue generated, etc.  Yet the cases showed missing qualitative pieces 
such as the quality of the participation efforts and the concerns about future effects on the 
neighborhood from these developments.  As shown, current traditional methods and 
entrenched power interests hinder participation and make benefits, such as local needs, 
empowerment and democratic ideals, difficult to measure.  Policy makers need to modify 
the requirements for participation, redefine the methods for evaluating the success of the 
program, and question the governance structures that hinder impactful public 




On more immediate, practice levels, brownfields officials could use current tools for 
promoting better integration of community organizations and individuals into the 
decision making process.  TAGs (Technical Assistance Grants), for instance, could be 
applied to all brownfield grant recipients, and particularly for community organizations, 
for increased technical interpretation and outreach.  An educational component could also 
be built into the program for educating officials, community organizations leaders and 
residents about more meaningful participation techniques.  The application process itself 
could reward recipients who identify and implement more meaningful participation 
methods and prove so through follow-up evaluations.  The application process could also 
be the primary venue where all issues related to the cleanup and redevelopment, 
including issues of gentrification and change, are vetted and, hopefully, resolved.  Also, 
such structures as the Major Institutions Master Plan could be altered to allow a more 
democratic voice for membership inclusion and confirmation. 
 
This research examined only three cases which exhibited little conflict and semi-public 
purposes.  Additional research could complement the work conducted here and perhaps 
provide different and starker interpretations of the importance of participation through 
community organizations in brownfields.  There are other areas of brownfields cleanup 
and redevelopment that may need further study. For example, my research has an obvious 
need for cases with private, non-local developers creating for-profit structures.  These 
types of cases would test the responses of interviewees who claimed that local respected 
developers were a factor in participation.  Many, like the Belltown residents stated that 
they protest certain developments in their neighborhoods by other developers.  Some, like 
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the residents of the Rainier Valley, claim that they have stopped development by outside 
developers.  These kinds of cases would shed light on the techniques used for impacting 
decisions (if decisions are indeed affected) and whether or not the same structures that 
kept out input in this study keep out protests in other situations. 
 
This research would also benefit from additional cases involving major conflict, 
regardless of the developer.  For example, another hospital in the First Hill neighborhood 
recently attempted to demolish and redevelop an older medical building within the 
purview of its respective Major Institution Master Plan.  Adjacent residents protested 
vigorously and the hospital eventually dropped the redevelopment.  Cases like this could 
expand upon the ideas of power and influence in decision making covered in this study 
and identify techniques for more direct public participation.  Also, additional cases in 
other cities, with less transparency and deeper social and economic divisions, could 
identify whether community organizations are more important for local residents to 
access the planning process. 
 
Examples of more meaningful, two-way participation techniques (with and without 
improved governance structures allowing more decision making input) would assist in 
testing ideas discussed in this study; notably the impact of participation on outcomes, the 
quality of outcomes, whether participation equated to increased power, and whether 




Additional research into the concept of environmental risk would help in identifying why 
residents and organizations in this study did not perceive their brownfields to be a 
concern.  Projects of this kind can and do generate enormous concern, protest, and 
policing.  They also can create a galvanizing effect upon a neighborhood, promoting 
participation, citizenship and empowerment within local residents and organizations. 
 
While this study is qualitative in nature, focused on the role of community organizations, 
and limited by time and resources, I would also conduct additional interviews and 
propose a survey to gather further information on participation rates, participation 
methods, project issues, and overall satisfaction to confirm the results from this current 
research.  Many individuals may be left out of the planning process for the very reasons 
that scholars note in Chapter 2, such as top-down planning, technocracy, and institutional 
racism. 
 
Community organizations, developers, and city officials may be unaware of the potential 
for greater public participation and the techniques for achieving greater satisfaction.  
Future research could focus on participation knowledge and recommend education to 
achieve greater awareness of participation’s potential. 
 
Evaluation techniques may be useful:  In conducting this research, I realized that there 
were essentially no evaluation processes in place to identify, or even define, successful 
projects and issues or problems that stakeholders faced in these cases.  The Seattle/King 
County Brownfields Office lists success stories but this is simply a listing of completed 
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projects and does not consider outstanding project issues and community concerns.  
Future research could look at other evaluation programs and even put a trial program in 
place in Seattle that could link community organizations with brownfield officials to 
easily create a method for evaluating programs. 
 
 
This research shows the role and potential for community organizations in brownfields.  
This research also identifies a lack of participation but may have more to do with issues 
of stakeholder power and trust than with environmental contamination.  Community 
organizations can and do play a mediating role but in ways which may not be accentuated 
in the literature in Chapter 2.  Additionally, organizations, and CDCs in particular, face a 
glaring contradiction of being a business, an advocate, and an activist.  Despite many 
calls for increased public participation in the literature and in practice, achieving greater 
public participation may not be necessary (or at least necessary in all phases of a project) 
and possibly even detrimental.  What planners and scholars should avoid is catch-all 
participatory democracy clichés and truly focus on the needs of the communities as 
defined by the communities themselves.  Government officials and developers in this 
study attempted to implement ‘public participation’ but often ended up with an 
outreach/advertising effort that lacked any real path for input.  Community organizations 
maintained a closer connection to community sentiment and needs but lacked the 
resources and power to put those feelings into actions.  Officials, developers, 
organizations, and individuals must work together to identify appropriate and effective 
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